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Pearson Edexcel A-Level History Coursework: 'Historians have disagreed about the origins of the Cold War. What is your view about the reasons for the start of the Cold War?'7,98 €
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Pearson Edexcel A-Level History Coursework: 'Historians have disagreed about the origins of the Cold War. What is your view about the reasons for the start of the Cold War?'
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Cours
Unit 1E - Russia, 1917-91: from Lenin to Yeltsin
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PEARSON (PEARSON)
This is a 4000-word essay [4,363] answering the question 'What is your view about the reasons for the start of the Cold War?'. I achieved 38/40 [A*] on this coursework using the historians Melvyn Leffer, Michael Cox + Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Gaddis as my primary references.
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Jenny Krasic
Historians have disagreed about the origins of the Cold War in Europe. What is your view about the causes of the
Cold War in Europe in the years 1944-49?
In the wake of the profound social upheaval of the Second World War, a hostile climate compounded in a series of
diplomatic conflicts that have come to define the 20 th century. The Cold War, a term which appears to be as
ambiguous as its origins, remains acutely relevant to our modern world and equally controversial. Post-Revisionist
historians such as Leffler, believe that the advent of the Cold War is attributed primarily to the post-war atmosphere
in Europe. It postulated a sense of crisis and opportunity amongst the allies that was exacerbated through a lens of
ideology and experience that “overcame their…desire to sustain…collaboration” 1. Revisionist historians take on a
different approach, tending to focus more on America’s responsibility for the conflict; Cox and Kennedy-Pipe argue
the Marshall Plan’s provocative implementation spurred on the Soviet expansionism that divided Europe. Whilst it
was “Stalin who eventually…made the Cold War inevitable” 2 his actions were a defensive reaction to America’s
antagonistic foreign policy. Historians such as Gaddis firmly refute Revisionist ideas. Retaining an Orthodox view,
Gaddis argues that the Cold War was brought about by Soviet policy based on ideology and the “malignant
authoritarianism”3 of Stalin’s rule. Whilst there is merit to each of these arguments, Leffler is the most convincing
scholar. He accurately points to the pre-eminence of international structures in the origins of the Cold War, showing
that the strength of Ideology does not equate to the ability to implement beliefs. This notion remains intrinsically
liable to these external factors.
Observing the Cold War through a study of international relations, Leffler convincingly utilised the “Security
Dilemma”4 to explain its origins. By arguing that the post-war system “engendered fears and opportunities” 5 rooted
in defence, he successfully demonstrates the significance of the correlation between the centralisation of power and
the development of diplomatic tensions. Indeed, as demonstrated by McMahon, the socio-economic upheaval of the
Second World War [1939-45] created a “pliable” 6 international order which allowed both the US and the USSR to
exert this power in pursuing their divergent aspirations of strategic defence. This is exemplified within the Red
Army’s occupation of Eastern Europe, which emulsified Stalin’s ability to create a transgressional Soviet bloc.
Regardless of the motivation, this occupation of countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania was significantly
reliant on the “overturned balance of power” 7 which equally permitted the US to finance the reconstruction of
Europe centred around universalist security. Notably, Leffler emphasises that in enhancing their own security, each
nation infringed on the others successfully demonstrating the effect of the War is shaping the Cold War.
Nevertheless, Gaddis, Cox, and Kennedy-Pipe suggest that this argument understates the role of human agency.
While they are correct that power in itself does not predetermine conflict, it essential to put the antagonistic policies
1
Leffler, M, 2007, For the Soul of Mankind
2
Cox, M and Kennedy-Pipe, C, 2005, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan
3
Gaddis, J, 1997, We Now Know: Re-thinking Cold War History
4
Herz, H, 1950, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma see also Jervis, R, Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
The Security Dilemma exists when many of the means by which a state tried to increase its security decrease the security of
others
5
Leffler, M, 2007, For the Soul of Mankind
6
McMahon, R, 2003, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction
7
McMahon, R, 2003, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction
1 Word Count: 439
, Jenny Krasic
of Expansionism and Containment into a larger context that represents the complexity human action. In asserting
that “fear in the international climate drove the American offensive” 8 Leffler successfully points to the significance of
this context. The social turmoil and economic dislocation in Europe spurred on disillusionment with many
democratic capitalist economies, reflected acutely in the French Tripartisme, the Greek Civil war and the growth of
the PCI in Italy. This supports Leffler’s view, as, despite Stalin being “stingy in [his] support of [these] indigenous
revolutionary movements”9 as assessed by Kenez, Soviet interests in Poland and Germany during the penultimate
wartime conferences of Yalta and Potsdam [1945] were deemed a threat precisely due to the opportunity for the
Soviet Union to spread its influence further than those regions. This argument is substantiated when considering the
US reliance on export trade, which had doubled its GDP from 1941-45. Whilst Leffler’s argument does not account
for the scope of the conflict, it indicates a convincing foundation for the exaggerated sense of threat from the
opportunities posed by the Second World War.
Leffler further substantiates his foundational arguments by emphasising the predominance of Germany as a central
source of the conflict which brought about the Cold War. Leffler’s view that “no country was as critical as Germany” 10
credibly acknowledges the value the allies placed on its future concerning their posterity and illustrates the potent
acceleration caused by their “contrasts in the thinking” 11. Undoubtedly, the allied intention for Germany would have
weighed heavily on the minds of European leaders as German expansionism had precipitated both the First and
Second World Wars with devastating consequences for Europe. Due to the converse approaches of the American
reconstruction of Germany and the Soviet decimation of it, as illustrated by their arguments over reparations at
Potsdam, these circumstances strengthen Leffler’s argument. They indicate concessions over its future would be
deemed an existential threat, explaining Molotov’s un-conciliatory attitude during the CFM meetings [1945-1947]
which, as analysed by McMahon, led to “demise of the grand alliance” 12. The ultimate compromise of reparations
intrinsically undermined the goal of economic unity in Europe, providing a significant source of tension within the
alliance. Though Gaddis may attribute aggressive Soviet actions in Germany, such as the Berlin Blockade, to the
inherent aggression of authoritarian regimes - Leffler’s view is more convincing as Gaddis fails to acknowledge the
US actions were equally aggressive. The end to deliveries of reparations to the Soviet zone [1946] supports Leffler’s
view as they indicate that the US were intent on harnessing German resources on the revival of Europe “even if that
meant the USSR would feel provoked”13. This is a pattern that is further illustrated in the creation of Bizonia [1947]
and the Deutschemark [1948] which spurred on an aggressive Soviet response leading to the division of Germany
[1949] and a virtually inevitable acceleration of diplomatic conflicts .
Nevertheless, Leffler does not understate the role of ideology. He argues that memory and ideology helped
determine threat perceptions and define ultimate objectives that prevented de-escalation. Leffler believes that
8
Leffler, M, 2007, For the Soul of Mankind
9
Kenez, P, 2006, A History of the Soviet Union from Beginning to the End
10
Leffler, M, 2007, For the Soul of Mankind
11
Vasori, A, 2001, The Failure of Peace in Europe 1943-48 (Cold War History)
12
McMahon, R, J, 2003, The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction
13
Leffler, M, 2007, For the Soul of Mankind Word Count 937
2
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