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Attlee By Author:
Contents:
[1] Addison, Paul. The Road to 1945.
[2] Tomlinson (1998) Why so Austere? The British Welfare State of the 1940s
[3] Let Us Face the Future Manifesto (1945)
[4] Brooke, Stephen Labour's War: The Labour Party and the Second World War, (1992),
[5] Rubinstein, D. `Socialism and the Labour Party: the Labour Left and Domestic Policy 1945-1950’
[6] Brooke, Stephen `Revisionists and fundamentalists: the Labour Party and economic policy during
the Second World War’ (1989)
[7] Hayes, Nick. ‘Did we really want a National Health Service?’ (2012)
[8] McKibbin, Ross. Parties and People, England 1914-1951 (OUP, 2010)
[9] Francis, Martin. Ideas and Policies under Labour 1945-51: Building a New Britain (1997)
[10] Crowcroft, Robert (et al.), “The Fall of the Attlee Government, 1951” (2013)
Addison, Paul. The Road to 1945. British Politics and the Second World War (revd ed. Pimico, 1993),
new Introduction & chapters 9, 10.
-> ‘Mr Attlee’s Consensus’, but specifically a Whitehall consensus rather than one for the whole
country
-> consensus based on a managed economy, nationalisation, and the welfare state
-> the war DID radicalise the public (most left-wing in 1942) BUT not toward socialism per se
-> 'When Labour swept to victory in 1945 the new consensus fell, like a branch of ripe plums, into
the lap of Mr Attlee’14
-> the war put Labour into Whitehall and allowed them to gain the support of the establishment
-> 'the political influence of the ration-book seems to me to have been greater than that of all the left-
wing propaganda of the war years put together’ - ethos of ‘fair shares for all’
-> argues that the optimists triumphed over the pessimists after the war (direct contrast to Fielding’s
pessimism argument)
-> Conservative weakness meant Labour could capture the middle classes
-> difficult to tell whether the coalition broke up because they exhausted all the topics on which THE
LEADERS agreed on, or whether it was divergent GRASSROOTS opinion that drove them apart
-> the issue of land was what broke up the coalition? - Uthwatt Committee proposed the
nationalisation of land - adopted as official Labour Policy - intense opposition from Tories - Uthwatt
proposals were key in Lewis Silkin's 1947 Town and Country Planning Act
-> argues that on the whole Labour did NOT have an organisational advantage in 1945, but Tories
were disadvantaged by their candidate selection process
-> Labour tried to make capitalism work for the working classes rather than dismantling it
-> 'Labour's demands had largely been cast in a mould of thought provided by the non-socialist
intelligentsia between the wars and during WW2'277- 'such was Mr Attlee's consensus’
Why did Labour win in 1945?
[1] opinion 'swung decisively' in Labour's favour
- Labour reflected popular radicalism, Conservatives failed to adapt
- Labour had to 'build upon the new foundations of popular opinion’
- eg. 1922 Committee successfully prevented the nationalisation of coal 1943; and opposed
1943 Catering wages bill
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[2] Labour manifesto better reflected people’s demands than Tories
- 'Labour put the material needs of the average family above all else in its campaign’
- eg. Emphasis on SS and housing
- ie. Was v practical minded manifesto
[3] Labour better reflected ‘all in it together’ mentality
- counted Tories ‘help him finish the job’ (individualistic) with emphasis on winning the
people’s war
Countering one argument - organisational strength:
- might think this was the decisive factor (Churchill at time claimed it was, but Addison
argues NO!
Churchill’s claims:
[1] Trade unions had had to stay home to organise war production so were still
organised
[2] all Conservative constituency agents been in war work or service (absent)
The rebuttal:
[1] March 1945 Labour had only 58 full-time agents, Tories had 246 that were going
to be released once war over
[2] Tory associations kept active during war → 'loyalty and enthusiasm of the Tory
ladies'
[3] Tory membership recovering by 1945
[4] 2 million more TU members by 1945 BUT contracting-in meant that this did not
equate to 2 million more Labour members
How did consensus form?
[1] role of progressives in war coalition
(a) TUC 'virtually a department’
(b) 1940 Keynes had his own room in the Treasury and the 'middle way' was popularised
[2] nature of the war
(a) 'fair shares’ originated in Board of Trade campaign for clothes rationing
(b) vindicate the ‘optimist’ position that capitalism could be tamed via state intervention vs
the ‘pessimist’ position that class divide was inevitable
[3] disinterest of Conservative leaders
(a) a little circle of eccentrics and foreign and defence experts'20 -eg. Lord Beaverbrook,
Eden more concerned about defeating Hitler than the home front (let Attlee rule)
What extent was Attlee Gov successful?
- on the whole, argues was successful
[1] 1945-50 governments extended the work of the coalition but went further (CONTEST -
Tomlinson)
[2] 1948 Bevan's NHS - only element that deviated from the coalition's plans was the nationalisation
of hospitals (CONTEST - Brooke on salaried doctors, Tomlinson on number of hospitals built)
[3] Nationalisation - successfully took one of the 'glittering prizes of the private sector’ (iron and
steel)
[4] Housing - claims 1947 act + 1mill built was a success (CONTEST - much lower than promised
4.5m, low real resource cost - Tomlinson)
To what extent was class important?
- argues little
- the country was economically (and increasingly) divided along class lines but this did not translate
socially/politically
- eg. Nationalisations were NOT in the name of class
- in the name of efficiency (COMPARE TO FRANCIS) - evidenced by only ‘token
opposition’ form Tories and fact had been influenced by Tory written reports
- ‘moderate social patriots’ - 'small and close kit community, insular, and bound together by strong
patriotic feelings’
- meant the Tories were able to adapt and adopt to Labour’s stance by 1950s
1993 Restatement - clarifying consensus:
[1] consensus on what level?
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- ‘neither a social consensus, nor a consensus between party activists...but a Whitehall consensus’
- Labour Party leaders largely autonomous from wider party
- postwar reconstruction involved ‘blueprints from above’
Example: rank and file in both parties couldn't wait for the coalition to end - the leaders DID NOT
WANT IT TO END (Churchill and Bevin discussed continuing coalition)
[2] consensus over what
(a) policy aims - YES
(i) universal health care
(ii) full employment (Assumption C) - though NOTE was only front bench
agreement (Labour BBs + Bevin skeptical as thought unemployment inevitable - something to managed not
fixed)
(iii) housing expansion
(iv) coal mining needed reform - promote efficiency
BUT:
- divided over the issue of Land - Labour wanted to nationalise (Athwart committee)
(b) policy instruments (means) - NO
(i) NHS- Labour wanted salary doctors
(ii) Employment - White Paper ruled out deficit financing
(iii) Housing - Tories wanted quantity (prefabs), Labour quality
(iv) Mining - Tories (Reid Committee) wanted min wage/EPL; Labour wanted
nationalisation
[3] consensus in policy?
(a) social policy
- argues against Brooke (1992)
- disagreement in principle did not translate to disagreement in policy
implementation (eg. social security benefits not at subsistence levels, education continued to follow 1944 act,
only one new health centre had been built by 1952)
(b) economic policy
- agrees with Brooke that was not consolidated until late 40s/50s (Butskellism)
- but argues that the seeds that Keynesian consensus were present in 1945
[4] consensus compared to what?
(a) disagreement: ‘areas of agreement were more important than areas of dispute’
(b) other time periods: ‘lowered the ideological temperature’ vs other time periods
- AND more substantive (vs MacDonald-Baldwin consensus of 'prevent anything
unusual from happening’)
Tomlinson (1998) Why so Austere? The British Welfare State of the 1940s
Key quotes:
[1] “1940s reforms seem to have brought into being an austere, minimalist structure of welfare
provision” - an “austerity welfare state”
[2] “austere priorities enunciated by Stafford Cripps extended in their impact beyond personal
consumption and into the collective consumption of welfare”
[3] ‘Beveridge’s plan dovetailed almost perfectly with both Labour’s rhetoric and its own plan for
social insurance’ (Brooke, 1992, p. 164)
[4] “The Treasury approach seems to have been to use this widespread and not unreasonable picture of
the demographic prospects to give credence to fears about the future”
Main Argument:
[1] Labour’s welfare state was an “austerity welfare state”
[2] This is with respect to
[a] real terms expenditure
[b] prewar provision
[c] comparable European countries
[3] 3 driving forces:
[1] economic priorities
[2] acceptance of Beveridge
[3] acceptance of the Treasury View
How it fits in:
