Biology and society: ethical and professional aspects
Chapter 1: What is science?
Standard view of science: science is a rational, empirical and objective activity which can be characterized
by logical reasoning, empirical evidence (through observation) and the formulation of theories and
hypotheses.
Logical empiricism: logical positivism means that all problems can be solved by science. 19 th
century: only knowledge based on observation serves progress of society. 20 th century: exploration
differences between science and other forms of knowledge acquisition by Vienna Circle. Non-
rational philosophies formed a threat. Two characteristics of
science are essential: logical reasoning and substantiation of
knowledge by empirical evidence. On top of observation,
science also formulates theories. So there are two layers:
theoretical and empirical statement.
o Empirical cycle: first observation (value free, no
bias). Then formulation of empirical laws, based on
the facts (observed factors). A theory is formed,
which provides deeper insight into the supposed
reality (can be about elements that cannot be
directly observed). From the theory, hypotheses can
be derived (and predictions can be based on this)
In science, objectivity must be ensured. Norms and
values are needed to ensure that scientists adhere to empirical and rational principles. Merton was
a sociologist who defined four norms: communism, universalism, disinterestedness and organized
skepticism, which are collectively known as the ethos of science. Sticking to these norms (CUDOS)
should result in objectivity
o Communism refers to common ownership of scientific knowledge, sharing of research
findings is very important.
o Universalism has to do with objective observations and logical consistency. No limitations
may be placed on science based on religion, gender, race or politics internationalization
of the practice of science.
o Disinterestedness means that scientists are expected to produce results without influence
from emotional, ideological, commercial or other interests: working in an honest and open
way.
o Organized skepticism is important to make sure facts and theories are not too readily
accepted. That’s why scientists critically assess each other’s work.
Karl Popper’s critique on the standard view
Popper spoke of problem of induction, which points out that since it is impossible to examine all possible
objects, universal statements cannot always have empirical foundation. He addresses it with the idea of
refutation and confirmation, in which he says that first a theory must be formed. From this theory,
singular statements can be derived. Falsification helps distinguishing scientific theories from non-scientific
ones. Scientific theories are falsifiable when it is possible to refute or falsify the theory with observation or
derive statements from it that preclude or forbid something (science is about refuting rather than
confirming). Popper was critical of the logical empiricists’ views on observation, since according to him,
observation requires a theory from the start (some sort of framework). This is called theory-laden
observation. We see theoretically embedded and interpreted objects instead of just points and dots.
Popper’s contributions give theory-forming a more important place in the cycle.
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,Thomas Kuhn’s critique on the standard view
Kuhn expressed suspicion about the objectivity of observational science. He wrote about how science
evolved based on historical material about scientific development. No empirical evidence can be used to
treat a theory without committing to it: the paradigm is a framework within which a scientific community
works and thinks. It is analogous to Popper’s theory-laden observation, but Kuhn calls it normal science.
According to Kuhn (as opposed to Popper), theories are not refuted, but existing theories are refined and
confirmed. A crisis (new and unexpected phenomena are uncovered by research) can lead to transition to
a new paradigm. A crisis closes is one of three ways:
1. Normal science can handle the problem and the paradigm remains in place
2. The problem resists but there is lack of tools to solve it, so it is set aside for a future generation
3. New candidate for paradigm emerges and battle over acceptance ensues reconstruction of prior
assumptions and facts. A shift can take place which changes a scientist world (e.g. creation to evolution).
According to Kuhn, paradigm shifts are non-rational: during a crisis there is no single generally accepted
paradigm. Also, impossible to use Popper’s idea of falsification. A change of paradigm is a scientific
revolution.
Response to Kuhn and Popper
Kuhn’s thought is strong in descriptive nature: showing how science develops. Popper and logical
empiricists base their ideas on how science should be: they wanted better science.
- Lakatos belongs to the school of thought that it is not necessary to abandon the idea of rational progress.
He agreed with Kuhn that rejection is not necessary, but a theory can be refined and modified. Falsification
does not take place either: when a hypothesis is falsified, there are circumstances that can be put forward
to preserve the theory. Theories occur in clusters (research programme) with a set of central theories
surrounded by protective theories (auxiliary hypotheses). The negative heuristic means that the hard core
must not be questioned: the auxiliary hypotheses should be adjusted. Dealing with counterexamples that
appear to refute a core theory is done with the positive heuristic: partially articulated set of suggestions
for additional hypotheses, new techniques, and methods. A new theory is produced, with the same hard
core but modified hypotheses. A progressive research programme is broadening, a degenerative research
programme is caused by accumulation of inconsistencies.
- Science and Technology Studies (STS) is another school of thought which describes studies in which
scientific research is actually carried out within a societal context. Work in STS shows that observations
and experiments also require non-scientific knowledge (experience, background knowledge), and that
theories are often empirically underdetermined (formulated more broadly than empirical evidence allows;
problem of induction or retained despite falsifying observations by postulating additional hypotheses or
special circumstances). So, there is room for interpretation. Uncertainty enables scientists to play an active,
constructive role (constructivism): scientific facts are less hard than is suggested societal element.
Latour did research into the construction of scientific facts; compares accepted facts to black box:
looks self-evident, but when opened, little that is self-evident. In almost every fact, there is some
controversy: interpretative flexibility. Once there is consensus to the reality, a claim becomes a
fact, and the discussion is forgotten. Latour says the construction of scientific facts requires
hindsight. If the controversy ends, the fact is accepted. According to constructivism, facts are not
objective elements of reality, but constructions created in the practice of science.
Constructivist interpretation is different from the standard view. The Vienna Circle and Popper were less
interested in the actual process of scientific knowledge but focused on philosophical and methodological
norms. Constructivists, however, have a more relativist approach: does science approximate truth? In
development of scientific knowledge, non-rational arguments are much more important than the standard
view permits.
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, Modern day view of science
So there can be different views: science is a purely rationalist enterprise (Vienna Circle, Popper, Lakatos),
or society influences the choices made in science (Kuhn and Latour). There certainly is a boundary area
(although blurred) in which science and society interact (scientists advising politicians, ethical
consequences, companies funding research). At the interface, various branches of knowledge and societal
approaches interact. Therefore, all manner of conflicts can be expected in which parties attempt to
safeguard their territory and exclude others from it: boundary work. There is also collaboration, since
mutual interests are involved. Boundary objects are concepts, practices or objects that can be used by
different viewpoints and are robust enough to maintain identity across them.
Mode 1 and 2 Science
Mode 1 is the classical view that science and society are separate (standard view). There are discussions
and conflicts, but they remain internal to science society is not involved until the results are made
public or knowledge is applied (this is called a linear model). However, in practice society concerns itself
with the practice of science (funding research, informing about research, quality assessed by contribution
to society). When boundary areas are expanding, more and more scientists are active within them:
Nowotny refers to this as Mode 2: the context (social environment) is a factor.
Mode 2 knowledge production emerged because science got more and more steered by the
government, universities are exploiting their research (commercialization, undermining the
Merton’s ethos of science), more collaborative partnerships in which non-scientific criteria are also
important, change in the role of the general public since they are better educated and ‘talk back’ to
science.
Conclusion
Scientists often refer to Popper when explaining their view of science: rationality (falsification model),
creativity (theories can come from anywhere), experiment and observation (testing), truth (to which the
falsification process brings us ever closer) and objectivity (theory-laden observation). Since Kuhn, the
paradigm concept was also used: acknowledging that social and psychological factors play a role on top of
rational aspects. Latour places an even greater emphasis than Kuhn on societal processes and on the
argument that we are continuously adjusting our perception of reality. Most scientist at least partly agree
with constructivist interpretation. There is no ‘standard view’ on science anymore since there are different
views on what science is.
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