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Summary International Organization
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- Universiteit Antwerpen (UA)
International Organization, course by Kustermans
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONTABLE OF CONTENTS
Hurd - International Organizations (Exam questions & answers).............................................................................2
Lecture 1: the end of the Liberal international order.............................................................................................16
Summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................16
Amitav Acharya – After Liberal Hegemony: The advent of a Multiplex World Order....................................16
Richard Haass – How a World Order Ends: And What Comes in Its Wake.....................................................18
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................19
Lecture 2: What is multilateralism?........................................................................................................................20
Current events.....................................................................................................................................................20
Summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................20
Reus-Smit – The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental............20
Ruggie – Multilateralism: the anatomy of an institution................................................................................20
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................21
Lecture 3: The globalization of international society..............................................................................................23
Summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................23
Dunne & Christian Reus-Smit – The globalization of interantional society (PP. 18-40).................................23
Klotz – Racial inequality (pp. 362-379)............................................................................................................26
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................27
In conclusion....................................................................................................................................................29
Lecture 4: International organizations and normative change...............................................................................29
Summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................29
Ruggie – Global governance and “new governance theory”: lessons from business and human rights.......29
Finnemore – International organizations as teachers of norms: the UNited nations educational, scientific
and cultural organization and science policy..................................................................................................30
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................31
Finnemore - International organizations as teachers of norms......................................................................32
Lecture 5: contested multilateralism......................................................................................................................34
Summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................34
Emerging powers in an Age of Disorder – Randall Schweller.........................................................................34
Contested multilateralism – Morse & Keohane..............................................................................................34
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................35
Emerging powers in an Age of Disorder – Randall Schweller.........................................................................35
Contested multilateralism – Morse & Keohane..............................................................................................36
Lecture 6: Authority and resistance........................................................................................................................37
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, summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................37
The politicization of world politics and its effect: eight propositions – M. Zürn............................................37
The Limits of Global Authority: World Bank benchmarks in Ethiopia and Malawi – Jacob & Sande.............40
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................41
The politicization of world politics and its effect: eight propositions – M. Zürn............................................41
The Limits of Global Authority: World Bank benchmarks in Ethiopia and Malawi – Jacob & Sande.............42
Lecture 7: Humanitarianism....................................................................................................................................43
summary texts.....................................................................................................................................................43
Evolution without progress. Humanitarianism in a world of hurt – Barnett..................................................43
Responsibility, legitimacy, morality: chinese humanitarianism in historical perspective - Krebs..................44
Discussion in class...............................................................................................................................................50
Evolution without progress. Humanitarianism in a world of hurt – Barnett..................................................50
Responsibility, legitimacy, morality: chinese humanitarianism in historical perspective - Krebs..................52
Lecture 8: Climate governance................................................................................................................................52
Current events.....................................................................................................................................................52
summary text......................................................................................................................................................53
Gridlock – Hale, Held & Young........................................................................................................................53
discussion in class................................................................................................................................................53
Gridlock – Hale, Held & Young........................................................................................................................53
HURD - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (EXAM QUESTIONS & ANSWERS)
1. What is distinctive about how the WTO enforces its rules, as compared with how
enforcement is handled by other international organizations?
First of all, self-interest is the main source of compliance within the WTO. However,
sometimes member states will start to disobey the rules when they feel that the benefits of
compliance are not enough to outweigh the incentives of ‘cheating’. In many international
organizations, the enforcement of rules is problematic. However, just as is the case with
compliance, the WTO will use the self-interest of the members in defense of the rules. Unlike
other international organizations, the enforcement function is not centralized within the WTO
itself. Instead, It relies on members to retaliate directly against those who violate the rules set
down by the WTO. In short, the WTO authorizes other member states to punish the violator.
The WTO secretariat itself is not in the business of monitoring compliance or taking
independent action in defense of the rules. The spirit of the WTO is very much that the
members have made commitments to one another and decisions on compliance and
enforcement are in their hands as well. This produces very different patterns of rule-
enforcement compared to other IOs
The WTO has a dispute settlement mechanism that is activated whenever a member
complains that another member has failed to meet the obligations under the treaty. When a
dispute is submitted, the WTO creates a panel of three trade experts. They draw up a legal
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,report, which is distributed to the complaining members. Subsequently, the report is also
taken to a separate Appelate Body of the WTO, acting as the Dispute Settlement Body. They
can either approve or reject the rapport. If it is approved, the recommendations in the report
become binding on the parties to the dispute. If the countries do not change their policy and
continue to disobey the rules, a license is granted by the DSB to the harmed member states
to retaliate, generally in the form of economic sanctions
This system build a legal regime around the old practices of inter-state trade disputes. The
system is basically a tit-for-tat system. However, retaliation can be self-defeating for smaller
countries. Therefore, strong countries are challenged less often. In that sense, the WTO’s
legal framework runs against the political and economic realities of a world with huge power
disparities.
In conclusion, enforcement of WTO rules is done by member states themselves, not by the
central authority of the WTO, in a unique arrangement that takes advantage of conflicting
self-interests among WTO-members.
2. The WTO is frequently critized for defending its rules of international trade
regardless of the consequences of other social or national values (such as
environmental protection, national sovereignty, or poverty reduction). Considering
the GATT treaty and the decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body, do you think
this criticism is justified, and why or why not? Are there certain cases where it is
more justified than others?
The GATT is a treaty from 1947 which specifies how countries can regulate their imports and
exports of most goods. The treaty follows the idea of bound tariffs, rules of most-favored
nation and national treatment. Furthermore, the treaty forbids quotas, discourages dumping
goods and sets rules on subsidizing domestic industries. However, all these rules are subject
to exceptions and provisos, so it ultimately depends on the interpretation of these rules. This
often results in enormous political battles over the interpretation of certain rules and clauses.
The GATT created a highly regulated international-legal environment. In the WTO all
member states try to shape the rules around their own interests, but the strongest
governments dominate the results in the WTO negotiations. The trade rules should therefore
be understood in political terms: they are designed with the interests of the strongest in mind.
In trade negotiations, weak states are generally rule-takers and not rule-makers. It is easier
for the strong than the weak to comply with the rules of the WTO since the rules generally do
not demand things of the strong that are politically very difficult.
There are two substantively important problems for the future of international trade and
international law. First of all, there is a tangled relationship between trade policy (WTO rules)
and environmental consequences. Secondly, there is a puzzle over the relationship between
how things are made and how things are traded. One example of this is the “Shrimp-Turtle”
dispute in which a group of countries complained that the US was breaking its commitments
under the GATT. However, the US used environmental protection laws as a disguise for its
trade protectionism. The decision of the DSB was that the US was violating its commitments
to WTO, rather than serving the environmental protection laws, because they discriminated
among trade partners. It raised the question if, in this case the turtle-excluder nets, are like-
products, or that the two methods of catching shrimp actually produce two different types of
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, shrimp. The Appellate Body in this case ruled that in some instances distinct production
methods might lead to distinct products. This is of course very ambiguous. In this way, the
WTO treaty has provided a sort of opening in the like-products regime for the idea that
production methods may be considered in determining “likeness”. This opens the possibility
for intense political fights.
Although the WTO has contributed to a growth in global wealth, it has ultimately also
contributed to the growth in wealth inequality. Possibly, it has contributed greatly to the
absolute decline in wealth in the world’s poorest regions. The WTO’s rules standardize trade
and reduce tariffs mainly for those goods in which the industrialized countries are already
highly productive, and they generally exclude those goods of greatest export interest to
poorest countries, such as agriculture, textiles and raw materials. These goods generally
remain outside of the WTO, or are subject to fewer and weaker rules, and politically
motivated trade patterns tend to dominate at the expense of the poorer countries. The WTO
is in part to blame for sustaining a structure of international trade that reinforces these
inequalities, even though the extent to its contribution is the subject of much debate.
In conclusion, criticism is justified and the WTO-rules most likely contribute to the growing
wealth inequality in the world, because the most important export goods for poor countries
often stay outside of the WTO rulings (agriculture, textiles, raw materials). Furthermore, the
rules under the GATT treaty sometimes collide with other social and national values, such as
environmental protection laws. The rules and clauses of the WTO are very vague and often
up to political debate. However, the criticism is most justified in terms of wealth inequality
between weaker and stronger states. The decisions of the DSB deserve less criticism. In the
Shrimp-Turtle case, the WTO did create an opening for production-methods exceptions that
take for example environmental or social laws into account.
3. How does the World Bank’s mandate to reduce global poverty contrast with the
IMF’s mandate to add stability to the balance-of-payments system? How do these
different missions lead to different kinds of loans by the two institutions? What
situations might arise that would involve both dimensions at once and so could
lead to cooperation (or conflict) between the IMF and the World Bank?
The World Bank’s goal is different from the IMF. The World Bank’s goal is development and
reducing global poverty by handing out loans. These loans are always projects-specific and,
in principle, to states. For example, if you want to build a bridge, you go to the World Bank.
The loans are only for projects that support either ‘reconstruction’ or ‘development’.
The IMF on the other hand has the goal to retain financial stability to the balance-of-
payments system after the Second World War. They do this by being a lender of last resort,
when a country has become financially unstable. This includes BOP adjustments, currency
rates, etc. These loans are not for specific projects. Furthermore, these loans come with
specific conditions (adequate safeguards).
Both the Bank and IMF work together in close cooperation. The World Bank's activities have
increasingly reflected the realization that the pace of economic and social development
accelerates only when sound underlying financial and economic policies are in place. The
IMF has also recognized that unsound financial and economic policies are often deeply
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