Readings Beyond the Borders of Europe: Diaspora and Migration
Session 1
Intensifying Fissures: Geopolitics, Nationalism, Militarism, and the US Response to the Novel
Coronavirus. Ileana I. Diaz & Alison Mountz.
Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States might have been described as a country
collapsing in on itself, defined by deep chasms in wealth and political ideologies. While divisions and
inequalities pre-existed the Trump presidency, the rise of support for nationalism has only grown.
This nationalism has been bolstered by an unexamined notion of American exceptionalism and
militant individualism. As this contemporary iteration of American nationalism interacts with the
COVID-19 pandemic, those in power with the privilege of narrating the geopolitical positioning of the
United States government have continued to emphasize border fortification, competition, and an
“us-vs-them” ideology. These narratives function at multiple scales, from the nation-state to
individuals in their communities, and have dictated everything from policy and trade-related
decisions to whether and when to leave one’s home, and whether to wear a mask at that time. These
decisions and narratives represent widening fissures in the United States and within the geopolitical
order, ever more influenced by notions of threat and scarcity. These fissures have erupted into
conflict with widespread political protest (including Black Lives Matter).
COVID-19 exposed great inequalities – particularly racialized inequalities – which have been brought
into stark relief in a politically, socially, and economically polarized United States, one of the
wealthiest countries in the world and statistically the country that has been hardest hit by the virus.
Among those most affected are communities of colour, reflecting the intersecting vulnerabilities of
racism, economic precarity, and in some cases legal status. Amid mass uncertainty and a global
pandemic claiming the lives of citizens, the United States exercised its default response: to defend
itself at all costs, but only in particular ways – focussing on defending the nation from external
threats – rather than focusing on the internal strategy and victims – emerged in several tactics
involving bordering practices, weaponization, and militarization. Defence at all costs and
simultaneously racializing the virus as the ‘’Chinese virus’’ under the Trump administration. In the
United States, individuals, national collectives, and institutions acted defensively against the virus
and with suspicion of others which demonstrated that everyday life was militarized – unlike in other
countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Trump aimed to put troops on all parts of the borders – as
if being at war or battle (rhetoric of war and battle also used in speeches by Trump) – instead of
purely focusing on social distancing measures. As weeks turned into months, this rhetoric became
reality, with Trump masterfully manipulating fear and polarization in US society, further dividing
people by praising those who exercised “bravery” in returning to work and otherwise carrying on
with life. Furthermore, the pandemic showed US patriotism, a resistance to being told what to do (to
stay home), and a dying commitment to individual freedom. As the US government practised
economic warfare, ordinary citizens responded to the coronavirus by arming themselves – in most
states, gun stores were seen as essential. From its government to individuals living within its
borders, some Americans responded to a health crisis as though it was a threat that could be
beaten with weaponized responses. Instead of stressing the ways in which we were all dependent
upon each other to slow the spread of the virus, the response was to defend – with arms – against
the perceived threat that others pose. This militarized rhetoric is not possible without a hefty
reliance on individualism. The exaltation of the liberal self requires the power to “stand alone” as a
nation and having individuals ready at all times to defend themselves against outside threats.
In this pandemic, the nation is built not so much on notions of fighting an enemy collectively, but on
individually defending against the threat of the virus and any potential threat posed by one’s
neighbours largely in the form of competition for resources. In this instance, the nation is
constituted by a fierce individualism at the cost of collective response. In this climate, any action
,that benefits the individual is the exalted action, one that indirectly benefits a nation which in turn
acts only in self-interest. The militaristic actions of individuals and the state, thus, become part of
bordering practices which demarcate who is deserving of lifesaving supplies (“our people”), what
must be defended at all costs (individual property, Americans contracting COVID19 from people
outside of its borders and less so from each other) and where responsibility for this defence lies (the
individual). In the United States, during the pandemic, borders shifted inwards, making people
within its borders its own enemies.
The Pandemic and Political Order; It Takes a State. Francis Fukuyama.
Democracies and autocracies have responded differently – some successful and others not – to the
pandemic. Countries that have a competent state apparatus, a government that citizens trust and
listen to, and good leaders have performed impressively, limiting the damage. Countries with
dysfunctional states, polarized societies, or poor leadership have done badly, leaving their citizens
and economies exposed and vulnerable. Economically, a protracted crisis will mean more business
failures and devastation for industries such as shopping malls, retail chains, and travel. The political
consequences could be even more significant. Populations can be summoned to heroic acts of
collective self-sacrifice for a while, but not forever. A lingering epidemic combined with deep job
losses, a prolonged recession, and an unprecedented debt burden will inevitably create tensions that
turn into a political backlash. The global distribution of power will continue to shift eastward, since
East Asia has done better at managing the situation than Europe or the United States. The United
States, in contrast, has bungled its response badly and seen its prestige slip enormously. The country
has vast potential state capacity and had built an impressive track record over previous
epidemiological crises, but its current highly polarized society and incompetent leader blocked the
state from functioning effectively. The president stoked division rather than promoting unity,
politicized the distribution of aid, pushed responsibility onto governors for making key decisions
while encouraging protests against them for protecting public health, and attacked international
institutions rather than galvanizing them.
Over the years to come, the pandemic could lead (1) to the United States’ relative decline, the
continued erosion of the liberal international order, and a resurgence of fascism around the globe.
Nationalism, isolationism, xenophobia, and attacks on the liberal world order have been increasing
for years, and that trend will only be accelerated by the pandemic. Barriers to the movement of
people have appeared everywhere, including within the heart of Europe; rather than cooperate
constructively for their common benefit, countries have turned inward, bickered with one another,
and made their rivals political scapegoats for their own failures. The rise of nationalism will increase
the possibility of international conflict. Still, given the continued stabilizing force of nuclear weapons
and the common challenges facing all major players, international turbulence is less likely than
domestic turbulence. The crisis has crushed the hopes of hundreds of millions of people in poor
countries who have been the beneficiaries of two decades of sustained economic growth. Popular
outrage will grow, and dashing citizens’ rising expectations is ultimately a classic recipe for
revolution. The desperate will seek to migrate, demagogic leaders will exploit the situation to seize
power, corrupt politicians will take the opportunity to steal what they can, and many governments
will clamp down or collapse. OR it could also lead (2) to a rebirth of liberal democracy, a system that
has confounded sceptics many times, showing remarkable powers of resilience and renewal.
Nevertheless, just as the Great Depression not only produced fascism but also reinvigorated liberal
democracy, so the pandemic may produce some positive political outcomes, too. It has often taken
just such a huge external shock to break sclerotic political systems out of their stasis and create the
conditions for long-overdue structural reform, and that pattern is likely to play out again, at least in
some places. The practical realities of handling the pandemic favour professionalism and expertise;
demagoguery and incompetence are readily exposed. This should ultimately create a beneficial
selection effect, rewarding politicians and governments that do well and penalizing those that do
,poorly. A lingering sense of “alone together” – with a good governance response – could boost social
solidarity and drive the development of more generous social protections down the road. Anti-
statism may linger among the lockdown protesters, but polls suggest that a large majority of
Americans trust the advice of government medical experts in dealing with the crisis. This could
increase support for government interventions to address other major social problems. And the crisis
may ultimately spur renewed international cooperation. While national leaders play the blame game,
scientists and public health officials around the world are deepening their networks and connections.
HOWEVER, as the author argues, there have been more failed governments and their responses
than adequate responses – for example, the failed national leader Trump in the United States as he
created division and not unity.
The Sting in COVID-19’s Tail for Poor Countries; What Comes Next Could Be Worse. Tarek Ghani.
There are fewer deaths per capita in low- and middle-income countries during the pandemic thus far,
but in these developing countries COVID-19 has a lot of potential to increase poverty, deepen social
fractures, and intensify conflicts – suffering more economically and politically than health wise.
Wealthy countries are weathering the economic storm much better than poor countries due to
vaccinations and testing BUT these gains are not evenly shared (inequality). The poorest countries
are disadvantaged several times over: their pre-pandemic growth rates were below the global
average; they have had little fiscal and monetary flexibility during the crisis; their populations bear
deep scars from hunger, disease, and missed schooling due to COVID-19; and they have limited
access to vaccines. Wealthy countries must look beyond their borders and international financial
institutions must redouble their efforts if they are to prevent COVID-19’ s long tail from causing
further disruption. Economic decline and uncertainties are a recipe for instability and unrest – for
example, protests, less aid to poor countries, high government deficits and low budgets, police
clashes and demonstrations against violence, increase of armed criminal groups where the
government has fallen short etc.
Conversation between Peter Baldwin and Ivan Krastev on the highly differentiated geographies of
Covid-19 – same disease, but very different pandemics.
According to Peter Baldwin, indeed the same decease/virus spread throughout the entire world with
the same medical problems, but it was not the same pandemic. This (different infection rates,
different pandemics etc.) depended on geography/location, biological variables, and hygiene. There
were differences between autocratic and democratic countries (also differences within democratic
nations) – different political systems, different leaderships, consistency, different attitudes of citizens
to leadership (more polarized, less acceptance of measures). There are also differences between
health care responses and medical responses – vaccines come from countries such as the US with
bad health care responses. Technology trumps politics assumably.
According to Ivan Krastev, the nature of the political regime – being autocratic or democratic – does
not matter in terms of predicting responses to the crisis. Political success per country is important in
terms of the crisis – a government can deliver these days by vaccinations and testing (Israel).
Session 2
The Geopolitics of Disease. Alan Ingram.
The term geopolitics has been often deployed in academic discussions of disease since the end of the
Cold War with the broader discursive shift from ‘’international’’ to ‘’global’’ health. A growing
concern of emerging and resurgent infectious diseases was important, but it is also related to
debates about relationships between neoliberal globalization, disease, and health. Interest in the
, ways in which disease becomes geopolitical therefore extends beyond a focus on outbreaks of
microbial pathogens to encompass much larger issues.
The article identified three main themes in relation to which issues of geopolitics have been raised;
these are not exclusive of each other but frequently intersect, especially with questions of
globalization:
(1) The spatialization of governance. Anxieties over infectious disease, and resulting practices such
as isolation and quarantine, are not simply functions of technical knowledge, popular fears, or media-
generated scares, but form part of much broader processes of place-, nation- and world-making.
These processes are in turn understood as being permeated by ambiguities of identity and the
circulation of power. The author is critical of academic literature regarding the use of the term
geopolitics, as the term is not well conceptualized or defined but rather used in a more general sense
to signal features of global order and disease governance. According to her research on historian
Bashford, the governance of disease is geopolitical because of (1) a divided world: disease is
geopolitical in that it emerges and is governed in a world that is spatially uneven and unequal, and
responses to disease are positioned as constitutive of particular kinds of space as well as reflective of
them; (2) the fact that governing disease is geopolitical in that it involves the making of borders and
the separation of things, people and places that would otherwise mingle, interact and transform
each other; (3) the intersection of bordering with the global projection of power. Ensuring ‘national’
health has often meant pre-emptive intervention by actors with ‘global’ reach, in an attempt to
contain disease threats; and (4) of the fact that disease management has become increasingly bound
up with formations of security in the post-Cold War period. Other authors have raised concerns
about the integration of global public health surveillance with counterterrorism, for example the
institutional affiliations between certain global health surveillance networks and military and security
agencies that is of great concern.
(2) Biopolitics. Scholars concerned with biopolitics take a Foucauldian approach mostly. Foucault
used the word biopolitics to signal a form of power which he argued became increasingly significant
to the constitution of Western European societies from the seventeenth century onwards. Biopolitics
is especially concerned with maximizing the welfare of populations, and is manifested in fields such
as urban planning, the sciences of population, fertility and reproduction and public health and
insurance. Crucially, for Foucault, biopolitics was a liberal technology of government: it could only
truly flourish in contexts where liberal ideas of freedom (of individuals, of the market, of choice)
provided a guide for government and wider social practice. Scholars have used the concepts of
biopolitics in tandem with geopolitics to examine the ways particular phenomena are addressed as
problems of security. However, here again, the author is critical that the term geopolitics has not
generally been given the same kind of explicit conceptual elaboration as biopolitics which leaves
room for further conceptual elaboration and exploration. For Braun, biosecurity is biopolitical in the
way it seeks to govern life, particularly at the intersections between human, animal, and microbial
life. But biosecurity is also geopolitical in that it also seeks to govern through and across spaces of
homeland security and foreign policy intervention. In Braun’s account there are multiple meanings of
geopolitics: (1) geopolitics in terms of imaginative geographies, in that biosecurity involves
performances of space that dramatize difference and fold it into distance; (2) idea of biosecurity as a
biopolitical and geopolitical project of liberal peace (global North vs. South); and (3) the geopolitics
of biosecurity involves the extension of forms of sovereign power by which life is ever more tightly
integrated with law. In contrast to Foucault, Braun interprets biopolitics as part of sovereign and
juridical power.
(3). Transnational political economies. Work on the spatialization of governance often takes note of
the role of neoliberal globalization in producing the context within which emerging infectious
diseases have become an important ‘global’ problem, and the ways in which it complicates efforts to
respond to them. Sparke is concerned to reveal the ways in which different imaginations of health as
geo-economic are not just politically invested, but form part of the reproduction of particular kinds of
material space. He thus positions imaginative geographies of global health as part of a dynamic that
