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Cooperation and Competition - Lecture Summary

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Summary of all lectures of the course Cooperation and Competition

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  • Chapter 1 to 6
  • May 24, 2021
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  • 2020/2021
  • Summary

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Summary - Cooperation and
Competition
Lecture 1 - Social Dilemmas
Kurt Lewin  “Interdependence is the greatest challenge to the maturity of individual and
group functioning”

Social Dilemmas
Individual Rationality leads to Collective Irrationality
Types:
- Prisoner’s dilemma
- Resource dilemma
- Public goods dilemma

Prisoner’s dilemma
People choose to cooperate or defect
Choose one: Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3-3 1-4
Defect 4-1 2-2
- Temptation outcome = 4
- Reward for cooperation = 3
- Punishment for defection = 2
- Sucker outcome = 1
- For it to be a prisoner’s dilemma Temptation must be higher than Reward
- Rule: T>R>P>S

Resource Dilemma  Social Traps
Small immediate positive outcome vs larger delayed negative outcome
- Examples: pollution, overfishing etc.
- People decide how much to take from a common resource pool
- Temptation to take as much for self as possible
Issues:
You can model the optimal harvest level:

¿ ( IPS)(r )
O=
( N )(r +1)
- IPS = initial resource size
- r = replenishment rate
- N = group size that is harvesting
Studying resource dilemma in laboratory
- 4-person group
- Consume from a pool of resources (400 points) over 15 trials
- each member can harvest 20 points per trial

, - r = 10% of remaining pool size
- game can go on until 15 trials or when pool is depleted


Public goods Dilemma (PGD)  Social Fences
Immediate negative cost for self vs delayed larger positive benefit for collective
- Examples: taxes, charity
- People contribute to a group, but there is a temptation to free ride
Issues:
- Jointness of supply: Public goods can never be completely consumed
- Impossibility of exclusion: people cannot be excluded from using the public good
even if they don’t contribute to it.
- For example: Everyone can go into a park, it doesn’t go away suddenly if people
don’t contribute to it
Types:
- Step-level = contribution must reach a certain amount before the good is provided
- Continuous = Any amount helps the public good
PGD Studying public good in laboratory
- 4 member each get 10 dollars
- Decide how much to give to group fund
- Everyone keeps the amount after contributing plus ¼ of the group fund
- Everyone has a better outcome if they give the full 10 dollars, unless the others do
not

The cooperation Index
Not all dilemma mentioned involve the same degree of conflict
- Sometimes self-interest might be more aligned with cooperation than in other
contexts  can be represented by the cooperation index
- K=(R−P)/(T −S )
- K = degree of conflict between cooperation and defection, between 0 and 1
- 0 = Zero-Sum situation, either winning or losing  no win-win situation
- K > 0 = Non Zero-Sum situation, can be a win-win situation

Solutions to social dilemmas
Structural solution:
Change how people make their decision
- Examples: Leaderships, incentives
Partition the resources
- Example: Divide resources into discrete unions
Motivational solution:
Change individual’s decisions and behaviour
- Examples: Communication, Trust, Self-efficacy, social identity

, Lecture 2 - Evolution and Cooperation
Darwinian theory of evolution
- Heredity  inheritance of physical and mental characteristics
- Mutation
- Selection

Peter Kropotkin  Believes that evolution can shape species to be cooperative with each
other

The Cooperation Puzzle
Logically if there is one D in the population, they will get a higher outcome and through
selection there will become more D’s in a next generation
C = Cooperate D = Defect




However, in nature it seems that there is a way to keep C’s existing

Dawkin’s; The Selfish Gene Perspective  a selfish gene doesn’t mean we don’t cooperate
or that we cannot cooperate
- Difference between genotype and phenotype

Evolutionary Psychology
Adaptations  what are the adaptations for cooperation?
- help the organism to fit to the environment
- make it more likely for an individual to reproduce
- accumulated output of selection process
4 aspects of adaptation:
- System of inherited developing properties that reoccurs among members of a
species  characteristics that everyone in the same environment will get
- Become incorporated into the design
- Coordinated with the structure of the environment  for example our lungs work
for the environment on earth/on land
- Functional outcome

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