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Samenvatting

Summary Philosophy and psychology

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Summary of all lectures, includes information to answer all SSA's. Clear summary and should contain sufficient information to pass the exam:) Samenvatting van alle hoorcolleges en werkcolleges. Daarnaast bevat het alle informatie van de SSA's. Door het leren van de samenvatting kan je de SSA's allemaal beantwoorden. Dit leren zal in principe voldoende zijn om het tentamen te halen.

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SUMMARY PHILOSOPHY

LECTURE 1 - PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND SUBSTANCE DUALISM
 Mind = referring to all states, processes, events, capacities
= mental aspect  person who you are

 Mind-Body problem = the mind has characteristics that the body does not have & vice versa:
Mental states are conscious and some have:
 Phenomenal quality =  Chalmers
o Pain/itch
 Problem: Hard problem
 Intentionality =  Brentano
o I believe that is a table
 Problem: AI
 Kreitler (2018): Mind-Body is implicit entailed in different psychological frameworks and the methods
they employ
o There is nothing but the body/brain
o There is nothing but the mind
o Body and mind exist in parallel & interact
 Substance dualism = body and soul are distinct
- Immaterial soul and material body
o Mind/Soul are mental processes
 Thinking/believing/perceiving/remembering/experiencing
o Body/Brain are sensory- and motoric processes
- Core of many religions
- Requires that mind and body can exist as separate entities
- Arguments in favor of substance dualism:
o Leibniz’ Law = identity of indiscernible (ononderscheidbaarheid)
 x = y  x & y has same properties
 Mind and body do not have the same properties





 Doesn’t work for psychological states: it’s unjustified leap of
epistemology (study of what we know)  ontology (study of what really exists)
 Intentional Fallacy = intentionele drogreden
o Descartes:
 Bodily states and processes have a spatial location/extension
 Problem: Identity theory
 Mental entities are rational entities
 Method of radical doubt: Cogito ergo sum = I think, therefore I am
o Interactionism = mind and body continuously interact
 Interaction problem: How can something non-spatial (mind) interact with something
spatial (pineal gland)?  Causal interaction needs spatial contact
- Dualistic alternatives:
o Interactionism
o Parallelism = mind and body similar coordinated with no interaction  caused by god
 Leibniz
o Occassionalism = Body and mind are different substances that do not interact directly with
each other  god mediates between the substances
 Malebranch
o Dualistic Monism = Everything is made of the same substance (mind and body physical, but
different characteristics/qualia)
 Idealism = everything that exists is mind-dependent

,  Materialism = Everything that exists matter: all processes reducible to matter
LECTURE 2 - VARIETIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

 Reductive physicalism = There are only physical properties in the world
 Non-reductive physicalism = mind is physical, but mental properties can’t be reduced to physical
properties
 Consciousness:
o Creature consciousness = sentience, wakefulness, self-awareness
o State consciousness = transitive, awareness of one’s mental state
 Access consciousness = direct accessibility for control of action/speech/thought
 Beliefs/thinking computers
 Phenomenal consciousness = subjective character of experience (bv: dreams)
 Qualia = Qualitative aspects of consciousness (visual
experience/taste-/olfactory/pain/etc.)
- Only subjectively accessible (only you know what’s like to feel pain)
- Specific experiential character (it’s specific what’s like to feel pain)
- Well-defined temporal boundaries (when pain over, quale gone)

 Easy problems of consciousness can be explained by cognitive science in terms of functional and
neural organization and their realization  access consciousness
 Hard problem of consciousness a simple explanation of function leaves the question open: why is it
accompanied by experience?

 Arguments against explaining (phenomenal) consciousness
 Zombie argument: Qualia are not physical properties
 Zombies have all my physical properties but lack qualia

 Not possible to have exact same behavior/internal structure while not having same qualia
 Why so sure that we can conceive of something that it is possible
 Knowledge argument: Qualia must be knowledge of something non-physical
 Bats echolocation
We kunnen precies weten hoe iets werkt, maar niet hoe het daadwerkelijk is om het te ervaren
 Thought experiment (Frank Jackson): kleur ervaren vs onderzoeken
 Maybe Mary did not know everything (knowing what it’s like to experience red)
 Explanatory Gap Argument: qualia are kind of nonphysical property
Can’t explain why consciousness occurs with certain neurological processes
 Unclear why and how the brain gives rise to consciousness:
How can we explain how something feels?
 There is a science of consciousness:
Global workspace theory = a central processor that mediates communication between a host of
specialized nonconscious modules

 Property dualism = person is not composed of 2 different substances
- Cognitive systems have physical and non-physical properties (qualia)
- Non-physical properties are not reducible to physical properties and vice versa
Epiphenomenalism = qualia are not causally efficacious properties and consciousness is causally
irrelevant
- We can give a full physical explanation of every physical event

 Reductive materialism vs substance dualism:
all that exists is composed of physical particles  fundamental parts of the world
 Reductive materialism vs non-reductive materialism:
mental properties are identical to physical properties and are fully explained by it
 Reductive materialism vs eliminativism: mental states exists, can be reduced to physical states

, LECTURE 3 - IDENTITY THEORY
Identity theory = mental states are identical to brain states
- Mentalistic language is neutral, this is not argument for/against substance dualism
- Ontologically simpler than substance dualism
- Mind-body problem: mind is identical to brain processes that are part of natural world

 Numerical identity = one & the same
 Qualitative identity = similar (the same kind)
 A priori = vooraf, zonder kennis
 A priori identity = definition = knowledge of a fact, without proof because of experience
 Murderer of Jones is the murderer of jones
 A bachelor is an unmarried man
 A posteriori = Achteraf gezien, terugwerken van gevolg naar oorzaken
 A posteriori identity = Knowledge because of experience
 Murderer of Jones is the owner of a grocery store
 Identity statements (A posteriori identity)= brute facts of nature that need to be discovered by
science
 Water is H2O
 Phineas Gage – Damasio (D’Escartes’ Error)
 Lesion Studies:
- Broca’s area: speech
- Wernicke’s area: language comprehension

 One-to-one mapping = one brain area is one cognitive function
 Modularity = how brain areas perform respective function in isolation from one another

 Type = class/category
 Dog
 Token = individual object in class/category
 My dad’s dog
 Type identity theory: every mental state of a specific type is identical to a brain state of a specific type
 can predict brain state type from mental state type and vice versa
 Every person that feels pain shares the same kind of brain state
o Numerical a posteriori type
o Challenges:
 Multiple realizability = Human beings with different types of brains can have same
types of mental states as humans  Pain (bv: bottles)
 Neural variability = significant differences between human beings
 Genetic/prenatal/environmental effects
 Neural plasticity
 Token identity theory: particular token of mental state type is identical to a particular token of a brain
state
 can’t make further assumptions
 Particular pain I feel right now is identical to the brain state of some type
o Lack of explanatory power

 Notes on brain research:
 Localism
 Globalism = specific cognitive functions identified best in widely distributed brain network
 Multifunctionality = same brain areas are involved in multiple cognitive functions
 Connectivity = processing of different cognitive functions are connected
 Many-to-many mapping = same brain area involved in multiple tasks & same task realized in different
brain areas & brain areas dynamically interact
o Mapping is not reduction
o Correlation is not explanation
 Neuro imaging: seeing is believing  researchers interpret their own findings
LECTURE 4 – FUNCTIONALISM
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