The Mind-Body Problem and Physicalism
The still ongoing mind-body debate was introduced to Western philosophy by Descartes (1641),
who epitomized his dualist theory of mind in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Cartesian
dualism is a form of interactive dualism, as it not only argues for the existence of two
fundamentally different substances; physical and immaterial, but contends that these coexist and
influence each other. However, the questions how exactly do the body and the mind
communicate, and what is the nature of their relation remain unanswered. Several alternative
theories have been proposed over the years to resolve the problem of mind-body interaction and
relatedness. The following essay will elaborate on physicalism, more precisely on the mind-brain
identity theory.
Descartes was a foundationalist looking for a secure, unshakeable foundation -an
Archimedean firm spot- for knowledge (Delius et al. 2012:44). He chose hyperbolic doubt as his
method. In Meditation 1, Descartes ends up casting doubt on all a posteriori as well as a priori
knowledge, after having introduced his dream and evil genius arguments. However, in
Meditation 2, he realizes that there is one belief, which is immune to all these doubts; his
existence. The Cogito is an indubitable truth. Even if he is dreaming, he must exist to be able to
dream. Even if he is being deceived by an Evil Demon, there has to be something that is being
deceived. At this point, Descartes establishes that he exists as ‘a thinking thing’/ ‘res cogitas’,
however, he still does not know whether he has a body. In Meditation VI, after having established
that the physical world exists, he develops his theory of mind and body. His considerations and
observations lead him to believe that there are two fundamentally different kinds of ‘things’:
physical, tangible (as in body) and immaterial (as in mind), which coexist and influence each
other. However, he fails to explain the precise nature of this interaction.
Most alternative theories of mind tend to be monist, advocating the existence of only one sort
of substance; one kind of reality. Monism can take the form of mentalism, which claims that only
mental phenomena are real or materialism, which argues that only physical phenomena are real.
1
, Armstrong (1987, Gross 2009:253) distinguished between peripheralist materialism, also known
as logical behaviourism, which identified mental states with behaviours, and centralist
materialism, the mind-body identity theory, that claims that mental states are identifiable with
physiological processes of the nervous system. Armstrong himself was heavily influenced by the
discoveries made by modern science, which led him to devise a materialist theory, that provides
an account of the mind ‘in purely physio-chemical terms’ (1980, Perry, Bratman & Fischer
2012:258).
One of the appeals of the identity theory is that it resolves the problem of communication
posed by Cartesian dualism with ease, since it completely rejects the existence of immaterial
substances. Additionally, neuroscience has enabled us to establish detailed correlations between
activities of particular brain areas and mental processes. Studies, which have investigated
patients suffering from neurodegenerative diseases and brain injuries proved to be particularly
useful in this regard. Scoville & Miller (1957) reported that HM following a medial temporal lobe
resection, which damaged his hippocampus, hippocampal gyrus bilaterally as well as his
amygdale, had moderate retrograde as well as severe anterograde amnesia. He was no longer
able to form new semantic and episodic memories in his long-term memory. Additionally,
Bechara et al. (2000) reported that patients with lesions in their ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFT), which has been found to affect decision-making abilities, processing of fear and
inhibition of emotional responses, repeatedly made decisions leading to negative outcomes
indicating that their capacity to learn from their mistakes was severely impaired. They also
seemed to be insensitive to future consequences and were primarily motivated by immediate
rewards. These and similar studies have clearly demonstrated that damage to the brain has a
profound effect on mental life. However, in relation to the mind-body problem they only seem
to address -what Chalmers (1995:200) dubbed- the ‘easy problems of consciousness’.
The identity theory states that a certain mental state can only be identified with a particular
neurophysiological state, implying that only human beings or creatures whose anatomy and
physiology is identical to ours, can have mental states. This extremely restrictive assumption led
to the charge of neuronal chauvinism (Garvey & Stangroom 2012:361). Searle (2004, Nath
2013:55) argued that if we were to accept that feelings of pain can only result from the
2
The still ongoing mind-body debate was introduced to Western philosophy by Descartes (1641),
who epitomized his dualist theory of mind in his Meditations on First Philosophy. Cartesian
dualism is a form of interactive dualism, as it not only argues for the existence of two
fundamentally different substances; physical and immaterial, but contends that these coexist and
influence each other. However, the questions how exactly do the body and the mind
communicate, and what is the nature of their relation remain unanswered. Several alternative
theories have been proposed over the years to resolve the problem of mind-body interaction and
relatedness. The following essay will elaborate on physicalism, more precisely on the mind-brain
identity theory.
Descartes was a foundationalist looking for a secure, unshakeable foundation -an
Archimedean firm spot- for knowledge (Delius et al. 2012:44). He chose hyperbolic doubt as his
method. In Meditation 1, Descartes ends up casting doubt on all a posteriori as well as a priori
knowledge, after having introduced his dream and evil genius arguments. However, in
Meditation 2, he realizes that there is one belief, which is immune to all these doubts; his
existence. The Cogito is an indubitable truth. Even if he is dreaming, he must exist to be able to
dream. Even if he is being deceived by an Evil Demon, there has to be something that is being
deceived. At this point, Descartes establishes that he exists as ‘a thinking thing’/ ‘res cogitas’,
however, he still does not know whether he has a body. In Meditation VI, after having established
that the physical world exists, he develops his theory of mind and body. His considerations and
observations lead him to believe that there are two fundamentally different kinds of ‘things’:
physical, tangible (as in body) and immaterial (as in mind), which coexist and influence each
other. However, he fails to explain the precise nature of this interaction.
Most alternative theories of mind tend to be monist, advocating the existence of only one sort
of substance; one kind of reality. Monism can take the form of mentalism, which claims that only
mental phenomena are real or materialism, which argues that only physical phenomena are real.
1
, Armstrong (1987, Gross 2009:253) distinguished between peripheralist materialism, also known
as logical behaviourism, which identified mental states with behaviours, and centralist
materialism, the mind-body identity theory, that claims that mental states are identifiable with
physiological processes of the nervous system. Armstrong himself was heavily influenced by the
discoveries made by modern science, which led him to devise a materialist theory, that provides
an account of the mind ‘in purely physio-chemical terms’ (1980, Perry, Bratman & Fischer
2012:258).
One of the appeals of the identity theory is that it resolves the problem of communication
posed by Cartesian dualism with ease, since it completely rejects the existence of immaterial
substances. Additionally, neuroscience has enabled us to establish detailed correlations between
activities of particular brain areas and mental processes. Studies, which have investigated
patients suffering from neurodegenerative diseases and brain injuries proved to be particularly
useful in this regard. Scoville & Miller (1957) reported that HM following a medial temporal lobe
resection, which damaged his hippocampus, hippocampal gyrus bilaterally as well as his
amygdale, had moderate retrograde as well as severe anterograde amnesia. He was no longer
able to form new semantic and episodic memories in his long-term memory. Additionally,
Bechara et al. (2000) reported that patients with lesions in their ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFT), which has been found to affect decision-making abilities, processing of fear and
inhibition of emotional responses, repeatedly made decisions leading to negative outcomes
indicating that their capacity to learn from their mistakes was severely impaired. They also
seemed to be insensitive to future consequences and were primarily motivated by immediate
rewards. These and similar studies have clearly demonstrated that damage to the brain has a
profound effect on mental life. However, in relation to the mind-body problem they only seem
to address -what Chalmers (1995:200) dubbed- the ‘easy problems of consciousness’.
The identity theory states that a certain mental state can only be identified with a particular
neurophysiological state, implying that only human beings or creatures whose anatomy and
physiology is identical to ours, can have mental states. This extremely restrictive assumption led
to the charge of neuronal chauvinism (Garvey & Stangroom 2012:361). Searle (2004, Nath
2013:55) argued that if we were to accept that feelings of pain can only result from the
2
