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Summary readings lecture 1-12 International Relations
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This summary contains all the readings of the lectures 1-12 of International Relations.
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Week 1 Introduction: from International Relations toInternational Studies or How to Study a Rapidly
Changing World?
Questions:
What do you consider as important differences between International Relations (IR) and
International Studies (IS)?
Give and explain the major contribution(s) of IS - if any - to a better understanding of
contemporary (i.e. post-Cold War) global politics.
Reflect on the relevance of academic IR for real world politics: compare Crocker’s analysis
with his policy advice
“The Coming Illiberal Order” – Michael J. Boyle
Viktor Orbán: “Throughout that crisis, he noted, it was illiberal states – as he put it, ‘systems that are
not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies, maybe not even democracies’ – which proved
more successful in responding to global economic turmoil. While he acknowledged that liberal values
retained a degree of attractiveness, Orbán argued that it was important for states to cut themselves
loose of the legal restrictions imposed by liberal democracy and to engage in a new type of economic
nationalism to ensure that their interests were protected in the global economy. At the time, Orbán’s
remarks were met by fierce criticism across the European Union, as many member states expressed
concerns about Hungary’s slide into paranoid, illiberal politics.3 Yet over the last 18 months it has
become clear that Orbán was a forerunner of a deeper shift against liberal values in Europe.” (35)
“Many right-wing parties are now openly questioning the liberal-democratic model and attacking
those institutions, notably the EU, wedded to that model.” (36)
“This assault on liberal values and democratic governance is not confined to Europe. There is growing
evidence that the world is in the midst of an ‘authoritarian resurgence’, with more countries sliding
backwards towards authoritarian rule and other forms of illiberal governance … Even the United
States has not been immune to this trend.” (36)
“The modern challenge to the ascendancy of liberalism is two-headed: it entails a rejection not just
of the liberal-democratic model at home by right-wing populists, but also of the international order
built by the United States at the end of the Second World War … domestic and international fortunes
of liberalism are linked; this is because historically the institutions of global order have mirrored the
domestic structures of the most powerful states in the system.” (36) Example: “post-Second World
War global institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, were designed to reflect American
hegemony, and the priorities and liberal values of the United States and its allies. A world rapidly
moving away from those values at home will naturally be one in which the legitimacy of such
institutions will come under question.” (37)
“Today, the foundations of the international order are under attack from a growing number of rising,
often illiberal, states that do not see a US-created order as consistent with their interests or reflective
of their power.” For example, president Putin of Russia who called for “a multipolar world to replace
the unipolar system dominated by the United States.” (37)
“For the United States, this poses a serious challenge. The demise of the liberal order is an outcome
that US President Barack Obama has staked much of his presidency on avoiding. He has steadfastly
maintained that the ‘rise of the rest’ need not be a zero-sum game – that states including China,
,Russia, India, Brazil and others can take their seats at the table in the new global institutional
architecture of the twenty-first century … Most of the Obama administration’s early efforts at
multilateral engagement were premised on the view that the United States could embed and
socialize Russia, China, India and other rising states into the existing liberal order. As Obama’s second
term draws to a close, it is clear that many of his efforts have come to ashes. Although he offered
several rising powers a greater role in the existing international institutions, they have instead joined
forces in the form of a new grouping, BRICS, to propose an alternative global currency and to develop
financial systems free from the influence of the United States.” (38) “ The ultimate lesson of Obama’s
second term may be that refusing to play a zero-sum game in foreign policy means little if one faces
opponents who, like Vladimir Putin, see things in exactly those terms.” (39)
“Given the change in the distribution of power in the international system, the US will have to take
more seriously the preferences of illiberal states, either as competitors or potential allies … The
world is moving away from a system governed by the US (and its democratic allies) and dominated by
liberal values, and becoming a tiered, multipolar order in which the interests and values of illiberal
states are seen as equal, if not more important, to global public opinion. The character of the new
order will become more illiberal as the views of authoritarian states and weak or illiberal
democracies become more influential in multilateral forums. … Whether Washington likes it or not,
the character of the new illiberal order will be very different from what has come before, limiting the
usefulness of concepts such as ‘containment’ and ‘engagement’.” (39)
“The new international order will be marked by the ascendancy of illiberal states and their value
systems, and a corresponding diminishment of the political and economic influence of the United
States.” (39) “The character of the rising states will gradually transform both the institutions and the
normative underpinnings of the liberal order through two processes. Firstly, in the new illiberal
order, the institutions of the previous order (such as the UN, World Trade Organisation and others)
will remain intact, but their structures and policies will be retrofitted to suit the interests of newly
dominant illiberal states.” (39-40) “Secondly, the key concepts of the liberal order – such as self-
determination, self-defence, democracy promotion and the ‘responsibility to protect’, among others
– will be contested or reimagined by illiberal states with different interests.” (40)
The new order
“The way in which power has diffused over the last decade away from liberal states to a wider array
of players has often been characterised as an unprecedented effort by the ‘rest’ to undermine the
political order created by the West. Yet this depiction is too simple.” (40)
“There are three tiers of states that could be described as challenging the US and the system it has
championed. The first tier is occupied by US rivals Russia and China, both of which have a substantial
military capacity (including nuclear weapons) and are willing to test the US and its allies with limited
military provocations.” (40) “The second tier comprises regional powers, including India, Brazil,
Egypt, Iran, Turkey and South Africa. These states are rising in their respective regions and looking to
spread their influence as powerbrokers, though they vary in the degree to which they demand a
recognised, geographically distinct sphere of influence. The third tier comprises rentier states whose
economies are driven by the export of oil, gas and some minerals, but which have managed to
translate their resource wealth into some political clout [Saudi Arabia, Qatar] … These states seek
regional influence or hegemony, if possible, and tend to ally with rising regional powers to achieve
this if needed.” (41)
“The rise of these states has taken various forms … [but] most of these states have serious
vulnerabilities.” For example, China’s banking system. “Yet all of these states have vastly increased
,their power and global status relative to only a decade ago. It would be a mistake to dismiss them
merely because they do not measure up to the United States, or to assume that temporary or even
long-lasting economic setbacks will deter them from pressing their advantages against the US and its
allies.” (41)
“The emerging international system is not marked by the absence of order, as some have suggested,
but rather by more of it. All three tiers of states are insisting upon restoring hierarchy in their regions
and projecting their influence accordingly.” (41)
“What we are seeing today is more the restoration of a long-dormant order than the creation of a
new one, as governments like Russia and Turkey seek to re-establish historical patterns of hierarchy
in their regions … To achieve this restoration, all three tiers of states are eagerly seeking alliance
partners and forming ad hoc coalitions. Unlike the US-led NATO alliance or the European Union,
these coalitions are neither exclusive nor static, but rather exceptionally fluid and responsive to the
changing intersts of their members.” (42)
“From an American vantage point, these developments give the appearance of disorder because they
challenge the US-underwritten post-Cold War international order in two ways. Firstly, they indicate
that the division of the world into ‘makers’ and ‘takers’ of the rules of international order has
ended.” (42) “Although they have very different material interests, all three tiers of states are
populated by governments that object to notions of American exceptionalism as a matter of
principle. Secondly, the United States preferred the post-Cold War system because it had lower
transaction costs and required less adaptive diplomacy to manage … Today, global competition has
spilled out into the open, and there is no alliance or institution that can entirely encompass or
repress it. This is neither an aberration nor a descent into disorder, but rather a return to the messy
power politics that had been common prior to the consolidation of alliance blocs during the Cold
War.” (43)
“As all three tiers of states assert their influence, build regional hierarchies and form ad hoc alliances
to achieve their goals, the character of the international order will change. Although there are real
differences between them, states belonging to all three tiers have political and economic preferences
which differ from those of the liberal states that dominated the post-Cold War era. Today, many
regimes are led by economic nationalists who believe that governments have an obligation to assist
private and semi-private companies to compete in global markets … most of them see the acquisition
of political and economic power as the joint responsibility of governments and the private sector.”
(44)
“Similarly, some illiberal states, including authoritarian states and democracies with weak civil
societies, face fewer constraints in a world of fluid alliances because they have fewer domestic
interest groups with a stake in foreign policy … It is important not to overstate this point: all three
tiers of states have domestic constituencies that partially shape their foreign-policy preferences and
constrain their governments in some ways.” (44-45)
“While there are divergent interests and policies among all three tiers, what unites them is their
rejection of the quintessential Western idea that a government’s behaviour towards its own citizens
can (or should) influence the rights that it enjoys within the international system. All three tiers
include governments that are very strongly neo-Westphalian in character, emphasising government
prerogatives and the right of non-interference by other states, in contrast to the pooled sovereignty
and emphasis on transnational human rights seen in Europe and elsewhere.” (45)
, “With some partial exceptions, the preferences of all three tiers of rising states stand in contrast to
the modern Western state model in a number of ways.” (45-46) “The traditional Western ideal – of
an accountable, democratic government with an independent private sector and a commitment to
human rights – differs markedly from the highly concentrated executive powers, low involvement of
interest groups or civil society in foreign policy, and greater emphasis on economic nationalism seen
in many neo-Westphalian states. Moreover, many of these states – authoritarian states, illiberal
democracies and those in between – reject the idea of a social contract as the foundation of
domestic political order. While most of them pay lip service to human rights, almost all explicitly
reject the idea that their abuse can be used as justification for a humanitarian intervention in the
absence of a UN Security Council mandate. Most are at least nominally committed to the reassertion
of the principle of non-intervention and a defence of sovereign prerogatives under international
law.” (46)
Why illiberal states will prevail
“Given the vast power of the US and the widespread acceptance of the institutions of the existing
liberal order, one might expect this order to remain liberal, or at least to favour the preferences of
liberal democracies over those of rising powers. Indeed, there is some evidence that the institutional
advantages enjoyed by the US and its European allies in constructing this order will endure even after
any substantial shift in global power.” Instances like the UN and IMF are also accepted by Russia and
China. “these institutions exhibit a modest socialising effect and may induce restraint on all three
classes of states, thus moderating the effect of their rise on the existing international order.” (46)
“Yet recent evidence suggests the future lies somewhere between the fear that Russia, China and
other rising states will overturn the liberal order altogether and the hope that things will remain just
as they are.” (46-47) “Two processes will combine to produce a discernible tilt in the character of the
order towards the illiberal states in the coming decades: institutional adaptation and normative
contestation. Firstly, many rising powers have made widely accepted arguments that the existing
institutions of the liberal order need to adapt to accommodate their new power position … Aside
from pressing for reforms of existing institutions, rising states have also created alternative, or
parallel, international institutions which will allow them to exercise leverage, and to win votes, in a
variety of multilateral forums. These institutions are explicitly designed to break the hold that the US
has over many global institutions.” Example of newly designed institution is the New Development
Bank (NDB and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). (47)
“While these new development institutions remain under-capitalised – the NDB began with $100bn
in contingency funds and $50bn for development projects, while the AIIB is expected to have an
initial capitalisation of $100bn – and suffer from political divisions, they have succeeded in winning
support from the developing world, and even some long-standing US allies … These institutions will
never replace the World Bank or the IMF, but they will stand alongside them as both peers and
competitors.” (48)
“In addition to weakening the stranglehold that the US has had on global finance and development
and diminishing its geopolitical influence, these institutions will also provide the BRICS governments
with political leverage in the developing world, and will allow states such as China, Russia and others
to engage in log-rolling to win votes in the UN and elsewhere.” (48)
“These parallel institutions also provide a generous financial alternative and diplomatic fallback
option for any government that runs afoul of Washington in traditional multilateral forums.” (48-49)
“The rising powers have also successfully offered a reinterpretation of some key political concepts
that currently underlie the liberal order, such as human rights, self-determination, self-defence and,
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