Is Functionalism Convincing?
Statement of Intent: I will be arguing that Functionalism is a convincing theory of mind. Firstly I will show
that conceptually and empirically the case of qualia is not convincing (and that functionalism coheres
more with what we know empirically) and therefore does not pose a problem from functionalism.
Secondly I will show that even without presupposing qualia thought experiments such as the China
System still fail to show a functional duplicate and therefore together functionalism has no issues with its
account of phenomenal conciousness. More crucially I will show that through multiple realizability,
Functionalism, corresponds with the phenomenology of our mental life, enables to account for animal
behaviour, and enables multiple realizability to be its strengths whereas for other theories it is a serious
weakness.
RICE 1:
A key contention with functionalism is whether qualia could exist. If qualia exists then functionalism is
false because qualia are defined as non-relational yet functional properties because it relates to input and
output must be relational and therefore if qualia exist then not all properties are relational and therefore
not all properties are functional. The existence of Qualia is argued for in the inverted qualia thought
experiment
R: Inverted Qualia is not a good thought experiment and is too simplistic. Every colour has a unique
similarity and dissimilarity relations to all surrounding colours (eg red is similar to orange but dissimilar to
blue). If we inverted red and green then this would mess up this similarity and dissimilarity relation. If
seeing an orange, the person who experienced red when seeing the tree would say the orange is a similar
colour to the tree which the other person would disagree. Therefore there is still a functional difference
and so they are not functional duplicates. Even if the qualia-advocate suggests to invert the entire colour
spectrum there are further issues in which humans are able to make finer discriminations in some colours
more then others. Therefore if we inverted the whole spectrum then we would still have difference in
behaviour if ask to compare shades etc. Therefore it is empirically impossible for someone to have
inverted qualia without functional differences. And so empirically functionalism is much more coherent
then the idea of an inverted qualia. We have no good reason to think that qualia can be inverted in the way
the thought experiment describes.
I: It is still conceivable that we could correct this as well. The person with inverted qualia has the same
objective discrimination abilities as the rest as us but inverted as well.
C: Whilst it is conceivable at that point are they really seeing the same colour as us? The colours they
experience have different similarity relations and have different powers of discrimination. The issue with
this response is that fundamentally the qualia-advocate misunderstands what it means to experience
colour. For the qualia advocate to experience colour is the conscious introspection however this is too
murky and it is better to explain the experience of colour physically - what colour is physically constituted
of, how our brain processes colour, our retina, cornea. How we experience colour should be determined
by who has the best explanatory theory of colour experience not by thought experiments. But qualia as an
empirical hypothesis is incredibly weak. If qualia was to exist then it seems to suggest that there is an
empirical difference in our conscious experience that are undetectable since they make no functional
difference. Science does not proceed by supposing undetectable facts. Therefore, empirically the case
for qualia to exist is weak.
E: Therefore I have shown that in the thought experiment conceptually and empirically qualia does not
exist and therefore a key potential objection to functionalism is resolved and from this we understand
functionalism to be a sucessful theory of mind because it coheres more with what we know empirically.
RICE 2:
Is Functionalism Convincing? 1
Statement of Intent: I will be arguing that Functionalism is a convincing theory of mind. Firstly I will show
that conceptually and empirically the case of qualia is not convincing (and that functionalism coheres
more with what we know empirically) and therefore does not pose a problem from functionalism.
Secondly I will show that even without presupposing qualia thought experiments such as the China
System still fail to show a functional duplicate and therefore together functionalism has no issues with its
account of phenomenal conciousness. More crucially I will show that through multiple realizability,
Functionalism, corresponds with the phenomenology of our mental life, enables to account for animal
behaviour, and enables multiple realizability to be its strengths whereas for other theories it is a serious
weakness.
RICE 1:
A key contention with functionalism is whether qualia could exist. If qualia exists then functionalism is
false because qualia are defined as non-relational yet functional properties because it relates to input and
output must be relational and therefore if qualia exist then not all properties are relational and therefore
not all properties are functional. The existence of Qualia is argued for in the inverted qualia thought
experiment
R: Inverted Qualia is not a good thought experiment and is too simplistic. Every colour has a unique
similarity and dissimilarity relations to all surrounding colours (eg red is similar to orange but dissimilar to
blue). If we inverted red and green then this would mess up this similarity and dissimilarity relation. If
seeing an orange, the person who experienced red when seeing the tree would say the orange is a similar
colour to the tree which the other person would disagree. Therefore there is still a functional difference
and so they are not functional duplicates. Even if the qualia-advocate suggests to invert the entire colour
spectrum there are further issues in which humans are able to make finer discriminations in some colours
more then others. Therefore if we inverted the whole spectrum then we would still have difference in
behaviour if ask to compare shades etc. Therefore it is empirically impossible for someone to have
inverted qualia without functional differences. And so empirically functionalism is much more coherent
then the idea of an inverted qualia. We have no good reason to think that qualia can be inverted in the way
the thought experiment describes.
I: It is still conceivable that we could correct this as well. The person with inverted qualia has the same
objective discrimination abilities as the rest as us but inverted as well.
C: Whilst it is conceivable at that point are they really seeing the same colour as us? The colours they
experience have different similarity relations and have different powers of discrimination. The issue with
this response is that fundamentally the qualia-advocate misunderstands what it means to experience
colour. For the qualia advocate to experience colour is the conscious introspection however this is too
murky and it is better to explain the experience of colour physically - what colour is physically constituted
of, how our brain processes colour, our retina, cornea. How we experience colour should be determined
by who has the best explanatory theory of colour experience not by thought experiments. But qualia as an
empirical hypothesis is incredibly weak. If qualia was to exist then it seems to suggest that there is an
empirical difference in our conscious experience that are undetectable since they make no functional
difference. Science does not proceed by supposing undetectable facts. Therefore, empirically the case
for qualia to exist is weak.
E: Therefore I have shown that in the thought experiment conceptually and empirically qualia does not
exist and therefore a key potential objection to functionalism is resolved and from this we understand
functionalism to be a sucessful theory of mind because it coheres more with what we know empirically.
RICE 2:
Is Functionalism Convincing? 1
