| Summary of ethics in international relations |
Preface
War! The idea has historically evoked widely varying emotions, from wild enthusiasm to brutal
viciousness to heart-stopping fear. War has built empires, extended civilizations, and produced
terrible suffering and destruction. It has had its horrors from its inception, when the main weapons
were the spear, dagger, mace, sling, and bow. The bloody business of stabbing and hacking someone
to death at close quarters enthralled some. But others wearied or were repelled by such acts. Often,
after the battle, war exhibited still other horrors such as the slaughter of the elderly, women, and
children. Then there were the horrors that followed in the wake of war, such as starvation and disease,
which often put more people in their graves than the war itself.
These horrors have always been more than occasional human experiences. There have been thousands
of wars since the Bronze Age, and even back at the time of the Mongols the killings were in the
hundreds of thousands, sometimes in the millions. In the twentieth century, World Wars I and II
caused ten million and fifty-five million deaths, respectively. And even today there are scores of little
but nonetheless shockingly bloody wars in progress throughout the world. Thus, it is not surprising
that people have been thinking about war since it came into existence. Some of this thinking, for
example by Sun Tzu in The Art of War (written more than 2,000 years ago) and by Clausewitz in On
War (first published in 1832), focus mainly on how to wage war. Because war is such a nasty activity,
these authors were presumably encouraged to make sure that their state was not on the losing side.
Others were concerned with the rights and wrongs of war. The horrors of war encouraged them to
think about what role, if any, morality has to play in war. The authors of this book share this moral
concern.
The present volume is about justice and war. Its authors come from different countries. Seen from this
perspective, it is not a common type of book. Literature on the subject of war ethics is generally
written for a domestic public as the issues at stake are those morally relevant to a particular political
culture. The concern of the scholarly community with domestic discussions on the ethics of war
reflects the concerns of their public opinion. That discussions on the ethics of war remain strongly
constrained within domestic borders is demonstrated by national debates on any international crisis.
The moral attitude of the public and of political elites in China, the United States, and European
countries to the issues of war and military intervention vary significantly. Scholars do not stand
outside the body politic, and their contributions to international scholarly debates often reflect the
political concerns of the nation in which they live and work. Finding the discussion of war ethics
compartmentalized nationally contrasts sharply, however, with the moral approach to war as embodied
in Just War Theory viewed strictly as a theory. As this book will make clear, this theory has its roots
in transcultural experiences, concepts, and principles.
The variety of public discussions on the use of force in which scholars are involved is only one of the
reasons why the contributors to this volume do not necessarily share the same opinion on how to
interpret just war principles, or on the theory itself. Such differences in approach are also a natural
consequence of personal choices within a commonly shared theory. Nearly all the chapters in this
book have been co-authored. Often, it was not so much the importance of the various principles that
was an issue in our discussion, but rather their concrete meaning in a particular context, and whether
particular conflicts had been correctly described and analysed. Some disagreements about factual
accuracy could be dealt with by a more thorough analysis of the literature available and by an appeal
to various historical sources. But description and analysis are also the result of a large number of
presuppositions and value orientations. Where differences of opinion remained, we have expressed
them by mentioning the possibility of various ethical perspectives. Some of the chapters include
different views on a particular ethical question. Two chapters discuss whether the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki was justified, and give opposing answers to that question. This approach
illustrates the pluralistic nature of Just War Theory.
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, | Summary of ethics in international relations |
The first edition of Moral Constraints on War was published in 2002 and the second in 2008. Since
then there have been significant worldwide changes in how international conflicts are dealt with.
Sanctions have become more prominent, and the use of drones widespread. Each of these
developments creates a new set of moral problems, which are addressed in this third edition.
Moreover, the literature on the ethics of war also addresses new themes, such as the traditional
separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles. This edition takes account of these
recent trends and discussions. It has therefore been largely rewritten to reflect the shifts in our thinking
about security. And this edition is, furthermore, more attentive than the previous ones to non-Western
thinking. The Islamic and Confucian interpretations of the just war principles are here described
systematically. The sections on Islam in this book focus mostly on the commonly agreed requirements
within this tradition, particularly regarding the question of a defensive war. They also explain how its
two major sects—Sunni and Shi’a Islam—differ in the way they view some of the just war criteria.
The book further refers to the main arguments of Sunni and Shi’a Islamic scholars who have been
engaged in discussions about how some radical and extremist groups defend their violence by
misinterpreting the Islamic texts. Like the two previous editions, this edition is divided into three parts.
Before the first part, an introductory chapter situates Just War Theory among contending approaches
to the ethics of war such as Realism, Militarism, and Pacifism. It then outlines some of the main
methodological problems in writing a book on Just War Theory. Some terminological problems, such
as the definition of war and the conception of justice in Just War Theory, are also analysed. The
Introduction finally raises the question of the extent to which such an approach may claim to constitute
a theory, as opposed to merely a tradition.
As in the previous editions, part I here deals with the six principles of jus ad bellum, the principles that
determine the conditions on which a war may be started. Part II analyses the two jus in bello principles
of Just War Theory, that is, the ones to be followed once a war begins. Each principle is analysed in a
separate chapter, whose length depends roughly on its importance in the systematic framework of Just
War Theory. The analysis of each principle is illustrated by a variety of historical examples. This
second part contains one new chapter: it is about the question whether combatants ought to be
regarded as moral equals. Although the idea of the moral equality of combatants is firmly entrenched
in the Just War Theory, a significant number of ethicists reject it. In this chapter, we will look at the
arguments of one of them: Jeff McMahan. Part III applies the various principles of parts I and II to
military interventions. Four new chapters have been specially written for this edition: the first two
chapters answer the question whether dropping an atomic weapon on Hiroshima in 1945 was justified,
the third is on the Korean War (1950–1953), and the fourth is on the use of armed drones. In each of
these four chapters we will put Just War Theory to work. As before, the final chapter is titled
“Concluding Comments.”
A Chinese edition of this book will be published in parallel with the present edition in English. The
Confucius Institute at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel kindly supported the participation of Dr. Xu Tian
in this book project. Its director Xinning Song was here most helpful, in line with his tireless efforts to
facilitate cooperation between Chinese and Western scholars. We further extend our thanks to Pierre
d’Argent, Farid Samir Benavides, Pasha L. Hsieh, Nils Melzer, Clara Portela, Stefaan Smis, Xiaokun
Song, and Catherine Woollard for their critical comments on some of the chapters, and to Veronica
Kelly for the language editing. We are also grateful to Alison Keefner, Meaghan Menzel, Joseph
Parry, and Bryndee Ryan at Lexington Books and to Arun Rajakumar at Deanta Global, who helped
see the project through to its successful completion.
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Introduction: the role of ethics in war
I. Introduction
War has led to the development of four string of thought about the role of morality in war:
- Realism
- Militarism
- Pacifism
- Just War Theory
Difference between ad bellum & in bello
- Ad bellum
Moral / non-moral criteria in a decision on waging of war / utility of violence.
- In bello
Moral / non-moral criteria for every decision made on the battlefield.
Morality in terms:
- Non-moral
Subject has no relation to moral or ethics.
- Immoral
Not conforming to accepted standards of morality or ethics.
- Amoral
Lacking moral sense; unconcerned with rightness or wrongness.
II. Realism: War is hell
As other theories, realists still see war as something cruel and horrific.
General principes:
- Anarchy reigns on the international stage
- War is non-moral: Morals and war are two separate kinds of activities:
o War: a tool to yield to yield benefits for state self-interest
o Ethics/ morals
- Cost-benefit calculation: war is worth it if the benefits are greater than the costs
- Eliminates or diminishes the role of ethics in war.
a. Kinds of realism within ethics of international relations
I. Strong realism
Strong realists:
- National- /self-interest is a necessary and sufficient condition for going to war.
- Ethics/morals play no role in war.
- During peacetime:
o Morality isn’t applicable on relations between nations.
➔ Their foremost concern is their self-interest; Don’t take each other’s interests into
account before declaring war.
o Moral relationships within the state.
▪ Ex. Crimes within a state are morally condemnable.
- During war:
o Morality still isn’t applicable on the international stage when a war starts
o War crimes are not morally wrong as it serves the national interest.
➔ Harm the enemy = not moral harm
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“Notice how little ethics have to do with what states do in their mutual relations with one another: In
international society all forms of coercion are permissible, including wars of destruction. This means
that the struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival, and the improvement of the
relative power position becomes the primary objective of the internal and the external policy of states.
All else is secondary”.
- Justification stance
o The international stage has no real moral authority, it is anarchic
o Survival of the state is the highest goal, morality is a secondary goal. This, the state
preserves by pursuing own state interests.
o Costs < benefits
o The war must be feasible
o Other strong realists give us variations:
▪ Self-interest motivates what nations do, but add that how they act is not a
matter of choice. The threat of war and war itself makes it impossible for any
nation to do anything other than act in its own self-interest.
▪ Invader = high stakes for the weaker nation; no choice to fight
➔ Ethics < survival
▪ Stakes in war are so high that, politically and psychologically, no nation can
take the time to rationally consider the rights and wrongs of war.
II. Weak realism
Weak realists:
- National-/self-interest is only a necessary condition for going to war
- Ethics/morals do have a role in war, as a necessary reason for war is often not sufficient.
o Ex. Enter a war for humanitarian reasons; this could also be part of a state’s self-
interest.
o But: Wars motivated by moral reasons cannot be sustained (rise casualties, …).
- Not always clear whether they mean “act exclusively in their own self-interest”
or
“act in their self-interest but, when it is not too costly, also take the interests of others into
account”.
- Thinkers:
o Edward Hallett Carr: morality reflects a particular national conception of state interests.
o Hans Morgenthau criticizes Carr’s rejection of the possibility of an absolute and
universal perspective, but maintains that the problem is that, nations cannot (should
not) base their actions on the universal moral code.
III. Weak or strong? A side-note
So, what is the difference between weak and strong realism? Well, there is a problem of
classification. The separation of war and morality is being softened within weak realism by referring
to moral principles. But in weak realism too, the national interest is the core of its position. So
compared to strong realism, weak realism is just a weak variant.
Not all standards are moral in nature. There is a clear distinction between normativity and morality.
They value those rules and actions not in moral terms but rather in terms of the national interest, and
especially the survival of the state and the nation. What realists see as “good”, is not seen as morally
good, only good within the framework of pursuing a state’s self-interest.
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