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Les 2: inter-staat conflicten: oorzakenTEKST 1: WAR AND PEACE – JACK LEVY
1. Introduction
Clausewitz: influential conceptualization of war as a continuation of politics by other means
o An instrument to advance political interest => suggests that war is instrinsically political, so that if we
want to understand why decision-makers choose military force rather than other means to achieve
their desired ends
Study of war is already elaborate, BUT:
o Few law-like propositions
o Limited predictive capabilities
o No consensus about the causes of war, most useful theories or methodologies?
o No consensus about appropriate criteria for evaluating competing theories
o Is it possible to generalize anything about war?
Three different things that we want to explain:
o Constant recurrence of war
o Variations in war and peace
o Origins of particular wars
These different questions or perspectives on war lead to different theoretical frameworks
and different methodologies
2. General trends in war and in the study of war
International relationship scholars define war as => large-scale organized violence between politically
defined groups
The past 5 centuries of the modern state system:
o Average of 1 great power war per decade
o Significant decline of great power wars over time
For many centuries was disproportionately concentrated in the hands of Europe
o 3 significant shift in warfare
From the major powers to minor powers
From Europe to other regions
From inter-state warfare to intra-state wars
Steady decline in the frequency of great power wars + steady increase in the severity of war (we see this in
the 2 world wars and the increase of hegemonic wars)
o Inter-state wars have demonstrated no significant secular trend over the past century, while civil
wars have increased frequency
Death from civil wars have been declining since WO II
This changing nature of war led to changes in the study of war:
o The nuclear revolution analyses the conditions for strategic stability and of the hypothesized
obsolescence of war
o Information revolution has led to discussions of the revolution in military affairs
o Political changes led to a shift in focus away from longstanding emphasis on the behavior of great
powers and on inter-state wars, toward intra-state wars
o Shift from a near exclusive focus on the causes of war to a greater interest in the termination of war
o More attention tot he condition of peace and the different kinds of peace
o Rise of regional and ethnonational wars => increasing attention tot he impact of domestic variables
o The spread of ethnonational conflicts has led to serious reconsideration of the best way to define
and operationalize war
Now: 1000 battle death
Works well with inter-state war, but is this line with ‘low-intensity conflicts’ or ‘identity wars’
between communal groups
,. Three perspectives on war
Three perspectives on war => 3 kinds of scholars:
o 1. War as a non-zero constant => War has been a constant, pervasive and recurring pattern of
violent conflict between people since the beginning of recorded history. (Er is altijd wel ergens een
oorlog bezig)
o 2. War as a variable => War has varied enormously in terms of its frequency severity, location,
participants, and social and political consequences
o 3. Look at particular wars
No single perspective is sufficient.
o Example: explanations for war as a constant (based in human nature or international anarchy for
example) can not explain either variations in war and peace or the outbreak of particular wars
Most influential work in the discipline focusses on the second (war as a variable)
4. realist theories of war
Common set of assumptions: the key actors in world politics are sovereign states who act rationally to
advance their security, power and wealth in an anarchic international system, defined as the absence of a
legitimate authority to regulate dispute and enforce agreements between states or other actors
o Given uncertainties regarding the current and future intentions of the adversary, political leaders
focus on the short-term security needs, adopt worst-case thinking, engage in a struggle for power
and security, and utilize coercive threats to advance their interests, influence the adversary and
maintain their reputations
Walts about neorealism => international anarchy is an important permissive condition for war
o Anarchy is generally treated as a structural constant and consequently it cannot account for
variations in war and peace
Not a causal variable, but a point of departure from which a theoretical system is
constructed
So neoliberalism does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war’s
dismal recurrence through the millennia
o In neoliberalism hypotheses (and not anarchy) carry explanatory power => attempt to explain the
conditions under which war is most likely to occur
Core realist proposition = variations in the distribution of power explain variations in the frequency of war,
BUT does not explain enough of the variance War is undetermined in neorealist theory
5. Paths to war in realist theory
Realists have 2 alternative paths to war:
o Status-quo states: security-seeking states, each of whom is more interested in maintaining its
current position than in extending influence. Because of uncertainty and worst-case scenario
thinking, even defensively motivated actions by other states are perceived as threats (security
dilemma). This leads to an action-reaction cycle that can lead to conflict spirals and war
o Revisionist states: a direct conflict of interests and calculations by at least one side that the conflict is
best resolved by war
Pure security path to war involves a pre-emptive strike by a state motivated only by the fear that its
adversary is about to attack and by the belief that if war is inevitable it is better to initiate it => rarely
happens (like in WOI)
Preventive war = war motivated only by the anticipation of a negative power shift and the fear of its
consequences
6. Balance of power and hegemonic realism
2 theories
o Balance of power = avoidance of hegemony is the primary goal of states and the maintenance of an
equilibrium of power in the system is an essential means to that end
States will build up their arms and form alliances to balance against those who constitute
the primary threats tot heir interests and particularly against any state which threatens to
secure a hegemonic position over the system
Almost always works to avoid hegemony
, o Hegemonic theory = de-emphasize the importance of anarchy while emphasizing system
management within a hierarchical order. Hegemons use their strength to create a set of norms and
behavior that enhances the stability of the system which at the same time enhances their security
Different rates of growth lead to rise and fall of hegemons probability of war highest when a
declining leader is being overtaken by the challenger
Both theories are opposites, but this is linked to their context
o The BOP theories have an Eurocentric basis and implicitly conceive of power in terms of land-based
military power and hegemony as hegemony over Europe
o Hegemonic theories generally define hegemony in terms of dominance on global finance, trade and
naval power
Most hegemonic stability theory are theories of the stability of the international political
economy and say little about war and peace
Both theories could be correct in their respective context
7. liberal theories of war and peace
Liberalists argue that under certain domestic and international conditions and with certain appropriate state
strategies the violent-prone character of world politics can be ameliorated and levels of warfare significantly
reduced
Institutionalists
o Hypotheses: economic interdependence and democratic institutions each promote peace
8. Economic Interdependence and peace
Trade and other forms of economic interdependence promote peace
o Arguments in favor
Economic deterrence argument = because trade generates economic benefits for both
parties, the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and lead to a loss or reduction of the
gains from trade deters political leaders from taking actions that are likely to lead to war
against key trading partners
Domestic level causal arguments = trade increases prosperity and prosperity lessens the
domestic problems that sometimes lead to war (external scapegoating, pressures for
protectionism leading to countermeasures, etc.)
Trade increases influence of groups who benefit from trade and have an interest in
maintaining a peaceful environment for trade
Trade increases contact, communication, familiarity and understanding, which reduce the
hostilities and misperceptions that contribute to war
o Arguments against
Can only explain dyadic outcome (peace) with state-level variables and ignore strategic
interaction
Strategies of coercion rather than cooperation are more likely if one side believes it is more
resolved than the other, whether because of differing risk orientations or perhaps different
sensitivities tot he domestic economic and political cost of cutoff of trade or when economic
interdependence is asymmetrical
Realist and Marxists – Leninists: asymmetrical interdependence increases, rather than
decreases the probability of militarized conflict
Realists: relative gains concerns can lead to conflict
The causal arrow points in the other direction: peace increases trade => politics determines
trade rather than trade determines politics
Trade and peace are valse variables => the conditions that facilitate trade simultaneously
promote peace
Hegemonic stability theorists: the primary condition facilitating trade is the existence of a
liberal economic hegemon able and willing to maintain a stable political economy, so it is
economic hegemony that promotes peace
Trade often continues after the outbreak of war
, 9. The democratic peace
Liberals => democracies are more peaceful than other states because democracies rarely go to war with
each other => growing consensus pacifying effects of joint democracy are real
BUT no one has yet identified a stronger empirical regularity
o Arguments against
Democracies are not significantly more peaceful than other kinds of states
Democracies frequently fight imperial wars
In wars between democracies and authoritarian regimes, democracies are more likely to be
the initiator than target
Democracies occasionally use covert action against each other
Democratic-authoritarian dyads are more war-prone than pure authoritarian dyads
o Other facts
Democracies almost never end up on opposing sides in multilateral wars
Democracies win disproportionate number of the wars they fight
Democracies suffer fewer casualties in the war they initiate
Democracies engage in more peaceful processes of conflict resolution when they get into
disputes with other democracies
Possible explanations
o Democratic culture and norms model = democratic societies are inherently averse to war because
citizens will not vote end send themselves off to wars (think Kant: Perpetual Peace). Democracies
share norms of bounded political competition and peaceful resolution of dispute, and these internal
democratic norms are extended to relations between democratic states
BUT what about imperial wars against smaller opponents?
Such norms have not precluded democratic states from initiating imperial wars against
weaker opponents despite the absence of any threat of exploitation by the latter, or from
fighting wars against autocracies with an intensity disproportionate to any possible security
threat
o Institutional constraint model = checks and balances, the dispersion of power and the role of free
press. These institutions preclude political leaders from taking unilateral military action, ensure an
open public debate and require leaders to secure a broad base of supporters before adopting risky
policies. BUT belligerent (strijdlustig) publics sometimes push their leaders into wars those leaders
preferred to avoid
Why they still fight imperial wars despite the absence of serious threats and why do
democracies get involved in wars just as frequently as non-democratic states?
o Bueno de Mesquita Model = democratic leaders tend to initiate only those wars they are confident
of winning and, once in war, to devote enormous resources to winning. Autocratic leaders devote
fewer resources because the cost of failure is less and because they need those resources to
distribute their key supporters at home. Makes democracies unattractive targets of aggression
War between democracies, both sides would invest enormously in the war effort, which
would result in a war that is economically costly to both sides as well as politically costly to
the loser => so they seek a negotiated peace rather than to fight
Because democratic leaders benefit from successful wars, they will not hesitate to initiate
imperial wars and wars against weaker autocracies. Autocracies will also start wars against
weaker democracies
o Signaling game (Schultz) = because of free press guarantees transparency and because the political
opposition has different incentives than the government and some influence democracies are better
able tan non-democracies to sent credible signals of their resolve in crisis, and this reduces the
dangers of crisis escalation duet to the misinterpretation
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