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A* 25-marker essays (fully written) for AQA Philosophy A-level syllabus
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These are all my A* Philosophy essays (fully written out) for the AQA exam board papers, some of which I used in my 2023 exam.
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Is Direct realism successful/do we perceive things directly? (25)In this essay I will argue that direct realism is not successful in convincing us that we
perceive things directly because it fares weakly against the critiques of the time lag
argument, argument from perceptual variation and the strongest critique of the hallucination
argument.
Theory X
Direct realism (DR) identifies two elements in perception: the perceiver and the object being
perceived, of which there is no third mediating thing; we perceive physical objects
immediately as they are. Our sense organs detect properties of these objects which exist in
the world mind-independently, and these objects retain their properties when unperceived as
well as all of us perceiving the same objects with the same properties.
A primary strength of DR is that it manages to avoid the issue of scepticism, which is a
theory that all knowledge is impossible and hence we must doubt all knowledge claims if
they risk being merely belief. DR gives us a clear account of how we have knowledge of the
world, we know because our senses provide immediate access to its true nature. Hence, DR
is convincing at this stage because it apparently evades scepticism.
However, Russell could refute this conclusion through the time lag argument, which asserts
that what we directly see are appearances not physical objects. It begins by pointing out that
the light from the Sun takes a certain amount of time to travel to Earth, around 8 minutes:
P1 The light from distant objects (such as the Sun) takes time to reach our eyes.
C1 So what we are seeing may no longer exist (we see the Sun from 8 minutes ago, not the
Sun now which may have ceased to exist).
C2 So what we are seeing and what is there are different.
P2 This is no less true for physical objects at any distance, only that the time lag is longer or
shorter.
C3 Thus, direct realism is false because we only perceive appearances of physical objects
(light as sense data mediating perception), not the object directly as it is.
Theory Y
But the direct realist could easily amend Russell’s misconception: although undeniably true
that light is mediating between us and the Sun, the direct realist may argue that C1 does not
imply C2. The time-lag means that what we are seeing is in the past and so it may have
ceased to exist by the time we perceive it, but there is nothing in DR that commits it to the
claim that the moment at which we perceive an object must be simultaneous with the object
perceived. The time-lag argument does not present a significant issue for DR because it only
ends up suggesting that we are simply seeing objects directly as they used to be, and a
direct realist can say that once we become aware of an object, we are aware of the object
itself despite the time-lag. Hence, DR is not as weak as it initially appears.
Yet I can still see two further criticisms of DR here. The weaker critique, the perceptual
variation argument, begins with the observation that the appearance of physical objects can
vary depending on the conditions under which they are perceived. Direct realism claims that
the immediate objects of perception are material objects and their properties, like colour. But
Russell argues that a table can appear white when the light is reflected off of it, and brown
otherwise, and that there is no basis for privileging one colour over the other, which means
the table cannot be said to have a particular colour. Russell then concludes that the real
table is not immediately/directly known to us at all, but must be an inference from what is
immediately known (sense data of the colour we see). Hence, direct realism is false because
the apparent properties are not the same as the real properties of physical objects so DR’s
assumption that we perceive the properties of objects as they really are is incorrect.
However this response is weaker of the two because the direct realist could retaliate by
giving up this naive assumption without giving up direct realism; objects may appear
differently to perceivers but they are nonetheless directly perceived because it is a property
of the table to appear white in certain lighting and brown otherwise. We have agreed
methods for determining the true colour of the table, and if in doubt we can ensure the
,lighting conditions are normal and move the table to avoid any glare. We are also capable of
explaining why the colour appears as it does from different angles in terms of the way the
light reflects off of the table’s surface. In this way, perceptual variation is not a significant
issue for direct realism because an object/ table appearing different under certain conditions
does not necessarily entail that it is not brown, or not being directly perceived.
The stronger critique of DR is the argument from hallucination:
P1 Hallucinations occur when a person perceives something which does not exist outside of
the mind.
C1 So what they perceive, the hallucination, exists only in their mind.
The argument follows on to explain that a person who is hallucinating cannot distinguish the
hallucination from veridical perception, and if both are subjectively indistinguishable, then the
person must be aware of the same thing in either case, so what they are directly aware of
veridically must also be in the mind (suggesting that perception is mediated by sense data).
This attacks DR at its core because objects which are conjured through hallucination are not
mind-independent, and their existence suggests that we perceive the world indirectly (we
infer from sense data, the nature of the objects), thus DR fails. The argument for
hallucination is much stronger than perceptual variation because DR cannot easily account
for hallucinations (in the the way that it can easily correct Russell for perceptual variation), as
hallucinations involve a third element of the ‘appearance of objects to the perceiver, or
alternatively the notion of ‘sense data’ in indirect realism, which DR lacks with its 2 elements.
In conclusion, DR is not successful because it fails against critiques that point towards a
third element in perception, with the strongest coming from hallucination. DR failing implies
that we perceive the world indirectly, using a third element of the subjective ‘appearance of
objects’ (or sense data) to the perceiver.
, Is Indirect realism successful/do we perceive things indirectly? (25)
In this essay I will argue that indirect realism is successful in convincing us that we perceive
things indirectly because a) it overcomes issues against direct realism, b) it defeats both
sceptic critiques against the primary and secondary quality distinction, especially the
strongest critique from Berkeley that ideas cannot be like material objects.
Theory X
Indirect realism (IR) is the view that mind-independent objects exist, but that there is a
distinction between the reality of these objects and the way they appear. There are three
elements in perception: the perceiver, the object perceived and the appearance of these
objects to the perceiver which is determined through inference on the basis of sense data
(data from experience in terms of the acts of sensory awareness). Because such perception
involves this inference, it is indirect.
A primary strength of this theory is that it accounts for issues that direct realism cannot, such
as perceptual variation (that the appearance of physical objects can vary depending on the
conditions under which they are perceived) and other arguments like that from illusion,
purely because IR posits the notion of sense data which can explain nuances in our
perception and in the way that multiple people perceive things because we can attribute said
nuances to others’ individual sensory awareness.
But a primary problem for IR is that it can lead to scepticism about the nature and existence
of the external world. Scepticism doubts all knowledge claims if they risk being merely belief,
and since perceiving anything indirectly requires subjective inference, we have much room
to doubt the true nature of the world, or at least, our knowledge of it, and so IR is not as
robust as it may appear at this stage.
Theory Y
However, Locke strengthens IR through his primary and secondary quality distinction
because it acknowledges that sense data of certain properties of objects, even if it is
subjective, resembles their real properties accurately (such as the solidity of an object or its
size) whilst other sense data of vaguer nature creates properties which do not correspond
accurately and can only exist in individual perception/inference. The first set of properties are
primary qualities, universally agreed and that make up micro-structures and insensible parts
of objects like their solidity. The second set are called secondary qualities which Locke calls
‘powers to produce an idea or sensation in us’, and that depend on the primary qualities and
our minds. This distinction is important to minimise scepticism because primary qualities are
‘utterly inseparable’ from an object whether or not anyone perceives them and so they give
us a true idea of the nature of the external world simply because they can be known with
certainty. Locke’s theory creates robustness in IR’s previous weak point.
Here I can see two more weaknesses in IR, both of which can be easily responded to. In the
less significant weakness, we can attempt to criticise the defence against scepticism that
primary qualities are ‘utterly inseparable’ from the object, and so the distinction itself
between primary and secondary becomes vague. Locke uses the example of an almond
being pounded - its parts must retain some solidity or size even if we can no longer see the
parts, and that without these qualities it would not be material at all. But Locke’s example
shows that both primary and secondary qualities change, such as an almond being pounded
changes its initial size or solidity (primary), or perhaps even its colour(secondary). If change
is only attributed to a secondary quality (because of how secondary qualities change
depending on perceiver), then by Locke’s logic we should regard the size or solidity of the
almond as mind or inference dependent, even though size and solidity should be primary
qualities. This inability and confusion in distinguishing primary and secondary qualities
means that IR does not defeat scepticism.
This weakness is less significant because Locke can easily respond by pointing out the
involuntary nature of our perception. When we open our eyes, we receive sense data
against our choice, and we are not in control of our perception; it is not subject to our will.
Locke argues that this means perception cannot fully come from us, and so the source of
sensations must be external, giving us little to be sceptical about in terms of what we
voluntarily perceive. It is highly unlikely that the notion of subjective inference or extremely
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