WILLIAMS
William believes that personal identity consists, but he don’t think that it could
be associated with mind.
Argument from Fear and hope:
-suppose two people switch bodies. One of them will have 100.000 and the
second one will be tortured. And you ask them who will have 100.000 and
who will be tortured?
Due this experiment people answered that they would prefer to have a body
with 100.00 that’s why people are identity themselves as their body. Body is
what constitutes identity according to Williams.
Reduplication Problem (what happens when psychological continuity is
duplicated)
-Person B and Person C today can claim that they have the same memories as
Person A in the past.
- It is absurd to claim that B and C are both numerically identical to Person A
because Person A would then be at two different places at the same time.
- Therefore, personal identity cannot be based on psychological continuity.
PLAN TO ATTAC WILLIAMS!!!!! Our memories are still different.
Bypassing the Fission Problem:
- Fission Problem: it is known today that memories are stored in both
hemispheres of the brain. Suppose technology allows us one day to
transplant brain hemispheres and we transplant each hemisphere to
different brains. Which of the two people with the different hemispheres
would be the same as the original?
- The change in spatiotemporal continuity that occurs in fission would
provide an answer in the negative to the question of identity.
Argument from spatio-temporal identity:
- If a body exists at one time and a later time, then the same body exists
through the interval.
- “historical enquiry” = charting the temporal path of a person, should
provide a description of the entire history of the object or person in
question.
Time (temporal identity of body).
,PARFIT
Rejection of Numerical Identity:
- Teletransportation cases: “A is the same as B only qualitatively”
1. Duplication after destruction (=B identical to A, starts existing after A
ceases to exist): similar to traveling.
2. Duplication without destruction (=B identical to A, starts existing, co-
exists with A): no pain=not same.
3. Duplication before destruction (=B identical to A, starts existing, co-exists
with A and continues to exist after A ceases to exist): similar to survival.
- Irrelevance of numerical identity: what makes me a person does not
depend on being the same. Being the same is not part of my personhood
(e.g. it is wrong to thing: Stellios = [same]+[Stellios])
- Worthlessness of numerical identity: It doesn`t matter to me to know that
I will be the same tomorrow.
Reductionism (anti-methaphisical view)
- Rejection of “Further Fact” View according to which personhood needs to
be related to some methaphysical entity (body or mind).
- Impersonality thesis: personhood is reduced to physical of psychological
events. Is means that what Thing is doesn’t matter. How it appears only
matters.
Critique of Physical Criterion of Qualitative Identity:
Standard view = spatio-temporal continuity (same spatio-temporal paths of
enough of the same body and brain)
Problems of how much is enough:
Physical changes (e.g. example of the altered self-portrait turning into
father`s portrait)
Gaps (e.g. example of the damaged (disassembled) watch)
Missing parts (e.g. ship of Thesus)
Unacceptable response to teletransportation: A is not the same as B in any
scenario.
Revision of Psychological Criterion of identity:
- Locke: self-awareness based on memory-mental states instead of the
existence of an entity.
Gaps: partial forgetfulness becomes impossible.
Overlapping chain of experiences (reversing Reid`s officer paradox: the
old officer is the same as the boy because each day their memories overlap
with same of their past experiences)
, Connectedness (instead of personal identity) = direct connections
between past and present.
Continuity (instead of numerical identity) = degree (strong vs weak) of
connectedness based on number (Locke).
Problem of how much is enough: Parfit says half without justification.
Cause of the self:
Against Narrow view: memory caused by my own experience (e.g.
climber remembering the shouting because of the shouting) rather than
someone else`s report.
Assumption of physical continuity of the brain (senses). Hence anti-
reductionist.
Unacceptable Response to teletransportation: myself on Mars is not
caused by myself on Earth.
For Wide view: not just memory mental states but other mental states
too cause personhood (e.g. past intentions of desires and present
actions)
- The advantages of Parfit`s reductionism:
o Invalidation of egoism : it makes less sense to have a self-interested
theory of morality.
o Invalidation of fear of death : it makes less sense to be depressed
about aging and death.
, SARTRE
Types of being:
i. Being-in-itself or en-soi (objects) =something that has a pre-
determined essence.
ii. Being-For-itself or por-soi (humans)= something that doesn`t have a
pre-determined essence and is not an object.
Modes of human consciousness:
i. Pre-reflective cogito (= does not express a particular self but simply
an immediate experience of something else or myself)
ii. Reflective cogito (pre-reflective cogito is being reflected upon (by
itself) and its objects from a unity).
Human nature:
o Rejection of God: the rational soul was a by-product of the conception of
God as a creator
o Transcending the givenness ( or “facticity”) of objects (the “in-itself”).
o Existence precedes its essence = we are without being something in
advance (negation of a determinate “human nature”)
o Ability to create our essence / meaning of our own existences through
international actions having ends (= I define myself through my decisions
for the future).
o Bad faith: belief in the self as an object with determinate essence or
purpose.
Freedom:
o Against psychological determinism (=actions being causally determined
by desires, beliefs, character)
o Intentionality thesis (=against chance): every action has an end (instead of
a cause) which constitutes / explains it as an “act” (instead of an event).
o Consciousness of negativity thesis: awareness of the current state is
lacking and hence not determining what the course of action should be.
o “condemned to be free”: I am never in the situation where I cannot choose.
The problem of other people:
o Against Descartes (assuming the Other: realism):
False assumption or cogito only as immediate and certain (pre-
reflective).
False assumption or other minds / cogitos to account for the behavior
of another body, by analogy with my own mind, because there is no
empirical knowledge of other mings.
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