100% de satisfacción garantizada Inmediatamente disponible después del pago Tanto en línea como en PDF No estas atado a nada
Buscado previamente por ti
ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II Final Exam Version 1 tips actual tested questions and answers Concordia University11,35 €
Añadir al carrito
ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II Final Exam Version 1 tips actual tested questions and answers Concordia University
5 vistas 0 veces vendidas
Grado
ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II
Institución
Concordia University (
)
ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II Final Exam Version 1 tips actual tested questions and answers Concordia University
Part 1: Analytical problems. Each problem is worth 30 points. In total 60 points for Part 1.
1. Two firms operate in a market where the inverse demand is given by p = 2...
ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II
Final Exam Version 1 tips actual tested questions and
answers Concordia University
, ECON 302 Intermediate Microeconomic Theory II Final Exam Version 1
tips actual tested questions and answers Concordia University
This is a 3.5-hour open-book take-home exam. Please answer all the questions
in Part 1 and Part 2. The total points is 100. Arrange your time properly. Make
sure you upload your complete answers in ONE PDF file on the Moodle site. Good
luck!
Part 1: Analytical problems. Each problem is worth 30 points. In total
60 points for Part 1.
1. Two firms operate in a market where the inverse demand is given by p = 240 — 2Y. Their
cost functions are c1(y1 ) = 0.5y21+1200 and c2(y 2 ) = 2y22+1200, correspondingly. Note
that the market quantity is Y = y1+y2. At any stage round your numbers to the second
decimal place if necessary.
Assume that the two firms decide their output simultaneously.
(a) State the maximization problem of each firm and derive their reaction functions.
(b) Find the optimal quantity that each firm produces, as well as the market quantity, the
market price, the profits for each firm, and the industry profit.
Assume now that the two Cournot competitors decide to collude and form a
cartel.
(c) State the maximization problem for the cartel and derive the first order conditions.
(d) What would be the output of each firm? What would be the cartel’s optimal quantity?
What is the market price? What is the industry profit?
Assume now that the two firms perform Stackelberg competition: firm 1 is
the first mover and firm 2 is the follower.
(e) Use backward induction to solve for the optimal output for each firm.
(f) What is the market price? Approximately what is the profit of each firm?
2. Consider a two-player game where the player A chooses “up” or “down” and player B chooses
“left” or “right” Their payo↵s are as follows: When player A chooses “up” and player B
chooses “left” they both get $6. When player A chooses “up” and player B chooses “right”
they get $2 (for A) and $4 (for B). When player A chooses “down” and player B chooses
“left” they get $1 (for A) and $6 (for B). Finally, when player A chooses “down” and player
B chooses “right” they both get $5. The two players decide simultaneously.
(a) Draw the strategic form game. Is there any dominant strategy? Justify your answer.
(b) Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Justify your answer.
(c) Find the best response functions and the mixed strategies Nash Equilibrium if each
player randomizes over his actions.
1
Los beneficios de comprar resúmenes en Stuvia estan en línea:
Garantiza la calidad de los comentarios
Compradores de Stuvia evaluaron más de 700.000 resúmenes. Así estas seguro que compras los mejores documentos!
Compra fácil y rápido
Puedes pagar rápidamente y en una vez con iDeal, tarjeta de crédito o con tu crédito de Stuvia. Sin tener que hacerte miembro.
Enfócate en lo más importante
Tus compañeros escriben los resúmenes. Por eso tienes la seguridad que tienes un resumen actual y confiable.
Así llegas a la conclusión rapidamente!
Preguntas frecuentes
What do I get when I buy this document?
You get a PDF, available immediately after your purchase. The purchased document is accessible anytime, anywhere and indefinitely through your profile.
100% de satisfacción garantizada: ¿Cómo funciona?
Nuestra garantía de satisfacción le asegura que siempre encontrará un documento de estudio a tu medida. Tu rellenas un formulario y nuestro equipo de atención al cliente se encarga del resto.
Who am I buying this summary from?
Stuvia is a marketplace, so you are not buying this document from us, but from seller smartzone. Stuvia facilitates payment to the seller.
Will I be stuck with a subscription?
No, you only buy this summary for 11,35 €. You're not tied to anything after your purchase.
