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Samenvatting Probleem 1 werkgroep uitwerkingen European Law
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Probleem 1 European Union LawLeerdoelen:
(1) What are the rules regarding the offering by states of (State) aid (in EU competition law)?
A&V: 506-518
A way in which member states can distort competition is by granting state aid to undertakings. (Een manier waarop lidstaten de
concurrentie/mededinging kunnen vervalsen (verstoord), is door staatssteun te verlenen aan ondernemingen.)
Art 107 (1) TFEU: elements prohibiting
1. Any aid granted by a member state or through state resources in any form whatsoever
2. That distorts or threatens to distort competition
3. By favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods
4. In so far as it affects trade between member states (voor zover het de handel beïnvloedt).
1 = a positive contribution of benefit (subsidies): the concept of aid is wider than that of the subsidy because it embraces not only
positive benefits, as subsidies, but also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the
budget of an undertaking and which (interventies die, in verschillende vormen, de lasten verlichten die normaliter op het budget van een
onderneming drukken), without therefore being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have the same
effect.
The Court of Justice has a functional approach: it focuses on the effect of the aid rather than the form in which it is granted.
In addition to subsidies, the following may also be classified as state aid: tax exemptions (vrijstellingen) or reductions (verlaging),
investments on non-market terms, loans at non-market interest rates and the sale or letting (verhuur) of land and buildings at non-
market prices.
According to the Court of Justice, a benefit does not include the granting of a subsidy to a public undertaking that does not exceed the
costs arising from the performance by that undertaking of a task of general economic interest, within the meaning of article 106 (2)
TFEU, with which it has been charged (niet de toekenning van een subsidie aan een openbaar bedrijf die niet hoger is dan de kosten die
voortvloeien uit de vervulling door dat bedrijf van een taak van algemeen economisch belang, in de zin van artikel 106, lid 2 ) VWEU,
waarmee het is belast). Under such circumstances, the subsidy merely enables the undertaking in question to compete with other
undertakings on an equal footing (bied juist de mogelijkheid om te concurreren). Finally, there is no advantage for the recipient
undertaking if the state acts like a market economy operator. In this market economy operator exception, there is no state aid when the
state can prove that the recipient company obtained the same deal, for example a loan, capital investment of debt alleviation, that it
would have gotten from a private market economy operator (In deze uitzondering van een marktdeelnemer in een markteconomie is er
geen sprake van staatssteun wanneer de staat kan bewijzen dat het ontvangende bedrijf dezelfde deal heeft verkregen, bijvoorbeeld een
lening, kapitaalinvestering of schuldverlichting, die het zou hebben gekregen van een particuliere marktdeelnemer in een
markteconomie).
This requires a comparison of the measure at hand with the actions a (fictional) market economy operator would take. This comparison,
that has tot be conducted by the Commission, is complicated. As a result, a two-stage approach had been adopted. In this approach, the
Commission will first determine the applicability of the market economy operator exception and only then test whether it applies to the
specific case at hand. This means that the intricacies of comparing the state's actions with those of a private market economy operator
can be avoided if it is clear that the market economy operator principle had no applicability in the first place because the state has acted
in a public capacity (Dit betekent dat de complexiteit van het vergelijken van de acties van de staat met die van een particuliere
marktdeelnemer in een markteconomie kan worden vermeden als duidelijk is dat het beginsel van de markteconomie in de eerste plaats
niet toepasbaar was omdat de staat in een openbare hoedanigheid heeft gehandeld).
The benefits in question must be granted by the state in one way or another: either directly, such as a ministry or municipality, or
indirectly by a third party.
According to the Court of Justice's judgment in Stardust Marine, a benefit granted by such a body, which is often a public undertaking,
must be imputable to the state (toerekenbaar zijn). However, the mere fact that a public undertaking is under state control is not
sufficient for benefit granted by that undertaking to be imputed to the state. Only in cases where the government was involved, in one
way of another, in the adoption of the measure concerned can a benefit be imputed to the state and potentially classified as state aid
(Het enkele feit dat een openbaar bedrijf onder staatscontrole staat, volstaat echter niet om de door dat bedrijf verleende voordelen aan
de staat toe te rekenen. Alleen in gevallen waarin de overheid op enigerlei wijze betrokken was bij de vaststelling van de betreffende
maatregel, kan een voordeel aan de staat worden toegerekend en mogelijk als staatssteun worden aangemerkt)
PreussenElektra: The Court of Justice's judgment in PreussenElektra suggests that member states can circumvent (omzeilen)
the prohibition of state aid by ensuring that benefits are not funded from taxation. This case concerned the statutory
obligation of regional energy distribution companies in Germany to purchase all electricity produced from renewable sources
in their area of supply at fixed prices that exceeded their market value. Despite holding that this arrangement conferred an
economic advantage on renewable energy producers, since it guaranteed them, with no risk higher profits than they would
make in its absence, the Court of Justice concluded that it did not amount to state aid. Because the German government had
reallocated resources towards renewable energy producers without placing itself in the middle by levying taxes and
distributing the proceeds to renewable energy producers the abovementioned arrangement did not involve the transfer of
'state resources'. (Ondanks het oordeel dat deze regeling een economisch voordeel opleverde aan producenten van
hernieuwbare energie, aangezien het hen zonder risico hogere winsten garandeerde dan zij zonder de regeling zouden
behalen, concludeerde het Hof van Justitie dat het geen staatssteun vormde. Omdat de Duitse regering middelen had
toegewezen aan producenten van duurzame energie zonder zich in het midden te plaatsen door belastingen te heffen en de
, opbrengst te verdelen onder producenten van hernieuwbare energie, was er in de bovengenoemde regeling geen overdracht
van 'staatsmiddelen').
Later judgments have restricted this exception.
The Commission had recently started taking an active interest in all kinds of tax arrangements that potentially involve the transfer of
state resources. This applies, in particular, to tax benefits laid down in agreements (overeenkomsten), so-called tax rulings, between
undertakings and the tax authorities of a member state. These agreements raise some interesting questions, especially on the subject of
transfer pricing. This term refers to the prices charged for the provision of goods and services between the various undertakings within a
group. These internal prices can be set in such a way that a particular undertaking within the group incurs substantial costs and
generates almost no profit - at least on paper. Since taxes are only paid on profits, this can result in a significant tax benefit for the
undertaking concerned. (Deze interne prijzen kunnen zo worden vastgesteld dat een bepaalde onderneming binnen de groep
substantiële kosten maakt en vrijwel geen winst genereert - althans op papier. Aangezien alleen over de winst belasting wordt betaald,
kan dit voor de betrokken onderneming een aanzienlijk belastingvoordeel opleveren)
The key question is thus whether the tax authorities' approval of a favourable transfer price amounts to state aid, given that it applies to
money that is transferred within a group of undertakings and therefor only potentially gives rise to a tax liability. (De hamvraag is dus of
de goedkeuring door de fiscus van een gunstige verrekenprijs staatssteun is, aangezien het gaat om geld dat binnen een concern wordt
overgemaakt en dus alleen in potentie aanleiding geeft tot een belastingplicht.) The next question concerns the calculation of the benefit
enjoyed by the undertaking as a result of the approval of a favourable transfer price. This is normally done using the arm's length
principle (zakelijkheidsbeginsel), according to which the price for the provision of a service or product within a group should be identical
to the price that would be charged to a third party for the same service or product. The value of the tax benefit is then calculated on the
basis of the difference between the agreed transfer price and the arm's length transfer price.
As to the principle, the General Court accepted that the arm's length principle can be used, given that the member state had
incorporated it in it own fiscal rules, as a tool to determine whether there is an advantage for the company involved. However,
the General Court fount several errors on the part of the Commission when it applied this tool to the actual tax rulings
involving Apple.
2/3 = The second and third conditions outlined art 107 (1) TFEU are closely related to one another. A distortion of competition as a result
of state aid only arises in situations where certain undertakings in a member state recieve such aid and others do not.
This is known as the selectivity test. When a measure produces a general benefit, such as a universal reduction in corporation tax or the
improvement of the road network, it does not selectively favour certain undertakings. Such a measure therefore does not fall within the
scope of art 107 TFEU and will be qualified as a general scheme of economic policy. For most state aid measures selectivity is easily
proven simply because most of these measures will be specifically directed at one recipient.
Things are more challenging when there is a measure of general application that enables the distribution of certain funds.(wanneer er
een maatregel van algemene strekking is die de verdeling van bepaalde fondsen mogelijk maakt). In that case a distinction has to be
made between the general scheme (algemene regeling) and the individual application of that scheme. Selectivity then exists whenever
there is discretion on the part of the member state. Things are more complicated where the state aid may exist in the form of an
exception to a national scheme of taxation (wanneer de staatssteun kan bestaan in de vorm van een uitzondering op een nationale
belastingregeling).
The selectivity test plays a key role in connection with the granting of certain tax exemptions and the determination of the tax liability of
undertakings in specific cases. In Adria Wien Pipeline: Austria had restricted the reimbursement of an energy tax to undertakings that
manufactured goods. According to the Court of Justice, such reimbursements were not selective and therefore did not amount to state
aid in cases where they were justified by the nature or general scheme of the system of which they were part. However, the Court of
Justice observed that the fact that a large number and wide range of undertakings were able to benefit from the measure did not
provide any grounds for concluding that it amounted to a general measure of economic policy. In addition, it held that the measure was
not justified by the nature or general scheme of the system, since the underlying ecological considerations did not justify the differential
treatment of undertakings that manufactured goods and undertakings that provided services as regards their consumption of energy.
Oostenrijk had de terugbetaling van een energiebelasting beperkt tot ondernemingen die goederen produceerden. Volgens het Hof van
Justitie waren dergelijke terugbetalingen niet selectief en vormden ze dus geen staatssteun in gevallen waarin ze gerechtvaardigd waren
door de aard of de opzet van het systeem waarvan ze deel uitmaakten. Het Hof van Justitie merkte echter op dat het feit dat een groot
aantal en uiteenlopende ondernemingen van de maatregel konden profiteren, geen reden was om te concluderen dat het om een
algemene maatregel van economisch beleid ging. Bovendien oordeelde het dat de maatregel niet gerechtvaardigd was door de aard of
de opzet van het systeem, aangezien de onderliggende ecologische overwegingen geen rechtvaardiging vormden voor de verschillende
behandeling van ondernemingen die goederen produceerden en ondernemingen die diensten verrichtten met betrekking tot hun
energieverbruik.
Art. 107 TFEU allows member states to differentiate between undertakings on the basis of objective justifications when establishing a
system of charges that is in the general interest. In contrast, when the state enjoys a degree of latitude that enables it to choose the
beneficiaries or the conditions under which aid is provided or exemptions are granted, the selectivity test is deemed to have been met.
(onderscheid te maken tussen ondernemingen op basis van objectieve rechtvaardigingen bij het vaststellen van een heffingenstelsel dat
in het algemeen belang is. Wanneer de staat daarentegen over een zekere speelruimte beschikt die hem in staat stelt de begunstigden te
kiezen of de voorwaarden waaronder steun wordt verleend of vrijstellingen worden verleend, wordt geacht aan de selectiviteitstoets te
zijn voldaan.)
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