Kate Patrick
(ii) In view of the economic conditions prevailing between the wars, how do you
explain the failure of the Fascist and Communist parties?
This essay will argue that the regional nature of unemployment meant that interwar Communist and
Fascist parties lacked the leverage needed to be successful, as traditional institutions were never
undermined. After outlining the nature of the economic conditions in the interwar years, I will argue
that McKibbon’s argument (1984) that the associational culture of the working classes offers shelter
from political extremism fails to explain the inter-war case because the regionally unemployed were
dismembered from this culture (Macintyre, 1980). I will then hold that there was a general
resistance amongst the working classes to extremism, but that this was a product of the ‘the
ideological predominance’ of traditional institutions (McKibbon, 1984). Furthermore, the
Communists failed to use the institutional channel of the trade unions to challenge this. While the
increase in political violence in the 1930s did threaten to undermine traditional institutions, the
response of the government successfully reasserted the authority of parliament, with the high
turnover of membership in both the BUF and CPGB evidencing that this threat was never deeply
rooted. As such, despite a period of economic dislocation, the Communist and Fascist parties never
undermined the authority of traditional institutions, and thus were unsuccessful.
I will primarily focus on the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and the Communist Party of Great
Britain (CPGB) given that they had the largest membership base (peaks of 50,000 and 18,000
respectively).While they were the largest, the CPGB only ever managed to win a maximum of one
seat, while the BUF never succeeded in gaining parliamentary representation. Given that neither
party succeeded in over-throwing parliamentary politics, I will hold that this lack of parliamentary
representation constitutes a party failure.
Moreover, an important preliminary is to note the unique economic conditions of the inter-war
years: the key feature was the extreme ‘degree of regional variation’ (Macintyre, 1980). Regions
dependent on old staple industries such as coal, cotton, iron, steel, and shipbuilding suffered from
high and protracted unemployment as a result of declining export markets. For instance, 12% of the
population were employed in coal mining in South Wales, with smaller pockets of pit-villages
experiencing even higher reliance, meaning that the decline of industry affected all aspects of every
day life (Macintyre, 1980). Conversely, areas in the Midlands and South England that bene tted
from ‘new’ industries like motor vehicles, electrical goods, arti cial bres, and chemicals, as well
as the service industry, relatively prospered bene tting from a housing boom and average rising
living standards by the mid 1930s. In contrast to comparable continental states like Germany or
Italy, the economic dislocation experienced in the interwar years was less widely felt and was
primarily concentrated in regional pockets. Given this, I will pay special attention to why the
CPGB and BUF were unable to gain mass support in these particularly hard-hit regions where we
may expect political discontent to be the most strong.
Firstly, McKibbon (1984) argues that one of the key reasons Communism failed to garner mass
support was that the working classes had a pre-existing associational culture that was in
competition with strictly political engagements. If so, then this could explain why regions facing
severe unemployment did not offer mass support to either the BUF or CPGB. Rising real wages
prior to WW1 had given the working classes 'a certain autonomy’ to foster a 'stable and relatively
sophisticated' associational culture based on activities such as mass sport, betting, and entertainment
(ibid: 307). Because many of these hobbies had occupational links (eg. breeding pigeons, angling-
clubs, cycling societies), they were, in an informal sense, political organisations. As such, any new
or serious political party that desired mass support amongst the working classes, had to compete
with these pre-existing associations to siphon off ‘political energies’ that were already in use.
Because of the occupational link, associational culture was strongest amongst the working classes in
regions dependent on only a few industries, which happened to also be those regions dependent on
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, Kate Patrick
staple industries and thus affected most by inter-war unemployment. As such, those areas which
may have been most susceptible to political extremism were sheltered by the existence of pre-
existing associations.
And yet, the regionally unemployed in the inter-war years were ‘dismembered’ and isolated from
the associational culture, so this argument fails to explain why the allure of extremist politics did
not captivate the unemployed working classes (Macintyre, 1980). Macintyre (1980) details how
1/3rd of the unemployed were below poverty line, while those who retained employment in these
regions experienced weekly wages falling faster than the cost of living. This meant that there was
no disposable income to partake in the leisure activities that had been central to creating a strong
associational working class culture. The the composition of the CPGB was 6% unemployed prior to
bene t cuts, rising to 60% after the cuts in 1931, suggesting that the less disposable income and the
more ‘dismemberment’, the more likely individuals were to offer their support to extremist parties.
This is further supported by contemporary Phil Paratin’s description of how families suffering from
unemployment were persuaded by communists to voluntarily destroy their BUF membership cards,
because this suggests there existed 'atomised individuals capable of being mobilised by either
extreme’ (Rawnsley, 2016: 192). Given this ‘dismemberment’, it is somewhat surprising that this
did not translate into deep disillusionment with traditional institutions amongst the unemployed that
could have been mobilised by Communist or Fascist parties. As such, a further explanation is
needed.
A more compelling line of argument is that the working classes were generally resistant to
‘revolutionary rhetoric or strategy’ because of long-standing commitments to the traditional
institutions (the crown and parliament) endowed them with a deeply rooted legitimacy (McKibbon,
1984). The seemingly fair and class-neutral nature of the traditional institutions meant that the
working classes did not possess a predisposition to reject institutions because they were not viewed
to be inherently biased against working class interests1. For instance, by end of 19th century the
crown was viewed as an 'even-handed guarantor of the class-neutrality of parliament’, with support
being shown by the general acceptance amongst the working classes of imperial honours2 (ibid:
312). Moreover, the 1918 and 1928 ROPA institutionalised the notion of fairness in parliament as
the working classes had the opportunity to gain political representation, and participation in
elections was a 'symbolic af rmation of acceptance’ of the system. This was particularly important,
given that elections had similarities to working class betting and sport culture, using metaphors
borrowed from sport (eg. 'below the belt’) to legitimise political institutions. Thus, the
predominance of the crown and parliament ‘inhibited’ the mass support for an ‘alternative social
system’, meaning that both the BUF and the CPGB faced strong ideological barriers when trying to
foster support amongst the working classes.
What’s more, the decline of militancy in the trade unions meant that the only institutional channel
through which Communists could have mobilised the working classes was effectively cut off
(Macintyre, 1980). Initially, the CPGB’s main strategy was to try to build links and promote
militancy within the trade unions3 and supporting organisations which collectively had access to a
pool of 100,000 supporters. Despite a period of resistance in the ‘militant atmosphere’ of the early
1920s, with the Triple Alliance successfully securing wage rises for miners and boosting CPGB
1 This is perhaps most notably when contrasted to the continent: eg. working class suspicion in the
newly formed state institutions of the Weimar Republic.
2This is particularly of interest given that this was not typical in other countries, for instance, in Australia
accepting a knighthood meant expulsion from Labour Party (McKibbon, 1984: 312).
3These were groups such as the National Worker's Committee, British Bureau of Red International of Trade
Unions, National Minority Movement.
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