Informatie- en mediarecht Arresten 2017/2018
Verplichte arresten Informatie- en
mediarecht
1
Edwin van der Velde Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen
,Informatie- en mediarecht Arresten 2017/2018
Inhoudsopgave
Inhoudsopgave...................................................................................................................................2
Week 1: Inleiding, Media in een democratsche rechtsstaat..................................................................3
Week 2: Recht op privacy, de afweging met vrijheid van meningsuitng..............................................16
Week 3: De rol van de journalist; art. 10 en doorgife..........................................................................25
2
Edwin van der Velde Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen
,Informatie- en mediarecht Arresten 2017/2018
Week 1: Inleiding, Media in een democratische rechtsstaat
Naam Handyside
Rechtsvraag Hoe moet de geoorloofdheid van een inbreuk op art. 10 EVRM
worden beoordeeld? En was in dit geval de beperking geoorloofd.
Kort antwoord Aan de hand van de wettigheid, het doel en de noodzakelijkheid
van de beperking, waarbij lidstaten een zekere
beoordelingsvrijheid genieten maar door het Hof worden
gecontroleerd; ja.
Samenvatting feitencomplex Klager geeft een schoolboekje uit waarin informatie stond met
betrekking tot seksuele voorlichting. Na een aantal klachten
worden in overeenstemming met de Britse wet zo’n 1000 boekjes
in beslag genomen. Verdachte wordt vervolgd voor het in bezit
hebben van obscene publicaties, hetgeen verboden is volgens de
‘Obscene Publications Act’. Klager betoogt dat dit in strijd is met
de vrijheid van meningsuiting als bedoeld in art. 10 EVRM.
Belangrijkste overwegingen 43. The various measures challenged - the applicant's criminal
conviction, the seizure and subsequent forfeiture and destruction
of the matrix and of hundreds of copies of the Schoolbook - were
without any doubt, and the Government did not deny it,
"interferences by public authority" in the exercise of his freedom
of expression which is guaranteed by paragraph 1 (art. 10-1) of
the text cited above. Such interferences entail a "violation" of
Article 10 if they do not fall within one of the exceptions provided
for in paragraph 2 (art. 10-2), which is accordingly of decisive
importance in this case.
44. If the "restrictions" and "penalties" complained of by Mr.
Handyside are not to infringe Article 10 (art. 10), they must,
according to paragraph 2 (art. 10-2), in the first place have been
"prescribed by law". The Court finds that this was the case. In the
United Kingdom legal system, the basis in law for the measures in
question was the 1959/1964 Acts (paragraphs 14-18, 24-25 and
27-34 above). Besides, this was not contested by the applicant
who further admitted that the competent authorities had correctly
applied those Acts.
45. Having thus ascertained that the interferences complained of
satisfied the first of the conditions in paragraph 2 of Article 10
(art. 10-2), the Court then investigated whether they also complied
with the others. According to the Government and the majority of
the Commission, the interferences were "necessary in a
democratic society", "for the protection of ... morals".
46. Sharing the view of the Government and the unanimous
opinion of the Commission, the Court first finds that the
1959/1964 Acts have an aim that is legitimate under Article 10
para. 2 (art. 10-2), namely, the protection of morals in a
democratic society. Only this latter purpose is relevant in this case
since the object of the said Acts - to wage war on "obscene"
publications, defined by their tendency to "deprave and corrupt" -
is linked far more closely to the protection of morals than to any
of the further purposes permitted by Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2).
48. (…)These observations apply, notably, to Article 10 para. 2
(art. 10-2). In particular, it is not possible to find in the domestic
law of the various Contracting States a uniform European
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Edwin van der Velde Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen
, Informatie- en mediarecht Arresten 2017/2018
conception of morals. The view taken by their respective laws of
the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from
place to place, especially in our era which is characterised by a
rapid and far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject. By
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces
of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the
exact content of these requirements as well as on the "necessity"
of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them. (…)
Consequently, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) leaves to the
Contracting States a margin of appreciation. This margin is given
both to the domestic legislator ("prescribed by law") and to the
bodies, judicial amongst others, that are called upon to interpret
and apply the laws in force.
49. Nevertheless, Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) does not give the
Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court,
which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the
observance of those States' engagements (Article 19) (art. 19), is
empowered to give the final ruling on whether a "restriction" or
"penalty" is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected
by Article 10 (art. 10). The domestic margin of appreciation thus
goes hand in hand with a European supervision. Such supervision
concerns both the aim of the measure challenged and its
"necessity";
The Court's supervisory functions oblige it to pay the utmost
attention to the principles characterising a "democratic society".
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential founda-
tions of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress
and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of
Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to "information" or
"ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or
disturb the State or any sector of the population. Such are the de-
mands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without
which there is no "democratic society". This means, amongst
other things, that every "formality", "condition", "restriction" or
"penalty" imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the le-
gitimate aim pursued.
From another standpoint, whoever exercises his freedom of
expression undertakes "duties and responsibilities" the scope of
which depends on his situation and the technical means he uses.
The Court cannot overlook such a person's "duties" and "respon-
sibilities" when it enquires, as in this case, whether "restrictions"
or "penalties" were conducive to the "protection of morals" which
made them "necessary" in a "democratic society".
52. (…) The Court thus allows that the fundamental aim of the
judgment of 29 October 1971, applying the 1959/1964 Acts, was
the protection of the morals of the young, a legitimate purpose un-
der Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2).
59. On the strength of the data before it, the Court thus reaches the
conclusion that no breach of the requirements of Article 10 (art.
10) has been established in the circumstances of the present case.
Geparafraseerde rechtsregel Het Hof schept een algemeen toetsingskader voor inbreuken op de
vrijheid van meningsuiting:
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Edwin van der Velde Rijksuniversiteit
Groningen
