What kills IOs? When and why do IOs terminate?
History of IOs and IO research
International institutions and organizations are the products of costly negotiation and
contracting processes that are far too deeply embedded in social and political structures to
suddenly nullify.
Key concepts
This article is about formal IGOs established by charter or treaty. To qualify as an IGO, an
international organizations must have a written charter, at least three sovereign parties and an
independent administrative structure, such as a permanent secretariat or staff.
The termination of formal IGos must be clearly distinguished from situations in which
deep-seated informal norms and practices lose their prescriptive status.
Ways to die
In legal terms, IGOs can terminate through 5 broad processes:
1. their founding treaties expire;
2. they’re explicitly dissolved by state parties;
3. they’re formally replaced by other organizations;
4. they’re formally merged with other organizations;
5. they simply fall into disuse for a prolonged period.
IGO mortality 1815-2016: descriptive statistics
Global termination rates increased sharply during decades marked by broad geopolitical
upheaval (high death-ratios). The size of an IGO’s membership is a strong predictor of death,
with an inverse correlation between number of members and risk of termination. In terms of
function, IGOs focused on security and judicial matters display the highest mortality rates,
followed by focused on trade and economic and social policy, followed by technical matters.
Turning to age, once an IGO makes it through a risky youth, during which it’s highly liable to
termination, its termination risk declines.
All in all, IGO death rates vary according to both exogenous factors (geopolitical upheaval)
and intrinsic features (membership, function and organizational age).
Theorizing IGO death
Debates in IR about the creation and endurance of international institutions have 3 mains:
power-based (realist) accounts, interest-based (‘functionalist') accounts and social
constructivism.
According to some, IGO deaths may be simply viewed as theoretically expected events
(endurance) that fail to materialize. However, absence of ‘robustness-enhancing’ factors is
unlikely to be a direct cause.
Functionalist, power-based and history institutionalism (HI) approaches are often
complementary - each emphasizing different aspects of institutional processes that may
produce institutional stability or change.
, Exogenous shocks and IGO death
Power-based theory (realist) says international institutions are created and maintained by
powerful states to advance national interest. Since they serve the needs of powerful patrons,
institutions are expected to change following major shifts in international power balances.
For example, newly powerful states creating IOs for own interest, or dismantling existing
IGOs that cause disadvantage.
They often focus on historical crises as starting points.
IGO deaths are caused by major shifts in international power balances, which reduce
the power of existing institutional patrons vis-à-vis institutional challengers.
Where realists ask whether institutions serve the needs of states, functionalists focus on
collective benefits. States create IOs to reduce transaction costs of cooperation - mainly
through supply of infor and by creating ‘focal points’. They have high start-up costs and their
benefits increase over time. Nevertheless, states will abandon IOs if they no longer bring
advantage. Presumably, exogenous shocks that trigger shifts in relative state power may also
reduce the expected utility to states of adhering to existing IOs. Yet by thinking of collective
gains instead of ‘private’, IGO death may reflect changes in state preferences independently
of powershifts. Furthermore, states will seek to reform existing IGOs rather than discard
them.
IGO deaths are triggered by major political and economic changes or shocks, which
reduce the collective utility to states of adhering to existing institutions.
Endogenous factors: adaptability as a function of scope, centralisation and
size
There is variation in IGOs’ capacity (utility) for adaptation. An IO’s organizational assets
(principles, rules, procedures) can be ‘specific’ or ‘general’. Adaptability may also depend on
centralisation. ‘General assets’ enable states to cooperate efficiently by providing info and
establishing rules for negotiation, decision-making, monitoring and resolving. IGOs that offer
centralized information provision, decision-making and implementation can be said to be rich
on ‘general assets’, which confer efficiency gains. A third aspect is size. The more members,
the larger the number of patrons to whom the IO can be of future value. Size may also reduce
vulnerability to exogenous shocks by ‘spreading risk’ (‘average outcomes’ across members
for country- or region-specific shocks). While large size may reduce strategic flexibility, it
may still increase adaptability.
IGOs are more liable to terminate if they have (1) small membership, (2) narrow scope
and (3) low centralisation. The liability of these intrinsic features increases in rapidly
changing environments.
, Reconciling exogenous and endogenous factors: timing and sequencing
An additional aspect of survivability is temporality. Unlike rationalist theories which portray
states as free to abandon institutions, a core insight of HI is that institutions are subject to
strong lock-in effects arising from positive feedback processes and complementarities
existing within broader institutional systems. It matters when, in what order and how long
they’ve been around - individually and jointly. There are 3 types of positive feedback
processes: first, institutions change the expectations of social actors, leading them to adjust
their behavior to reinforce initial institutional choices (‘adaptive behavior’). Second,
institutions gather knowledge and expertise, which leads to returns from continuing use
(‘learning effects’). Third, strong exchange relationships develop over time, increasing
complementary practices among actors and joint benefits (‘coordination effects’).
All in all, the longer an IGO is in operation, the greater are the adaptation, learning and
coordination effects.
Not merely the passage of time, but also the timing and sequencing of events may affect
IGOs. Exogenous shocks may be more severe if they hit early in an IGO’s lifespan. Also
(sequentially), being first to facilitate cooperation on a given issue may be advantageous
(market). → Additional to benefits of absolute age, IGOs that are older relative to their peers
are more likely to weather exogenous shocks thanks to their ‘first-comer status’.
Younger IGOs have higher mortality rates due to limited learning, adaptation and
coordination effects. The ‘liability of youth’ is greatest in rapidly changing
environments.
Technical vs. non-technical IGOs
Technical IGOs have a low mortality rate.One reason might be that ‘technical mandate’ is
confounded with other survival enhancing factors (large size, high centralization). Still,
serving a technical function in itself enhances that - they have strong positive feedback
processes and self-reinforcing effects, and thus incur high substitution costs. A second reason
is that they often fulfill practical needs (metrology, postal services) for which there is
continued demand even in times of crisis.
IGOs are likely both to have lower mortality than non-technical IGOs and to display a
different pattern of mortality insofar as terminations are less likely to closely track
geopolitical upheavals.
Technical IGOs have lower overall mortality and are less acutely vulnerable to
geopolitical shocks than non-technical organizations.
Empirics: exogenous change and IGO death
Periods of geopolitical (= relating to politics as influenced by geographical factors) and
economic instability have higher IGO termination rates. Many IGOs also survive wars and
economic crises. The identified intrinsic factors are separate from, but complementary to,
exogenous shocks; such features are likely to render organizations particularly vulnerable
during periods of rapid exogenous change.
