In dit document zijn alle artikelen van het vak wetenschapsfilosofie samengevat. De artikelen die in het Engels zijn, zijn niet vertaald. De volgende artikelen zijn in deze samenvatting opgenomen:
Chalmers, A. F. : What Is This Thing Called Science? Chapter 5 (Introducing falsificationism); Ch...
What is this thing called science? Chapter 5 – Introduction falsificationism
Introduction
Karl Popper was the most forceful advocate of an alternative to inductivism that I will refer to
as ‘falsificationism’. Popper himself tells the story of how he became disenchanted with the
idea that science is special because it can be derived from the facts, the more facts the better.
It seemed to Popper that these theories could never go wrong because they were sufficiently
flexible to accommodate any instances of human behaviour or historical change as compatible
with their theory. Consequently, although giving the appearance of being powerful theories
confirmed by a wide range of facts, they could in fact explain nothing because they could rule
out nothing. By making a specific, testable prediction the general theory of relativity was at
risk. It ruled out observations that clashed with that prediction. He arrived at his key idea that
scientific theories are falsifiable.
Falsificationists freely admit that observation is guided by and presupposes theory. Once
proposed, speculative theories are to be rigorously and ruthlessly tested by observation and
experiment. Theories that fail to stand up to observational and experimental tests must be
eliminated and replaced by further speculative conjectures. Science progresses by trial and
error, by conjectures and refutations. Although it can never be legitimately said of a theory
that it is true, it can hopefully be said that it is the best available; that it is better than anything
that has come before.
A logical point in favour of falsificationism
According to falsificationism, some theories can be shown to be false by an appeal to the
results of observation and experiment. Even if we assume that true observational statements
are available to us in some way, it is never possible to arrive at universal laws and theories by
logical deductions on that basis alone. However, it is possible to perform logical deductions
starting from singular observation statements as premises, to arrive at the falsity of universal
laws and theories by logical deduction. ‘A raven which was not black was observed at place x
at time t’, then it logically follows from this that ‘All ravens are black’ is false. That is, the
argument:
Premise A raven, which was not black, was at place x at time t.
Conclusion Not all ravens are black.
is a logically valid deduction.
Falsifiability as a criterion for theories
The falsificationist sees science as a set of hypotheses that are tentatively proposed with the
aim of accurately describing or accounting for the behaviour of some aspect of the world or
universe. However, not any hypothesis will do. A hypothesis must be falsifiable. A hypothesis
is falsifiable if there exists a logically possible observation statement or set of observation
statements that are inconsistent with it, that is, which, if established as true, would falsify the
hypothesis. They insist on this because it is only by ruling out a set of logically possible
observation statements that a law or theory is informative. If a statement is unfalsifiable, then
the world can have any properties whatsoever, and can behave in any way whatsoever,
without conflicting with the statement.
,Degree of falsifiability, clarity and precision
A good scientific law or theory is falsifiable just because it makes definite claims about the
world. The more a theory claims, the more potential opportunities there will be for showing
that the world does not in fact behave in the way laid down by the theory. A very good theory
will be one that makes very wide ranging claims about the world, and which is consequently
falsifiable, and is one that resists falsification whenever it is put to the test.
We learn from our mistakes. Science progresses by trial and error. Because of the logical
situation that renders the derivation of universal laws and theories from observation
statements impossible, but the deduction of their falsity possible, falsifications become the
important landmarks, the striking achievements, the major growing-points in science.
Rash speculations are to be encouraged, provided they are falsifiable and provided they are
rejected when falsified. This do-or-die attitude clashes with the caution advocated by the
extreme inductivist. According to the latter, only those theories that can be shown to be true
or probably true are to be admitted into science. The demand that theories should be highly
falsifiable has the attractive consequence that theories should be clearly stated and precise.
The more precisely a theory is formulated the more falsifiable it becomes. If we accept that
the more falsifiable a theory is the better (provided it has not been falsified), then we must
also accept that the more precise the claims of a theory are the better.
Falsificationism and progress
Science starts with problems, problems associated with the explanation of the behaviour of
some aspects of the world or universe. Falsifiable hypotheses are proposed by scientists as
solutions to a problem. The conjectured hypotheses are then criticised and tested. Some will
be quickly eliminated. Others might prove more successful. When a hypothesis that has
successfully withstood a wide range of rigorous tests is eventually falsified, a new problem,
hopefully far removed from the original solved problem, has emerged. This new problem calls
for the invention of new hypotheses, followed by renewed criticism and testing. And so the
process continues indefinitely. It can never be said of a theory that it is true, however well it
has withstood rigorous tests, but it can hopefully be said that a current theory is superior to its
predecessors in the sense that it is able to withstand tests that falsified those predecessors.
Literatuur week 2
What is this thing called science? Chapter 8 – Theories as structures I: Kuhn’s paradigms
Theories as structures
Since the 1960s it has become common to conclude from this that a more adequate account of
science must proceed from an understanding of the theoretical frameworks in which scientific
activity takes place. The dependence of the meaning of concepts on the structure of the theory
in which they occur, and the dependence of the precision of the former on the precision and
degree of coherence of the latter, can be made plausible by noting the limitations of some of
the alternative ways in which a concept might be thought to acquire meaning.
Introducing Thomas Kuhn
Inductivist and falsificationist accounts of science were challenged in a major way by Thomas
Kuhn (1970a) in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He came to believe that
traditional accounts of science, whether inductivist or falsificationist, do not bear comparison
with historical evidence. Kuhn’s account of science was subsequently developed as an attempt
to give a theory more in keeping with the historical situation as he saw it. A key feature of his
,theory is the emphasis placed on the revolutionary character of scientific progress, where a
revolution involves the abandonment of one theoretical structure and its replacement by
another, incompatible one. Another important feature is the important role played by the
sociological characteristics of scientific communities.
pre-science – normal science – crisis – revolution – new normal science – new crisis –
The disorganised and diverse activity that precedes the formation of a science eventually
becomes structured and directed when a single paradigm becomes adhered to by a scientific
community. Workers within a paradigm, what Kuhn calls normal science. Normal scientists
will articulate and develop the paradigm in their attempt to account for and accommodate the
behaviour of some relevant aspects of the real world as revealed through the results of
experimentation. In doing so, they will inevitably experience difficulties and encounter
apparent falsifications. If difficulties of that kind get out of hand, a crisis state develops. A
crisis is resolved when an entirely new paradigm emerges and attracts the allegiance of more
and more scientists until eventually the original, problem-ridden paradigm is abandoned. The
new paradigm, full of promise and not beset by apparently insuperable difficulties, now
guides new normal scientific activity until it too runs into serious trouble and a new crisis
followed by a new revolution results.
Paradigms and normal science
The paradigm sets the standards for legitimate work within the science it governs. It
coordinates and directs the ‘puzzle-solving’ activity of the groups of normal scientists who
work within it. The existence of a paradigm capable of supporting a normal science tradition
is the characteristic that distinguishes science from nonscience, according to Kuhn. Much of
modern sociology lacks a paradigm and consequently fails to qualify as science.
Normal science involves detailed attempts to articulate a paradigm with the aim of improving
the match between it and nature. A paradigm will always be sufficiently imprecise and open-
ended to leave plenty of that kind of work to be done. Kuhn portrays normal science as a
puzzle-solving activity governed by the rules of a paradigm. The puzzles will be of both a
theoretical and an experimental nature.
Kuhn recognises that all paradigms will contain some anomalies and rejects all brands of
falsificationism. It is the lack of disagreement over fundamentals that distinguishes mature,
normal science from the relatively disorganised activity of immature pre-science. According
to Kuhn, the latter is characterised by total disagreement and constant debate over
fundamentals, so much so that it is impossible to get down to detailed, esoteric work. Kuhn
insists that there is more to a paradigm than what can be explicitly laid down in the form of
explicit rules and directions.
If one tries to give a precise and explicit characterisation of some paradigm in the history of
science or in present-day science, it always turns out that some work within the paradigm
violates the characterisation. However, Kuhn insists that this state of affairs does not render
the concept of paradigm untenable any more than the similar situation with respect to ‘game’
rules out legitimate use of that concept.
Crisis and revolution
Normal scientists work confidently within a well-defined area dictated by a paradigm. The
paradigm presents them with a set of definite problems together with methods that they are
confident will be adequate for the solution of the problems. If they blame the paradigm for
any failure to solve a problem, they will be open to the same charges as the carpenter who
blames his tools. Nevertheless, failures will be encountered and such failures can eventually
, attain a degree of seriousness that constitutes a serious crisis for the paradigm and may lead to
the rejection of a paradigm and its replacement by an incompatible alternative.
The mere existence of unsolved puzzles within a paradigm does not constitute a crisis. Kuhn
recognises that paradigms will always encounter difficulties. There will always be anomalies.
It is only under special sets of conditions that the anomalies can develop in such a way as to
undermine confidence in the paradigm. An anomaly will be regarded as particularly serious if
it is seen as striking at the very fundamentals of a paradigm and yet persistently resists
attempts by the members of the normal scientific community to remove it. The number of
serious anomalies is a further factor influencing the onset of a crisis.
According to Kuhn, an analysis of the characteristics of a crisis period in science demands the
competence of the psychologist as much as that of the historian. When anomalies come to be
seen as posing serious problems for a paradigm, a period of ‘pronounced professional
insecurity’ sets in. Attempts to solve the problem become more and more radical and the rules
set by the paradigm for the solution of problems become progressively more loosened.
Normal scientists begin to engage in philosophical and metaphysical disputes and try to
defend their innovations, of dubious status from the point of view of the paradigm, by
philosophical arguments. Once a paradigm has been weakened and undermined to such an
extent that its proponents lose their confidence in it, the time is ripe for revolution.
The seriousness of a crisis deepens when a rival paradigm makes its appearance. The new
paradigm will be very different from and incompatible with the old one. The radical
differences will be of a variety of kinds.
Each paradigm will regard the world as being made up of different kinds of things. Rival
paradigms will regard different kinds of questions as legitimate or meaningful. The way
scientists view a particular aspect of the world will be guided by the paradigm in which they
are working. Kuhn argues that there is a sense in which proponents of rival paradigms are
‘living in different worlds’. There will be no purely logical argument that demonstrates the
superiority of one paradigm over another and that thereby compels a rational scientist to make
the change. One reason why no such demonstration is possible is the fact that a variety of
factors are involved in a scientist’s judgment of the merits of a scientific theory. An individual
scientist’s decision will depend on the priority he or she gives to the various factors.
A second reason why no logically compelling demonstration of the superiority of one
paradigm over another exists stems from the fact that proponents of rival paradigms will
subscribe to different sets of standards and metaphysical principles. Judged by its own
standards, paradigm A may be judged superior to paradigm B, whereas if the standards of
paradigm B are used as premises, the judgment may be reversed. The conclusion of an
argument is compelling only if its premises are accepted.
There are a number of interrelated reasons, then, why, when one paradigm competes with
another, there is no logically compelling argument that dictates that a rational scientist should
abandon one for the other. There is no single criterion by which a scientist must judge the
merit or promise of a paradigm, and, further, proponents of competing programs will
subscribe to different sets of standards and will even view the world in different ways and
describe it in different languages. The aim of arguments and discussions between supporters
of rival paradigms should be persuasion rather than compulsion.
A scientific revolution corresponds to the abandonment of one paradigm and the adoption of a
new one, not by an individual scientist only but by the relevant scientific community as a
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