Artigo em Anais de Evento:
Referência: ESPÍRITO SANTO JR, R. A., CORREIA, F. C., PALHARES, G. L, 2001, “Airport Privatization
in Brazil: Questions and Answers” In: 36th Canadian Transportation Research Forum (CTRF), Vancouver.
Proceedings of the 36th CTRF Annual Conference: 2001 A Transportation Odyssey. v. 1, p. 17-31.
AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION IN BRAZIL: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Respicio A. Espírito Santo Jr., D.Sc. 1 a , Fabio Cardoso Correia 2 b, Guilherme Lohmann Palhares 3 c
a
Associate Professor – Department of Transportation Engineering
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ/Brazil)
b
Senior Contract Manager, Office of Environmental Affairs
The City of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
c
Masters student in Transportation Engineering (UFRJ/Brazil)
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid 90s, Brazil has undergone a series of privatization processes involving various public
service activities: telecommunications, water and power distribution, financial institutions and also
transportation (highways, railroads, port terminals, etc.). Meanwhile, the air transportation industry did
not follow the steps of those other sister industries: indeed, only the state of São Paulo’s airline was
privatized (in 1990/91). Regarding the airports and related infrastructure, there were no signs of a
political shift in the mid 90s.
Even without any signs coming from the federal government during the 90s, some states began their
privatization processes. The state of Bahia has already three of its airports managed by private groups,
while the state of São Paulo is undergoing public hearings to privatize some of its most important
state-run airports. But in 1999, following a more aggressive privatization policy, the federal
government appointed the first civilian president for the federal airport management company, the
INFRAERO. His main roles include restructuring the entire organization and considering the
privatization of the nation’s major airports. Moreover, the creation of the Brazilian National Civil
Aviation Agency (ANAC) will directly influence the privatization processes as it will regulate airline
competition, and establish airport fees, among other roles.
In view of this, the objectives of this paper are: (1) analyse the current practices and the alternatives
being thought for the privatization of large/medium federal and state-managed airports in Brazil; and
(2) comment on how the new domestic regulatory environment may impact the privatization process
in the country.
2. CURRENT AIRPORT MANAGEMENT MODELS IN BRAZIL
This section will give a brief overview of the federal, centralized management model in practice for
the major airports in Brazil, while pointing the efforts and the recent policy being pushed forward by
some state transportation authorities to privatize its main airports.
2.1 The Federal Airport Authority: INFRAERO
In order to cope with the technological demands regarding Brazilian airport infrastructure, originated
from the introduction of the jet in the late 50s and the widebodies in the late 60s, the federal
government creates the International Airport Project Coordination Commission – CCPAI in the late
60s. Its main objective was to coordinate all the necessary studies regarding the planning and
construction of the new international airport in the country: Rio de Janeiro’s Galeão International
airport (GIG). In May, 1970 the federal government turns the CCPAI into the ARSA – Aeroportos do
Rio de Janeiro S.A., which builds itself into a very successful company managing not only GIG’s
planning and construction but also several other airports in the state of Rio de Janeiro and two other
1
E-mail address: respicio@momentus.com.br
2
E-mail address: cardosocorreia@ig.com.br
3
E-mail address: email@guilohmann.com
, Artigo em Anais de Evento:
Referência: ESPÍRITO SANTO JR, R. A., CORREIA, F. C., PALHARES, G. L, 2001, “Airport Privatization
in Brazil: Questions and Answers” In: 36th Canadian Transportation Research Forum (CTRF), Vancouver.
Proceedings of the 36th CTRF Annual Conference: 2001 A Transportation Odyssey. v. 1, p. 17-31.
neighboring states. Following its great success, in December 1972 the federal government, through the
Ministry of Aeronautics, transforms ARSA into the Infraero – Empresa Brasileira de Infra-estrutura
Aeroportuária or Brazilian Airport Authority, with the responsibility to manage the most important
airports of the country (Rosa et al, 1999).
Today, Infraero manages 67 airports in Brazil, from the very major airports (i.e. São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro Internationals) to general-aviation (GA) airports, like Campo de Marte and Jacarepaguá,
respectively in the city of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. It is a centralized federal government-owned
company under the Ministry of Defense since 1999. From its creation in 1972 until 1999 it was
directly under the Ministry of Aeronautics (Air Force Ministry), thus it has been a military-run and
military-structured organization for its entire life. Infraero is divided into seven “business centers”
(CNs), each responsible for a certain region of the country and its airports. Control is totally
centralized in Infraero headquarters in the country’s capital, Brasília. This centralized structure
prevents any independent management decisions from the CNs: for instance, each CN cannot set
individual/particular terminal and/or landing fees for its airports. As a measure of its importance,
Infraero-managed airports are responsible for about 95% of the total scheduled passenger traffic and
more than 99% of the cargo.
Indeed, the concept of a centralized airport administration company was very important in developing
a nation-wide high standard airport infrastructure during the 70s and 80s. But the concept has come to
some critical drawbacks. Being under a centralized management policy, each airport management
team lives with a permanent limitation towards developing studies, strategies and policies in order to
better interact with the particular characteristics (i.e.: economic, touristic, cultural) of the communities
or region it has its business. This precludes the management to fully explore the infrastructure
potentials in regard to its surrounding activities, not to say that it also prevents a closer participation of
the mentioned communities in the airport life. In turn, these factors combined lead to a series of
management practices and strategies that are not linked at all to the communities’ needs and interests.
Moreover, due to the centralized policy, there is also a centralized management and control of
resources. Dealing with the nation’s major airports together with low-traffic and also with GA airports,
in other words to very profitable airports to very unprofitable ones, a logical consequence is the need
for cross-subsidies. The very benefit of this model is that those always-unprofitable airports have
guaranteed resources for keeping them as fully usable and safe facilities. But the benefit is limited: as
the airport authority does not set individual studies and goals for each airport and its surrounding
communities, say through detailed passenger and cargo profile analysis and economic impact reports,
those allocated resources do not function as economic multipliers to the communities and regions,
staying almost totally limited to the operational needs of the infrastructures themselves.
Suffering the most of this centralization are the profitable airports. In fact, they never get to see their
profits returning as possibilities to really continue their roles of being the entry doors of the country.
An example is Brazil’s largest and most important airport, São Paulo/Guarulhos International (GRU):
it has reached its maximum capacity in terms of passenger traffic, but there are not enough resources
to build a third terminal. If GRU’s profits could have been used in its own benefit for the last several
years, the third terminal could be nearing its operational status in 2001.
Another great disadvantage of the current model is that it has developed a culture that can be referred
as a lack of stimuli for unprofitable airport managers as well as for those executives serving in the
profitable ones. The first group may well think that their role is just to keep the infrastructure opened
and running, as the resources for any improvements may eventually arrive, even though it will not
come from its own facilities. On the other hand, the executives from the profitable ones may well think
that they can also rest: even if they work hard to make their airports more and more profitable, this
increasing amount of resources will most likely be distributed and allocated to maintain and improve
