Unit 2G.1 - The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911-46
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Summary WWII and the end of fascism
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Unit 2G.1 - The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911-46
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A detailed summary of the impact of Italy's decision to enter WWII on the side of Nazi Germany and the extent to which the Italian nation changed between 1943-46.
Unit 2G.1 - The rise and fall of fascism in Italy, c1911-46
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What was the impact of Italy’s decision to enter the Second World
War on the side of Nazi Germany in 1940?
Failures in France, North Africa and the Mediterranean
Italy’s entry into the war alongside Germany was based on the concept of a ‘parallel war’
Italy would concentrate on the Mediterranean basin and hinterland and north Africa while the
Germans would concentrate on northern, central and eastern Europe
The first part of the campaign was somewhat successful
France requested an armistice with Germany even before Italian troops had attacked French territory
Mussolini then ordered the Italian advance into the French Alps
However, Italy’s first major engagement in the war simply revealed massive problems in the army
The troops lacked proper clothing for an alpine war, the air force lacked the bombs needed to destroy
French fortifications and Mussolini insisted on using tanks that were completely inadequate for the
terrain
The advance was slow and the Italians captured only 13 unimportant villages at the cost of many
men, including deaths from frostbite
The French government signed an armistice with Germany and fascist newspapers claimed that
Italy’s intervention had been critical to this decision but in reality, it had saved the Italian army from
further embarrassment
Mussolini had hoped for a short war that would provide Italy with the spoils of war for little cost
However, when Ciano met with Hitler, the Nazis now said that Italy must wait for the defeat of
Britain before territorial claims could be discussed
Mussolini ordered the partial demobilisation of Italian troops, mistakenly believing that the war was
virtually over and waited for Germany’s invasion of Britain to take place
This was a serious miscalculation
Italian forces in Libya were ordered to attack British positions
They had some early successes crossing into Egypt and towards the Suez Canal, but this was simply
a tactical British retreat
When Britain counter-attacked, the Italian forces fell into mass retreat
An Italian force of nearly 250,000 were defeated by 30,000 much better equipped British troops
By May 1941, Italy had lost Eritrea, Somalia and most critically, Abyssinia
Around 380,000 Italian troops had surrendered and been taken prisoner, a huge blow to fascist
propaganda that proclaimed the transformation of the Italian people into a militant nation
The British advance into Libya was only halted by German troops under the command of Rommel
who had been sent to reinforce Italian troops
This signalled the end of the concept of the parallel war, as Germany now had to engage in areas
where Hitler had hoped the Italians would do the fighting
Rommel’s Africa Corps had some early victories, but by late 1942 they were on retreat
In May 1943, the German-Italian Axis surrendered in North Africa
Libya was lost and the Allies were preparing for an invasion of Italy from Tunisia
In the Mediterranean, which had been a dominant focus for Mussolini all the way through his
dictatorship, Italian strategy proved confusing and inadequate
Despite his propaganda, Mussolini had no consistent strategy for attacking key British positions in
the Mediterranean
The Italian navy had been crippled by a British air attack in November 1940
There was poor coordination between the air force and the navy — July 1940, the air force bombed
its own ships
Italy also lacked aircraft carriers without which they could not hope to mount a serious attack on
British positions in the Mediterranean
By 1943, Italy had failed to achieve any of its aims set out in the parallel war
Disaster in Greece
Italy had launched its attack on Greece in October 1940 from its base in Albania
Italian aims in Yugoslavia had been rebuffed by its German ally and instead, the Nazis occupied the
Romanian oil fields
, This was seen by Mussolini as an attempt by Hitler to push German influence into the Balkans,
disregarding the agreement they had come to on separate spheres of influence
Moving into Greece would increase Italy’s strategic position in the Balkans
Mussolini decided not to tell Hitler about his planned invasion
The invasion, however, was a disaster
Mussolini assumed that the Greeks only had 30,000 troops and therefore Italy would attack with
60,000, when in fact they had 300,000
He believed that Bulgaria would join the Italian invasion, although this was completely unfounded
He did not coordinate the attack with the navy or air force despite the fact that this was crucial for
the seaborne invasion
The weather conditions in Greece at this time of year were wet and freezing in the mountains
Italian forces were bogged down in the difficult conditions, they had little mechanical support and
their uniforms disintegrated in the heavy rains
The Greeks soon counter-attacked, taking over a quarter of Albania
Italian casualties were high and after six months, Mussolini had to call on the help of Germany who
humiliated the Italian forces by defeating the Greeks within weeks
Italy was given administration over Greece but the campaign dealt a serious blow to fascism
Mussolini’s dictatorship had been shown to be weaker than Greece, which was not considered a
great European power
Fascist propaganda was unable to disguise the truth from the Italian people and the defeat had a
major impact in undermining their faith in fascist rule and Mussolini
It also confirmed Italy’s subservience to Germany and the end of the parallel war
War economy and military weaknesses
Mussolini held the positions of Minister of War, Minister of Navy, Minister of the Air Force and
Supreme Commander of the Italian armed forces
He was also head of five separate ministries
This concentration of power hampered Italy’s military effectiveness
Mussolini took all the major decisions, often without consultation with military experts
If he left Rome, the government shut down as other fascist ministers were unable to make any
decisions without him
He was unable to coordinate the army, navy and air force or transform the economy to fulfil the
priorities of Italy’s war
He would often call meetings with military leaders and gave vague instructions to improve war
production without explaining how this was to take place
In 1941, he sent 200,000 troops unasked to assist Hitler in Operation Barbarossa, troops which
would have been of much more use in north Africa
The military was also in a very poor state at the start of the war and this was never improved upon
Italy had 75 divisions but only enough equipment to arm 35 of them
It lacked tanks and vehicles required for the mechanised fighting taking place in Africa
Around a third of tanks and a quarter of the artillery being supplied to Africa was destroyed by
British attacks in the Mediterranean
Many of the rifles and canons dated from the First World War
Italy had very few aircraft carriers and its naval ships had no radar equipment and very little oil
The air force was outdated compared to the British Spitfires and they had no long-range bombers to
attack British positions in Egypt or Gibraltar
Rations were low and the state of clothing worse than during the First World War
There were language problems between the officers and peasant conscripts and many could not
understand why they were fighting so far away from home
Morale was low, as shown in the massive numbers of Italian prisoners taken in Africa
Tactics were outdated, Italians often still employed 19th century charges against enemy positions,
which by the Second World War, were virtually suicidal
The Italian economy was completely inadequate for the requirements of the Second World War
By 1942, the industry in the USA could produce more aircraft in a week than Italy in a year
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