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Summary Ethiek (Shafer-Landau) H21
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Ethics – Metaethics: The Status of Morality – Chapter 21 – Eleven Argumentsagainst Moral Objectivity
Ethical objectivism is the view that there are some objective moral standards. Moral
claims are objectively true whenever they accurately tell us what these moral standards
are, or tell us about what these standards require or allow us to do. Moral skepticism, as I
defined it here, is the view that ethical objectivism is false, and thus that there are no
objective moral rules and no objective moral truths. A big reason to favor with one side, is
unhappiness with the other. Perhaps the biggest reason that so many people are moral
skeptics is a suspicion that ethics just cannot be objective. Naturally, objectivists are
happy to return the favor, and usually defend their position by raising their serious doubts
about moral skepticism. Relativism, nihilism, and objectivism are the three options when
it comes to the status of ethics. If two of these can be defeated, then the one left
standing must be the correct account.
Let’s consider some of the least plausible arguments first, before turning to critiques of
objectivism that are more difficult to handle.
1. Objectivity Requires Absolutism
Many people claim that if morality were objective, then moral rules would have to be
absolute. And since they aren’t, morality isn’t objective after all. The Argument from
Absolutism summarizes this line of thought:
1. If moral claims are objectively true, then moral rules are absolute.
2. No moral rule is absolute.
3. Therefore, moral claims are not objectively true.
An absolute moral rule is one that is always wrong to break – no exceptions. I don’t know
if there are any absolute moral rules. Luckily we don’t have to settle this issue here,
because even if premise 2 is true, and there are no absolute moral rules, premise 1 is
false. That premise tells us that when it comes to morality, being objective and being
absolute go hand in hand. But that isn’t so. There is nothing in the very idea of an
objective morality that requires moral rules to be absolute. The objectivity of moral rules
has to do with their status: with whether they are correct independently of our opinion of
them. The absoluteness of moral rules has to do with their stringency: with whether it is
ever okay to break them. There is no direct connection between matters of status and
stringency. So premise 1 is false. And since it is, this argument does not threaten ethical
objectivism.
2. All Truth Is Subjective
A popular thought in some circles is that claims can be true only relative to individual
perspectives. On this line, there are not objective truths at all. The Argument against
Objective Truths couldn’t be simpler:
1. There are no objective truths.
2. Therefore, there are no objective moral truths.
The first thing to note about this argument is that, if it works, there is no special problem
for morality. Most moral skeptics are trying to show that morality is in some ways second-
rate. By embracing a global kind of skepticism, this argument abandons this strategy.
The problem with this argument is its premise. Premise 1 is either true or false. If it is
false, then the argument crumbles right away. It cannot be true. If it were, then there
would be at least one objective truth – premise 1. And if there is at least one objective
truth, then premise 1 is false! Since that is so, it follows directly that there are at least
some objective truths. Perhaps none of them is a moral one. But we can’t rely on this
argument to support that skepticism.
,3. Equal Rights Imply Equal Plausibility
Since everyone has a right to a moral opinion, no one’s moral views are any better than
anyone’s else’s. and if everyone’s moral opinions are on par with one another, then there
is no objective moral truth. These thoughts can be combined into an Argument from
Equal Rights:
1. If everyone has an equal right to an opinion, then all opinions are equally
plausible.
2. Everyone has an equal right to his or her moral opinions.
3. Therefore, all moral opinions are equally plausible.
4. If all moral opinions are equally plausible, then ethical objectivism is false.
5. Therefore, ethical objectivism is false.
The fourth premise is true. If moral standards are objectively correct, then some people’s
views are going to be very far from the mark, and others are going to be right on target.
I also believe that the second premise is true. But the argument is a failure even if 2 is
true, for premise 1 is false. From the fact that we each have right to our opinions, nothing
at all follows about their plausibility. The first premise of the argument confuses two
entirely separate matters: whether a person has a right to an opinion, and whether that
opinion has any merit. This confusion undermines premise 1, and with it, the argument
itself.
4. Moral Objectivity Supports Dogmatism
Imagine any fanatic or tyrant. This thoroughly unpleasant picture yields the following
Argument from Dogmatism:
1. If there are objective moral standards, then this makes dogmatism acceptable.
2. Dogmatism is unacceptable.
3. Therefore, there are no objective moral standards.
Dogmatism is a character trait of being closed-minded and unreasonably confident in
one’s own opinions. Premise 2 looks good, since a theory should not ask of us that we
close our minds to competing ideas. But ethical objectivism does not encourage a
dogmatic attitude. The first premise of this argument is false. Ethical objectivism is a view
about the status of moral claims. It does not tell us what is and is not morally acceptable.
All it says is that the correct moral code, whatever it happens to be, is objectively true.
But we can say more. If moral truth is not of our own making, then it will not always be
easy to discover. And that fact should encourage us to be humble, rather than arrogant
and closed-minded.
If ethics, too, is a subject whose truths are objective, then we should also be open-minded
about moral matters. It is true that the worst fanatics among us are always ethical
objectivists. But that is not a strike against the theory. Rather, it is a strike against the
individuals who misapply it. Ethical objectivism is not committed to saying that moral
wisdom is easy to get. In fact, objectivism makes such wisdom harder to come by than its
competitors do, precisely because objectivism denies that individuals or societies get to
have the final word about what is right and wrong. And so objectivism does not license
dogmatism. Thus the first premise of this argument is mistaken. The argument is
therefore unsound.
5. Moral Objectivity Supports Intolerance
, A very popular reason for rejecting ethical objectivism is a concern for tolerance. People
in open societies rightly value tolerance, but many think that tolerance would be
threatened if moral standards were objectively correct. Indeed, these critics say that the
best way to support tolerance is to assume that all moral views are as good as any other.
We can trace this line of thinking in the Argument from Tolerance:
1. Tolerance is valuable only if the moral views of different people are equally
plausible.
2. If ethical objectivism is true, then the moral views of different people are not
equally plausible.
3. Therefore, if ethical objectivism is true, then tolerance is not valuable.
That second premise is true. But the first premise is false. In fact, ethical objectivism is
much better than moral skepticism at supporting tolerance. The basic reason is this:
If all moral views are equivalent, then a tolerant outlook is no better than an
intolerant one.
Indeed, we can easily frame a counterargument that shows why the value of tolerance
poses a threat to skepticism, rather than to objectivism:
1. If all moral vies are equally plausible, then moral views supporting tolerance and
those supporting intolerance are equally plausible.
2. These moral views are not equally plausible.
3. Therefore, some moral views are less plausible than others.
The first premise must be correct. And those who value tolerance will want to embrace
the second. The conclusion follows directly. If individuals have the final word on what is
morally right, then those who are fundamentally intolerant – intolerant at their core, in
their deepest beliefs – are making no mistake. Their rejection of tolerance is as plausible
as your endorsement of it. That should be little comfort for those who value tolerance.
Those who think of tolerance as very valuable will want to say that tolerance is morally
required even for those people and those societies that despise it. Such a view is
perfectly compatible with ethical objectivism.
6. Moral Objectivity Cannot Allow for Legitimate Cultural Variation
If there are objective moral standards, then they will apply to everyone, in every society.
While this seems pretty plausible, other cases raise a worry for objectivism. For it does
seem that there can be legitimate cultural variation in what is morally required and
forbidden. We can formulate the Argument from Cultural Differences to express this
worry:
1. If ethical objectivism is true, then all moral standards apply universally – to
everyone, in every society.
2. Some moral standards do not apply universally, but only in certain cultural or
social contexts and not in others.
3. Therefore, ethical objectivism is false.
Objectivists will reject the first premise, because they will insist that some moral
standards (like recreational slaughter) apply universally, but others (like public nudity) do
not. Doing so certainly requires explanation. But objectivists can provide it. The core idea
is simple: the basic moral principles apply to everyone, everywhere. But when we apply
these principles to different living situations, they can generate more specific moral
standards that can allow for some degree of cultural variation. A natural way to describe
this situation is to say that although there is just one basic rule in play here – like showing
respect to others – this rule can generate different moral standards in different
circumstances. The objectivist explains this moral difference by pointing out that a moral
standard that dictates the terms of a dowry is not a basic moral rule. Customs and
traditions can help to shape our specific moral duties. But this difference, and all others
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