Kate Patrick
(i) What did Thatcherism have in common with previous forms of
Conservatism?
This essay will argue that ultimately the key commonality between Thatcherism and previous forms
of Conservatism, was the pursuance of a Conservative style of statecraft (Bulpitt, 1986). The rst
part of this essay will discuss whether the individualist ideas central to Thatcherism were consistent
with previous forms of Conservatism. I will problematise Green’s (2006) argument that Thatcherite
individualist ideas were incompatible with traditional Conservative principles, rst by arguing that
Thatcherite conceptions of the individual collapsed into that of the family (Sutcliffe-Braithwaite,
2012), and secondly by holding that the co-existence of libertarian and collectivist strands has
always been central to the ‘non-ideological’ Conservative tradition (Gamble, 1994). This will lead
onto the second half of the essay, in which I will argue that neoliberalism, which at a rst pass,
seems to be a radical break from post-war consensus Conservatism, was actually just the relevant
weapon of choice for the pursuance of traditional Conservative statecraft (Tomlinson in Jackson,
2012). As such, while Thatcherism did draw on a richer ideological repertoire than previous forms
of Conservatism, this was only because it was necessary to reassert Conservative dominance.
Thatcherism as a term is misleading: it seems imply a coherent ideological phenomena that is
distinctive from Conservatism. I will follow Gamble in holding that ‘Thatcherism’ is best
understood, not as a coherent ideology, but as a ‘political project’ that aimed to reassert
Conservative dominance after a series of electoral failures in the 1970s. Thatcher did not enter
government in 1979 with a clear ‘blueprint’ of what to do, and the government 'like apprentices,
continued to learn on the job’, improvising on the spot policy such as industrial relations legislation
(Bulpitt, 1986: 36). Moreover, I will hold that a ‘form of Conservatism’ is not reducible to a
particular Conservative government or leader. Rather, it is characterised by a combination of ideas,
principles, values and statecraft. Taking this broad view means that this essay focuses on the ways
in which Thatcherism had these elements in common with previous forms of Conservatism, rather
than a simple comparison of policies between governments. It seems evident that there was a lack
of policy commonality between Thatcher and previous governments, with the conviction to achieve
“the free economy and the strong state” via neoliberal and monetarist policies, that were in stark
contrast to the post-war Conservative governments who had ‘acquiesced’ to the Keynesian demand
management consensus. Yet, I will hold that once we look at the underlying characteristics of
Conservatism, Thatcherism had more in common with previous forms than a surface level policy
analysis would suggest.
Firstly, Green argues that the individualism central to Thatcherite justi cations for privatisation and.
reduced state intervention represented a break with previous forms of Conservatism because it
stretched the central principle of ‘organicism’ to ‘breaking point’ (2006: 50). Organicism is one of
the four central principles of traditional Conservatism detailed by Quinton1 and is the idea that
society is characterised by the balanced symbiotic social relations between individuals, and society,
resulting in ‘an organised living whole’ that is neither the ‘mechanical aggregate’ of collectivist
socialism, nor the atomic individualisation of pure libertarianism. The Thatcherite emphasis on free
markets and personal responsibility of the individual seems to directly contradict this notion. It is
possible that Thatcherites could offer Conservative justi cations for liberal markets with regard to
the other conservative principles: for instance, Enoch Powell argued that state regulation transmuted
intellectual imperfection into ‘natural’ and perfect free market outcomes. However, Green (2006)
holds that these justi cation are ‘problematic’ because the economic theories underpinning tenets of
liberal market economics (eg. Propensity to save) are equally products of ‘abstract, deductive
1 The other three being intellectual imperfection, political skepticism, and traditionalism.
fi fi fi fi fi fi
, Kate Patrick
reasoning’, meaning that the assumptions upon which neoliberalism are based are equally as
imperfect as that which supporters of State intervention hold. Thus, the centrality of individualism
to Thatcherism 'raises a major problem' in terms of placing it in the Conservative tradition (Green,
2006).
However, when the moral dimension of Thatcherism is considered, it becomes apparent that the
type of individualism integral to it was perhaps more compatible with previous forms of
Conservatism than Green’s analysis would suggest. Sutcliffe-Baithwaite (2012) argues that
Thatcherite individualism was ‘family-centred' and ‘moralistic' and thus not identical to the
neoliberal self-interested and rational utility maximiser that Green’s argument rests on. This
emphasis is encapsulated by Thatcher’s infamous declaration that there is no such thing as society
but ‘There are individual men and women and there are families.’, as well as references to
‘Victorian values’. As such, when policy allows or incentivised individuals to pursue self-interest,
this was framed as inadvertently bene ting families and thus ‘reinvigorates’, rather than
disintegrating, societal relations. Individualism is thus compatible with ‘organicism'. This ‘moral
imperative’ underpinned Thatcherite social policy, which rejected Heath’s tax credit system on the
grounds that short-term bene ts like sick pay were not taxed so individuals had the incentive to
scrounge off the state rather than take moral responsibility for themselves (and their families).
Instead, Thatcherism favoured lower taxes and regulated bene ts in line with in ation, on the
grounds that the nanny state infantilised the tax payer, and reduced incentives to act in the self and
family interest that would promote societal relations. Thus, when Thatcherite individualism is
viewed through a moral lens, it can be seen as compatible with the traditional Conservative
principle of ‘organicism’, even though at a policy level this meant rejecting policies proposed by the
Heath government.
While it is possible to reconcile Thatcherite individualism with Conservative tradition at a moral
level, Gamble (1994) offers a more compelling argument: namely, as a traditionally ‘non-
ideological’ party, British conservatism has always housed both liberation and collectivist strands of
thought, and that Thatcherism merely represented a continuation of this. For instance, in the 1880s
and 1890s there was strong anti-statist views within the Conservative party, with the Liberty and
Property Defence League organising campaigns to 'preserve the open shop, limit picketing and
prevent the growth of pro t sharing’ (Gamble, 1994: 155). Moreover, the ‘conscious assimilation of
Liberal nostrums’ to attract Liberal defectors after 1918 and 1951, meant that libertarian strands
were 'not entirely eclipsed' even after 1945, when Conservative governments accepted a more
collectivist welfare state and intervention in the form of Keynesian demand management. For
instance, the constant presence of libertarian Waldron Smithers, Nigel Birch, and Enoch Powell, as
well as the pressure fromm the 1950s onwards of the IEA. Similarly, the fact that the ‘wets’
continued to exist and hold key positions under the Thatcher government, lends credence to Ian
Gilmore’s assertion that ‘as far as ideology is concerned a Conservative is well advised to travel
light’. Thus, there are ‘no clear guidelines’ that Conservatives must follow with regard to their
beliefs about the role of government, so whether Thatcherism leaned more toward libertarian
individualism or collectivism is irrelevant for judging the commonalities with previous forms of
Conservatism.
And yet, even if the existence of the libertarian strand in Thatcherism was not a deviation from
previous forms of conservatism, the primacy of neoliberal ideology in driving the break with the
post-war consensus seems to be in tension with the claim that Thatcherism represented a
continuation of the non-ideological form of conservatism. For instance, Thatcher called for the need
to have an ‘intellectual counter-attack’ to what was presented as the immoral and inef cient post-
war socialist state (Green, 2006). And while Thatcher herself seemed to be wary of using overtly
ideological rhetoric, preferring the more homily terms ‘'honest' or 'sound' monetary policy, the likes
of Hayek and Friedman, as well as the ‘think-tank archipelago’ (eg. IEA and the CPS) who sought
fi fi fi fi fl fi
