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Case study Syria. Comprehensive summary
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THE CONFLICTThe battle for Syria-Phillips, 2020, CHAPTER 2
- The Arab spring started in Tunisia - due to the death of a street vendor who is harassed by the
police. Protests were thoroughly documented and began to spread across the Middle East
- Egypt: protests began in Tahrir square. 18 days of protests which forced Mubarak to step down
- The ideas spread to Syria:
o Deraa teenagers tortured - led to protest
o Socio-economic problems - unemployment
o Assad's failing leadership - there were no reforms, a favoring of government employees and the
failure of the switch to a socialist economy.
The regime fights back - Assad used soft power to keep control. Because the Syrian regime is more
embedded in social fabric
- Buy-in: economically the middle class would benefit from the regime.
- For tribes: patronage (their alignment in the past) would be used to decide sides
- Ideology - some people believed Assad's anti West ideas
- there was also the fear that the next leader would have a religious prejudice. Assad was seen
as a bulwark against Islam and jihadism.
Coup-proofing: Arab autocrats organized security so that it could be overthrown individually not in
groups.
- Different spying agencies were also used during this time: Mukhabarat
o also spied on each other to assure that individually they did not have too much power
o shot soldiers refusing to attack civilians
All of this led to regime violence
- peaceful protesters were defined as armed gangs and killed- This led to more protests and
more protesters being killed.
- Violence supplemented by Shabina and Mukhabarat - They arrested protestors
- actions were taken to avoid Kurds from joining the uprisings
- Assad made superficial concessions - Investigations were dropped and there was a
withdrawal from the emergency environment.
- There was internal uncertainty in the regime - Assad ruled as a director not a dictator.
Could Assad have done things differently?
- Either he could have become more hardline - more lethal force but technology disallowed
gross abuse
- could have used more compromises
,Van Dam 2017, Could the war have been avoided? (CH. 2)
- Could hardly have been avoided, according to the author; due to the regime’s history of
misbehavior and the support that the opposition received from foreign countries: military and
political. Because of this support, the Syrian war turned into a proxy war as well as an intra-Syrian
war. Civil war is not appropriate, as the regime supported by Russia, Iran and Hizballah. - The
totalitarian regime, due to traditional discriminating and repression, could not have been toppled
peacefully, as it would have to give up its privileged positions: Assad never wanted to implement
reforms, and negotiations to agree to them could not have worked. - The majority of Syrians since
1946 have only known dictatorships, this does not mean that they do not have the capacity to build
a democracy. On the other hand, there were many opposition forces that were not in favor of the
build-up of a democratic society; those were also the best organized military wise. They also thought
that reform could only be made possible by counterforce.
On the long term, reform by Assad would not have been fruitful; as further demands would have
been made. The elite could also expect to be court martialed and executed; these circumstances
strengthened resistance.
The Dangerous Trap of Sectarianism - Sectarianism undermined the possibility of achieving freedom
and democracy, as demanded by Syrian opposition groups, but was not talked about, because it is a
sensitive subject; the first demands by demonstrators were more political freedom and an end to
the corrupt on-party system; sectarianism was not a topic and the Syrian people were portrayed as
being one. - Syria was never ‘ruled by the Alawi community’, but many opponents thought so
anyway; and many Alawi’s also sought political change. The Arab Spring in 2011 gave hope to Syrians
that the situation in their country would change for the better: they were carried away by other’s
successes.
Sectarianism made a special case of Syria; many Alawi’s occupied high-ranking administrative and
military positions in the country. - The sectarian polarization was hardly avoidable, because of the
sectarian composition of the Syrian armed forces elite troops, its security services and its armed
gangs; those were heavily Alawi dominated, and thus it was seen as “Alawi’s dominating the non-
Alawi’s (Druzes, Sunni’s or Christians)”. The peaceful civilian protest was not sectarian-orientated,
the militant Islamist and Jihadist groups in the opposition were very much so; this only contributed
to more polarizing in Syrian society. - The Alawi-dominated army and security forces provoked a
sectarian confrontation by ethnic cleansing; particularly between Alawi’s and Sunnis and Radical
Islamists expelling Christians from villages. The “Four Towns Agreement” in September 2015 as a
sectarian reshuffle by population exchanges.
From Peaceful Demonstrations to War:
- During the first phases, a peaceful solution could have been possible through reconciliatory
dialogue about a ‘peaceful transition to a democratic, civil and pluralistic state’; no national dialogue
without a security solution: confidence building was needed. There was however only mistrust
between regime and opposition. The decision by the regime in 2011 to solve the crisis by brute
force, just like in 1924 in Hama, would be a disastrous mistake: they situation was completely
different, with opposition forces receiving political, financial and military support from abroad.
,An Intra-Syrian War and a War by Proxy
- Regional powers tried to establish an intra-Syrian national dialogue, but mediation was to no avail
and thus these countries, like Turkey and Saudi-Arabia (the latter supported ISIS later on, for fucks
sake, but then again, what do you expect for people chopping journalists to pieces), began
supporting the opposition with funds and material aid while claiming to support a political solution
(with Turkey openly supporting the fall of the Assad regime: military solution) which meant regime
change. This turned Syria into a proxy war. - Syrian-Arab League relations worsened, and the Syrian
National Council of the opposition was not recognized by the League. Western countries had not
even tried to open political dialogue with Damascus and declared Assad illegitimate, thus cutting of
diplomatic ties. The US, EU and others imposed sanctions on the regime, but these backfired against
the population.
Contradictory Measures of the Regime
- The regime reacted to peaceful demonstration with heavy force and thus bloody suppression;
resulting in demonstrations becoming more hostile. The government began releasing prisoners in an
attempt to appease protesters and it did not understand that its employed measures were out of
balance. The regime seemed to trust its superior military capacity, and did not take foreign aid into
account when deciding to act in this way as it labelled the uprising in Islamist or extremist terms:
‘motto of Jihad’, which may have helped to ensure support of the sectarian communities of Alawi’s
and Christians. - On 21 April 2011, the state of emergency was abolished by Assad, at the demand of
protesters; it did however not make a difference suppression-wise. Continued shooting (despite
Assad’s orders to cease fire) in May 2011 indicated that the regime sought an outcome by violent
means.
Was Assad really in control? He was appointed as a way to ensure continuity after his father (Hafiz),
but he did not have as much power; those who had become used to acting independently,
commanders, acted as they pleased. Assad was however fully responsible for what his men did, as
Supreme Commander, and in 2011 he was already in power for 11 years, which is long enough to
establish a secure and powerful position.
Bashar Hafiz Al-Assad: A Son of Syria, Not of the West
- After assuming presidency, Bashar was seen as a person open to reform and democracy, but in
practice he was not able to implement reform at all. The Damascus Spring died out. Bashar was
maybe influenced by Western ideals, but never thought they could be brought into practise in Syria;
it would take a long time before democracy could be implemented at all. Bashar was a Child of Syria
and a member of the Baath Party.
Opposition Counterviolence
- The fact that images and films about regime violence were spread via social media, only increased
the opposing side’s violent reactions. There was already violence in the beginning, but this only
came from side lines, such as radical Islamists, but demonstrations by civilians were peaceful for a
long time; too because they did not have much choice; not many of them owned guns. This changed
from June 2011 onwards, as protestors in increasing violence asked for the toppling of the Assad-
regime and even his execution; in this, they were still influenced by the ideals of the Arab Spring and
they imagined support from the West. - After mediation failed, opposition forces were armed by the
US, Turkey, Qatar, France, Saudi Arabia and the UK, whereas the regime was supported by Russia,
Iran and Hizballah; for some of these, intervention was part of their own national agenda’s.
, Who Wants an Alawi State? - The most important question is: can guarantees be made in this
environment, especially in the sectarian-tinted environment? Assad counted on Alawi sectarian
survival instinct to fight to the end for him. As in theory large ethnic Alawi cleansing would take
place as they would flee to the “Mountains”, this would drastically change the distribution of the
Syrian population. This would however not lead to territorial fragmentation, if it were up to the
inhabitants. Decentralization would mean that the Alawi regime loses control of the country and
their privileged positions in the government.
CHAPTER 3
Within two months of demonstrations in 2011, the army began suffering from defections; shot or
fled abroad. Most stayed inside Syria and started the Free Officers Movement who announced the
formation of the Free Syrian Army in July 2011; moderate, but not very effective. It greatly depended
on foreign assistance and suffered from fragmentation (Syrian Interim Government). Donor
countries gave assistance according to regional priorities over ending the conflict. Image of the FSA
as controlled by Arab and Western intelligence agencies: ‘not following instructions = no money’. -
The Islamist organizations tended to be better organized (Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusrah and
Kurdish YPG); enjoyed more consistent support from Turkey, Qatar and Jordan. ISIS, IS from 2014,
had been in influence from 2006 onwards, and it focused on establishing a Caliphate and submit
subjects to sharia law and indoctrination. It became a threat to the West because of terror attacks,
what caused the former to focus on IS rather than the support of the FSA, which was to act
accordingly (which caused FSA to sometimes ally with extremist groups who then became
prominent).
The Military Forces of the Regime
- The regime Army was at a low at the beginning of 2011; many Alawi’s and Assad family members in
the armed forces top positions. Dissidence was severely punished: “black box of family, clan,
business, and intelligence elites”. When the balance of battle turned to Assad’s disadvantage in July
3015, Russia started to intervene militarily in September. Next to this, the regime formed militias
and irregular units. The extent to which the regime was in control is a matter of debate; prominent
role of militias due to exhausted military?
Shifting Military Alliances
- During the war the ‘marriages of convenience’ shifted on various occasions, depending on short-
term priorities. Moderate-extremist cooperation has been referred to before; only to win or survive.
The international coalition did not ally with the Assad regime against IS. IS was a regime enemy as
well, but as long as it was fighting opponents elsewhere, it was left alone. It also left towns that were
not supportive enough at the mercy of IS > Salamiyah for example. It was accused too of cooperation
with PYD, who in reality was an enemy; it was used as counterbalance against IS in the north. Turkey
did not mind this, but when things turned out positive for PYD, it became a security threat and
Turkey became willing to open negotiations with Russia and Iran. The US however supported the
PYD as a force against IS. The regime supported Iraqi Shi’a militias against the opposition, supported
by Iran.
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