Summary
Samenvatting Probleem 4 uitwerkingen European Law
- Course
- Institution
Dit zijn uitwerkingen van Probleem 4 European Law Jaar 2
[Show more]
Seller
Follow
chlvdziel
Content preview
Probleem 4 European LawLeerdoelen:
1) Are charges that are levied on foreign products at the borders permitted under European law? What are the
derogations?
(2) Are national charges that penalise mainly foreign products permitted under European law? What are the
derogations?
pp. 349-356
Articles 34-37 and 45-66 TFEU contain several provisions on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. These are often
referred to as the four fundamental freedoms:
- Free movement of goods
- Free movement of (natural and legal) persons
- Free movement of services
- Free movement of capital
The four fundamental freedoms relate to the essential factors of production. For any functional market these production factors need to
be able to move freely and thus, without barriers, within that market. Given the EU’s desire to create an internal market, it makes
perfect sense to strive for free movement of these production factors between the member states. In addition, the EU also seeks to
bring about ‘an ever closer union among the people of Europe’. This is arguably facilitated by making it easier for the people of Europe to
travel between the member states and take up residence in another member state. These two objectives clearly explain why the
fundamental freedoms are enshrined (verankerd) in the Treaties.
The prohibition of discrimination, or unequal treatment, on the grounds of origin or nationality (op grond van afkomst of nationaliteit) is
a central feature of the Treaty provisions and legislation and case law concerning the establishment of the internal market. A measure
that explicitly differentiates between domestic and imported products or between domestic workers and workers from other member
states constitutes overt discrimination.
- Overt discrimination, which is also referred to as direct discrimination, goes against the very essence of the internal market
and is therefore almost always prohibited. The existence of overt discrimination can be established on the basis of a simple
legal analysis of the measure in question. After all, when a rule only applies to imported products or when a member state only
grants a certain advantage to its own nationals, this is usually abundantly clear from the wording of the rule. A simple reading
of the relevant legal provisions will be enough to identify the discrimination.
In addition, certain measures that do not explicitly differentiate between domestic and imported products or between domestic and
foreign workers may nevertheless put imported products or foreign workers at a disadvantage. A language requirement for workers is an
example of such a measure.
- It can nevertheless lead to covert discrimination, also referred to as indirect discrimination.
A measure that has a greater of different impact on foreign products or workers than on domestic products or workers may form an
obstacle to free movement, even if it does not involve overt or direct discrimination. Such obstacles are prohibited, unless they can be
objectively justified. This legal framework is primarily a product of the case law of the Court of Justice.
Scope of the fundamental freedoms
The very title of the provisions on freedom of movement implies a restriction (een beperking van hun reikwijdte) of their scope. In
principle, they only apply to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between member states. The application of the
Treaty provisions on freedom of movement thus requires a cross-border element, which exists when a good, person, service or capital
crosses the border between two member states. A case in which there is no cross-border element is referred to as a ‘purely internal
situation’.
Two reasons can be advanced in support of the purely internal situation doctrine.
1. The first – pragmatic – reason is that the Court of Justice simply wished to avoid having to rule on the compatibility of (almost) all
national rules (verenigbaarheid van nationale regels) concerning goods, persons, services and capital, which would have increased its
workload exponentially.
2. The second – more fundamental – explanation has its origin in the limited transfer of sovereignty (beperkte
soevereiniteitsoverdracht). In this context, it can be argued that the member states only agreed to transfer sovereignty to the Union and
thus subject themselves, inter alia, to the provisions on freedom of movement insofar as trade between member states is concerned
(alleen te onderwerpen aan bepalingen over vrij verkeer voor zover het handel tussen lidstaten betreft ).
The wholly internal situation, U-turns, reverse discrimination and abuse of EU-law
- A so-called U-turn: this manoeuvre entails making use of the freedom of movement for the sole purpose of ensuring the
application of EU law in order to circumvent national law (met als doel toepassing van EU-recht te waarborgen en nationaal
recht te omzeilen). In such cases, the member state against which EU law has been invoked must prove that the U-turn was
performed for the purpose of circumventing national rules and thus qualifies as abuse of (EU) law.
- U-turns are often prompted by reserve discrimination, which exists when a state imposes stricter conditions on its own
nationals than on the nationals of other member states.
- The U-turn and purely internal situation doctrines are closely linked to the abuse of EU law doctrine and its procedural
counterpart (tegenhanger): a request for a preliminary ruling on a hypothetical question.
Reverse discrimination, equality and harmonization
, Why would a member state wish to put its own nationals at a disadvantage compared to the nationals of other member states? The
Pistre case reveals that there can actually be valid reasons for doing so:
- Imposing stricter rules on domestic producers can sometimes be beneficial for the image – and sales – of a particular product.
A rule that results in reverse discrimination without creating any benefits for national producers, as in Mathor will continue to give rise
to a purely internal situation.
Restrictions resulting from purely internal situation can thus only be addressed on the basis of a principle of national law relating to
equality or non-discrimination or via harmonization under EU law (Beperkingen die het gevolg zijn van een zuiver interne situatie kunnen
dus alleen worden aangepakt op basis van een beginsel van nationaal recht inzake gelijkheid of non-discriminatie of via harmonisatie
onder het EU-recht).
pp. 357-362
Free movement of goods: tariff and non-tariff restrictions
The free movement of goods is protected against so-called tariff and non-tariff restrictions or barriers. Article 30 and 110 TFEU relate to
restrictions of a financial nature, while art 34-36 apply to all other restrictions.
Despite its great significance, the term ‘goods’ is not defined in Title I of Part Three of the Treaty. Nevertheless, it should be clear that
this term at least covers all physical objects. Objects with a negative value, such as waste that is generally removed at the seller’s
expense and objects whose value cannot be measured, such as art, also fall into this category.
Tariff restrictions: charges having equivalent effect
Pursuant to Article 30 TFEU, all customs duties and charges having equivalent effect (to customs duties) are prohibited. Since custom
duties no longer apply between member states, the focus is currently on charges having equivalent effect (CEEs).
Any pecuniary charge, whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on goods by reason of
the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a customs duty in the strict sense (Elke geldelijke heffing, ongeacht de
benaming en wijze van toepassing, die eenzijdig wordt opgelegd aan goederen omdat zij een grens overschrijden, en die geen
douanerecht in strikte zin is).
In its Marimex judgment, the Court of Justice held that CEEs cannot be justified on the basis of Article 36 TFEU. As a consequence, in
principle they are always be prohibited. However, two exceptions to the very broad definition of what constitutes a CEE have been
created in the case law, while the TFEU moreover distinguished CCE’s from internal taxation.
1. In Bauhuis, the Court of Justice held that charges consisting of the payment of a fee incurred on the basis of a rule of EU law did not
constitute a CEE. The case concerned a veterinary inspection that the member states were required to carry out on the basis of a rule of
what is now EU law. The purpose of the rule was actually to promote freedom of movement by replacing the member states’ various
veterinary inspections with a single inspection by the exporting member state. In these circumstances, asking exporters to pay the fee
could not be regarded as a CEE, despite the fact that it was requested on the occasion of the crossing of the frontier. The Court of Justice
clarified that the charge had to be based on the uniform application of a rule of EU law and that the payment could not exceed the actual
cost of the relevant inspection.
2. The second exception applies to payments for services actually rendered to importers. However, if a service is not purchased
voluntarily but is instead imposed by a member state, the payment for that service does constitutes a CEE.
In addition, CEEs need to be distinguished from internal taxation within the meaning of Article 110 TFEU. A charge that is imposed at the
frontier or on the occasion of the crossing of the frontier does not fall under Article 30 TFEU if it is part of a general system of internal
taxation. The classification of a charge has thus important implications, since CEEs are always prohibited and cannot be justified, while
the only rule applying to internal taxes is that they must not discriminate (Een heffing die wordt opgelegd aan de grens of ter
gelegenheid van grensoverschrijding valt niet onder artikel 30 VWEU als zij deel uitmaakt van een algemeen stelsel van binnenlandse
belastingen. De classificatie van een heffing heeft dus belangrijke implicaties, aangezien CEE’s altijd verboden en niet te rechtvaardigen
zijn, terwijl de enige regel die van toepassing is op binnenlandse belastingen is dat ze niet mogen discrimineren.).
The latter classification is obviously muss less intrusive on the member state contemplating a financial measure that could impact the
free movement (Deze laatste classificatie is uiteraard minder ingrijpend voor de lidstaat die een financiële maatregel overweegt die het
vrije verkeer zou kunnen aantasten.). In Outokumpu, for example, a Finnish ecotax on the supply of electricity became subject to review.
The company for which the case is named, which imported Swedish electricity into Finland, was required to pay a duty when the
electricity crossed the border. According to the company, this duty constituted a CEE. As the result of a request for a preliminary ruling,
the case came before the Court of Justice, which held that what are currently Article 30 and 110 TFEU were mutually exclusive. When a
particular charge is part of a system of internal taxation, the sole fact that it is imposed on the occasion of the crossing of the frontier
does not turn into a CEE (elkaar uitsluiten. Wanneer een bepaalde heffing deel uitmaakt van een stelsel van binnenlandse belastingen,
wordt het enkele feit dat ze wordt opgelegd ter gelegenheid van het overschrijden van de grens, nog geen CEE).
In order to determine whether it is dealing with a CEE or an internal tax, the Court of Justice examines whether the measure in question
‘forms part of a general system of internal dues applying systematically to categories of products according to objective criteria applied
without regard to the origin of the products’ (deel uitmaakt van een algemeen stelsel van interne heffingen dat systematisch wordt
toegepast op categorieën producten volgens objectieve criteria die worden toegepast zonder rekening te houden met de herkomst van
de producten').
Tariff restrictions: internal taxation
When a tax is actually imposed on imported as well as domestic products, the Court of Justice subjects it to a more detailed examination
on the basis of Article 110 TFEU: this essentially contains a non-discrimination clause.
The benefits of buying summaries with Stuvia:
Guaranteed quality through customer reviews
Stuvia customers have reviewed more than 700,000 summaries. This how you know that you are buying the best documents.
Quick and easy check-out
You can quickly pay through credit card or Stuvia-credit for the summaries. There is no membership needed.
Focus on what matters
Your fellow students write the study notes themselves, which is why the documents are always reliable and up-to-date. This ensures you quickly get to the core!
Frequently asked questions
What do I get when I buy this document?
You get a PDF, available immediately after your purchase. The purchased document is accessible anytime, anywhere and indefinitely through your profile.
Satisfaction guarantee: how does it work?
Our satisfaction guarantee ensures that you always find a study document that suits you well. You fill out a form, and our customer service team takes care of the rest.
Who am I buying these notes from?
Stuvia is a marketplace, so you are not buying this document from us, but from seller chlvdziel. Stuvia facilitates payment to the seller.
Will I be stuck with a subscription?
No, you only buy these notes for $3.65. You're not tied to anything after your purchase.
Can Stuvia be trusted?
4.6 stars on Google & Trustpilot (+1000 reviews)
53340 documents were sold in the last 30 days
Founded in 2010, the go-to place to buy study notes for 14 years now