Reforming Intelligence or Redefining Strategy?
BURSTING THE ANGLOSPHERIC BUBBLE: RETHINKING
INTELLIGENCE BEYOND ‘FIXING’ IN THE CASE STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
1
, Introduction
Since the War on Terror, intelligence services in the global South have been vital
accomplices to the United States and its allies. In Afghanistan, wide-ranging efforts anchored
in Western conceptions were initiated to overhaul the Afghan intelligence agency central to
this study: the National Directorate of Security (NDS).
However, intelligence is not a universal concept, nor is there a single formula that is
applicable in every context. Recognizing the substantial disparities among intelligence
cultures is crucial to develop appropriate national security goals and policies (Yalçinkaya &
Özer, 2016, p.3). The end of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan and the rapid resurgence
of the Taliban raises important questions about ‘what works and why’ in the reconstruction
and evolution of an indigenous intelligence agency (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012, p.1012).
Therefore, this in-depth study of the NDS (2002-2021) aims to determine the impact the
Anglo-American intelligence culture and strategy have had on the NDS by answering the
main research question: How did the lack of cultural and strategic awareness of the US-led
forces impact the operational effectiveness and autonomy of the National Directorate of
Security in Afghanistan? The scope of this research concentrates on two specific areas of
intelligence: National Security Priorities (NPSs) and Intelligence Cooperation (IC):
SQ1: What impact did the CIA's initial lack of cultural and strategic intelligence of
Afghanistan’s security landscape have on the National Directorate of Security’s national
security priorities?
SQ2: How did the Anglospheric intelligence mindset delimit the CIA’s ability to deploy
intelligence cooperation in the establishment of an autonomous National Directorate of
Security?
2
BURSTING THE ANGLOSPHERIC BUBBLE: RETHINKING
INTELLIGENCE BEYOND ‘FIXING’ IN THE CASE STUDY OF THE
NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SECURITY
1
, Introduction
Since the War on Terror, intelligence services in the global South have been vital
accomplices to the United States and its allies. In Afghanistan, wide-ranging efforts anchored
in Western conceptions were initiated to overhaul the Afghan intelligence agency central to
this study: the National Directorate of Security (NDS).
However, intelligence is not a universal concept, nor is there a single formula that is
applicable in every context. Recognizing the substantial disparities among intelligence
cultures is crucial to develop appropriate national security goals and policies (Yalçinkaya &
Özer, 2016, p.3). The end of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan and the rapid resurgence
of the Taliban raises important questions about ‘what works and why’ in the reconstruction
and evolution of an indigenous intelligence agency (Aldrich & Kasuku, 2012, p.1012).
Therefore, this in-depth study of the NDS (2002-2021) aims to determine the impact the
Anglo-American intelligence culture and strategy have had on the NDS by answering the
main research question: How did the lack of cultural and strategic awareness of the US-led
forces impact the operational effectiveness and autonomy of the National Directorate of
Security in Afghanistan? The scope of this research concentrates on two specific areas of
intelligence: National Security Priorities (NPSs) and Intelligence Cooperation (IC):
SQ1: What impact did the CIA's initial lack of cultural and strategic intelligence of
Afghanistan’s security landscape have on the National Directorate of Security’s national
security priorities?
SQ2: How did the Anglospheric intelligence mindset delimit the CIA’s ability to deploy
intelligence cooperation in the establishment of an autonomous National Directorate of
Security?
2
