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Summary Summaries - Political Philosophy (PHI2042F)
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Summaries of all of the prescribed readings for all 6 political philosophy sections.
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POLITICAL PHILOSOPHYPHI2042F
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**These are key points taken from the Prescribed Readings for PHI2042F. SOME parts are directly quoted, others have been simplified by me and
my classmates. I do not take credit for any knowledge expressed in this document.**
Topic 1: Nation State - Do We Need It?
KAI NIELSEN - A World Government, Security, and Global Justice
Nielsen supports establishment of world government as single court of final appeal to settle international disputes & enforce decisions through legitimate
means of violence. He also emphasizes importance of protecting cultural diversity of political communities & their limited power of self-determination.
Nielsen believes that for world government to be legitimate, it must be constitutional democracy & take federalist form. He also advocates for
implementation of world justice, which involves achieving basic human rights & equality of condition for everyone in world while promoting individual
autonomy & flourishing of human life. However, Nielsen acknowledges that establishment of such world government would be extremely difficult, & it
should not be high priority on political agendas. Idea of world government will sound impractical, if not dangerous, to many people because of entrenched
& antagonistic nature of nation-states. Even within nation-states, there are ethnic or class conflicts, which make oppression, strife, & conflict pervasive in
world. Sense of being people runs deep, & even highly educated & politically sophisticated people tend to have firm sense of their particular identity.
Hegemonic nation-states hate each other & are set on firmly conflicting course that only elementary sense of prudence keeps from breaking into war. There
is little likelihood of movement toward world government because of such conflicts, & if achieved, it would be inherently unstable, thereby threatening
repeatedly to break out into civil war. Despite challenges & prevalent view, Nielsen defends idea of world government as single final authority, court of last
appeal, in fraternal, worldwide, cantonal system of diverse peoples. In world of diverse peoples with different traditions & conceptions of life, respect for
persons & moral equality requires respect for these different traditions even when they conflict with our own. This includes sustaining values of cultural
independence & sovereignty & commitment to distinct political communities. Nation-states exist to protect integrity of these larger cultural entities, & they
claim sole right to sovereign power over territory & its people. To have community of nations, we must have respect for communal integrity & different
patterns of culture & political development. However, we are not close to having community of humanity, as identity is found in distinct communities
rather than humanity as whole. Morality is morality of Sittlichkeit, & our personal identities are often found in our cultural identities. Main point made by
Nielsen is that he advocates for loose federalist system of cantonal system in democratic & federalist world government that would protect distinctive ways
of life of different cultures. Nielsen argues that single world government would be dangerous & culturally drab, & that diversity is necessary for human
options to remain open. He counters Michael Walzer's argument that world government would lead to dangerous brutality by suggesting that democratic &
federalist world government with cantonal system would protect traditions & rights of individuals under system that cedes ultimate sovereign authority.
Nielsen disagrees with Walzer's second argument against possibility of world government being desirable state of affairs.
Nielsen discusses Michael Walzer's argument against idea of world government. Walzer claims that world government would undermine possibility of
political life, which depends on shared history, communal sentiment, & accepted conventions. However, Nielsen disagrees with Walzer's argument, stating
that loose federalism of world government would give autonomy to different groups while protecting them from war & enhancing cooperation among them.
He cites examples of modern nation-states that respect autonomy & local attachments of distinct peoples while still providing single control of legitimate
means of violence. Nielsen argues that universalistic values of Enlightenment can extend to idea of being citizens of common world while having distinct
local identities & attachments. As universalistic values of Enlightenment deepen, it is possible to have distinct local identities & attachments without
feelings of cultural superiority. Different peoples can protect their identities without nation-state charged with representing that identity exclusively or
dominating it. Commitment to basic human rights commits us to mixed view that includes both universalistic commitments & local attachments. Certain
rights, such as linguistic choice in public education, may be appropriate for some regions but not others, while other rights, such as sexual equality, are
universal. National sovereignty should not be seen as most important entitlement, & we should see ourselves as members of human community first & as
members of particular nations second. Socially necessary rights of security & subsistence should be accorded to all people & should not be subverted by
nationalist considerations. Nations are becoming increasingly interdependent economically, culturally, & politically, & metaphor of global village is
,becoming more accurate. Nationalism that only recognizes community of sovereign states & not humanity is backward-looking. Cosmopolitanism is
growing, especially with increased education & understanding, leading to increasing sense of right to self-determination for people. Right to
self-determination need not lead to hegemony of nation-state. As people's sense of universalism & recognition of need for secure peace in nonviolent world
grow, they can come to accept world government voluntarily & democratically. Nielsen is arguing for desirability of voluntarily accepting world
government that has characteristics suggested in this section.
ADVOCATING WORLD GOVERNMENT: Nielsen addresses challenge that advocating for world government is irresponsible given current state of world
& likelihood of national chauvinism & intransigence. He acknowledges difficulty in achieving world government, but argues that nonideal theory should
not concern itself with issue of establishing world government. Instead, nonideal theory should focus on social issues & struggles, with aim of transforming
existing societies to be more caring & responsible, both within & beyond their borders. This struggle may involve small communities & particular social
issues, but should also include larger agenda in background. Nielsen suggests that aim should be to transform societies in direction of decency, through
mechanisms focused on how to get from current state of affairs to better one. Nielsen argues that pursuit of socialism & feasibility of achieving it should be
part of struggle for better world. He also distinguishes between ideal theory (which imagines ideal world without considering how to achieve it) & nonideal
theory (which focuses on how to make progress towards better world). Nielsen argues that ideal world would have world government, which would be
necessary to provide security, settle conflicts between different ethnic groups & cultures in equitable way, & promote human flourishing. He acknowledges
potential for world government to become authoritarian & tyrannical, but argues that cantonal-type democratic federation would be desirable, with
considerable autonomy devolving to distinct cultural entities within global federation. World government would be democratically elected & have
constitutional democracy with specified system of rights, providing protection of constitutional democracy for world government. Federal systems such as
Switzerland & Canada are not paradigms of just societies. Coherent & feasible conception of global justice is needed to secure just world order. This
conception of global justice should be coherentist & based on our considered judgments in wide reflective equilibrium. It should be capable of stable
institutional exemplification in feasibly possible world order. Belief in moral equality, belief that life of everyone matters & matters equally, is general
considered judgment that has firm acceptance in modern societies. Just world order should aim to achieve equal protection of rights, equal societal concern
for well-being of everyone, equality of condition compatible with individual autonomy & human flourishing, & fullest satisfaction of needs compatible
with fair treatment & equal respect for autonomy. Nielsen argues that coherent & feasible conception of global justice is necessary to secure just world
order. She suggests that commitment to moral equality is crucial component of this conception, which requires equal protection of rights for everyone,
equal societal concern for well-being of everyone, equality of condition for everyone compatible with individual autonomy & human flourishing, & fullest
satisfaction of needs for all individuals. However, she acknowledges that achieving all these values may be difficult & may not be fully achievable. She
argues that commitment to achieving as full approximation as possible of these values is necessary for global justice. Finally, she suggests that world
government with legitimate authority would be necessary to secure conditions that would enable achievement of global justice.
SO-CALLED INTRACTIBLE CASES: Nielsen argues that a world government that tries to represent different people in an equitable way could fail due to
conflicts arising from the differences in people's beliefs and interests. He uses the example of immigration in New Zealand, where the interests of New
Zealanders to maintain their way of life clash with the interests of Bangladeshis to emigrate for a better life. Nielsen contends that considerations of global
justice would lead to a further opening of immigration in New Zealand to achieve greater equality of life conditions in the world, but this may strain
people's commitment to the breaking point. However, Nielsen argues that there are principles and practices of global justice that, with a good knowledge of
the world, can give us definite guidance on what is to be done in these situations. Nielsen also notes that with the development of the productive forces,
intelligent and socially committed use of resources, and a firm commitment to the conceptions of global justice, Third World peoples can come to find a
tolerable life without emigrating. Nielsen argues that conflicts of interest can often make achieving social justice difficult, but it is possible to find rational
and morally acceptable solutions. He presents a case in which there is a conflict of interest between two groups of people, but argues that justice requires
siding with a utilitarianism of rights that protects the more extensive interests when the interests of everyone cannot be satisfied. He suggests that in most
cases, conflicts can be settled in a rational and morally acceptable way if there is a thorough knowledge of the facts and an acceptance of certain moral
truisms. Nielsen argues that there are enough common needs and interests among people to give a basis for some common policies and commonly
justifiable moral judgments, including judgments of global justice, that a world government could act upon in accordance with the pervasive interests of its
citizens. The key to achieving global justice, according to Nielsen, is political will and the resolute use of human intelligence.
SOCIALLY BASIC RIGHTS: Nielsen discusses the concept of human rights and how they relate to global justice. He argues that human rights are
demands that all of humanity has on each other, and that some of these rights are socially basic, meaning they are necessary for the enjoyment of all other
rights. Nielsen suggests that a good world government should be committed to securing these socially basic rights for everyone, and that this is a central
,aim of global justice. He asserts that conflicts of interest should be resolved in favor of these socially basic rights, which will typically trump other, lesser
interests. Overall, Nielsen suggests that a world government committed to securing socially basic human rights would provide a strong foundation for
achieving global justice. SUMMING UP: Nielsen discusses the possibility of a global state and argues that while it is not impossible, it is not something
that should be a priority at this time. He suggests that a just and humane cantonal federation on a global scale, with extensive cantonal autonomy for each
canton, would be a good model for a global state. However, he also suggests that a world of democratic socialist nation-states could function well without a
global state. Nielsen acknowledges that a monopoly on the means of violence is not desirable, but argues that the state may be a necessary evil to ensure
security and stability. He also argues that a global state committed to human rights and furthering the good of humanity would be a more just and humane
social order than any alternative, and would provide better conditions for mutual cooperation. Ultimately, Nielsen suggests that if a global state does not
provide these advantages, then the value of more complete autonomy for discrete peoples would outweigh the need for a world government.
FURTHER DOUBTS ABOUT WORLD GOVERNMENT: Nielsen argues for the necessity of a world state to secure global justice and prevent devastating
consequences, such as nuclear war. He argues that international law without effective sanctions cannot ensure compliance, and that a world state would
provide the necessary means to enforce international law and maintain peace. Additionally, he acknowledges that a world state may not completely
eliminate conflicts and struggles, but it would set moral and legal impediments to naked aggression and prevent global war. Despite cultural differences and
economic disparities, a world state with a judicial system representing wider interests would provide significant protection from the threat of nuclear war.
However, he also acknowledges that a world government could not abolish nuclear knowledge, and some cantons may secretly develop weapons systems,
potentially leading to a similar nuclear standoff. Nielsen argues that a world state, even in the form of a loose federation, would not be able to adequately
address the disparate interests and conflicts of its member states. He suggests that attempting to form such a federation would lead to instability, ultimately
resulting in a repressive authoritarian government prone to domination, civil wars, and the development of nuclear weapons by some of its member states.
However, even if this worst-case scenario were to come to fruition, Nielsen argues that it would still be better than the current world order, which is
characterized by wars, oppression, exploitation, and starvation. He notes that an authoritarian world government would at least reduce the nuclear threat
and make it harder to recapitulate the present war machines that obtain in nation-states.
Nielsen argues that the idea of a world federation and a humanity that goes with it would motivate people to struggle for democracy. He believes that if
there were ever to be a world dictatorship to contain rebellious elements, there would eventually be a struggle to regain the federation and move towards a
mutual accommodation among different cultures and classes. Despite the difficulties involved in such political encounters, Nielsen maintains that this
scenario would offer more hope for global justice, protection of human rights, and the bonds of sisterhood and brotherhood. However, he also suggests that
this near-worst-case scenario is not as likely as some far more benign scenarios. Nielsen thinks that world conquest by any one power is unlikely, and the
only kind of world government that would stand much chance of being accepted would be one that had a democratic and federalist structure. Nonetheless,
he acknowledges that such a structure would not come into being until the idea of democracy had been extended to all humankind and nationalisms had
been considerably weakened. Finally, Nielsen argues that with Enlightenment ideas of democracy and fellowship of humankind, prudence about mutual
nuclear destruction, and the continued development of the forces of production, there are conditions that could generate the impulse necessary to make
world government a live option. Nielsen defends the possibility and desirability of a world government of a distinct democratic sort. He acknowledges that
there are staggering difficulties along the way, and that as long as capitalism survives, there may not be much chance of a world government of the sort he
has characterized. Nielsen suggests that the same forces that push us toward a world government also push us toward democratic socialism, which extends
the idea of democracy from the political to the economic realm. He argues that industrial democracy, workers' control of their workplace, and ownership by
the public of the means of production are crucial for extending human autonomy and well-being, and that political democracy is necessary for economic
democracy to flourish. Nielsen believes that the idea of democracy, like the related idea of moral equality, is irresistible once brought to people, and that in
the longer view of things, there is no turning back from democracy.
Is Patriotism A Virtue? - Alasdair MacIntyre
MacIntyre argues that the task of the moral philosopher is to articulate the convictions of society in order to subject them to rational scrutiny. He notes that
there are significant disagreements about patriotism in society, which can be placed on a spectrum with two poles: one end sees patriotism as a virtue, while
the other sees it as a vice. MacIntyre aims to clarify the issues that divide these views, rather than offer reasons for taking one view over the other. He also
notes that in cases where conflicting and incompatible beliefs are held within a community, the first task of the moral philosopher is to render explicit what
is at issue in the disagreements. The first step in clarifying patriotism is to distinguish it from two other sets of attitudes: (1) the attitude of those who
champion their nation's causes solely because of its association with a moral ideal, and (2) mindless loyalty to one's own nation without regard for its
, characteristics. Patriotism is not primarily about championing a moral ideal, but about loyalty to a particular nation that only those possessing that particular
nationality can exhibit. Patriotism involves a peculiar regard for the particular characteristics, merits, and achievements of one's own nation, which are
valued as reasons supportive of the patriot's attitudes. Patriotism is one of a class of loyalty-exhibiting virtues, along with marital fidelity, love of one's own
family and kin, friendship, and loyalty to institutions such as schools and clubs. M argues that attitudes of loyalty, including patriotism, are distinct
from other attitudes that may be associated with them, such as loyalty to ideal or gratitude for benefits received. Loyalty involves particular
historical relationship of association between individual & relevant person, institution, or group, & is founded on peculiar action-generating
regard. M also notes that patriotism & other such loyalties cannot be reduced to responses of gratitude, & that particularity of relationship is
essential & ineliminable. Finally, M poses fundamental question about relationship between patriotism & morality, suggesting that if
patriotism is understood as he has described it, it must be considered vice rather than virtue. Thesis that patriotism, as understood by M, is
not virtue but vice because it is incompatible with morality as traditionally understood. Traditional understanding of morality is impersonal
& impartial, while patriotism requires particular loyalty to one's nation, which involves social particularity & partiality. Some argue that
patriotism can be limited in scope so that it does not conflict with morality, but M believes that this view of patriotism is emasculated &
empty. There are at least two kinds of circumstances where patriotic standpoint comes into conflict with standpoint of genuinely impersonal
morality or amounts to no more than set of empty slogans. M discusses two types of circumstances in which patriotic standpoint &
impersonal moral standpoint are at odds. First type of conflict arises from scarcity of essential resources, such as land suitable for
cultivation or fossil fuels, which can lead to competition between communities for these resources. Patriotic standpoint requires individuals
to strive to further interests of their own community, which may entail going to war on their community's behalf. However, impersonal
moral standpoint requires allocation of goods that treats each individual person as equal, & does not give priority to any particular
community. Second type of conflict arises from differences between communities about right way to live. This can lead to situations where
liberal moral standpoint & patriotic standpoint are at odds.
M gives example of Roman Empire setting its frontiers at point where they could be most easily secured, even if it meant infringing upon
territory & independence of border peoples who viewed raiding their traditional enemies as essential part of good life. Settled urban or
agricultural communities that provided target for these raids, on other hand, viewed subjugation of these peoples as central responsibility.
Two types of conflict that can arise between communities: one based on competition for scarce resources, & one based on differences in
beliefs about how to live. In both types of conflict, standpoint of impersonal morality & that of patriotism are at odds. Impersonal moral
standpoint requires neutrality between rival interests & sets of beliefs, while patriotism requires allegiance to one's own community & its
interests. Impersonal moral standpoint is based on idea that morality consists of rules that are equally binding on all persons & are
independent of social particularity. This understanding of morality is incompatible with treating patriotism as virtue, & requires that
patriotism be treated as vice. However, there are alternative accounts of morality that assign different place to patriotism, & M will discuss
one of these alternative accounts in next passage. Liberal account of morality holds that where & from whom one learns morality is
irrelevant to content of morality & one's commitment to it, much like mathematics. M's alternative account of morality holds that where &
from whom one learns morality is crucial to both content & nature of moral commitment. One's morality is acquired through way of life of
particular community, & moral rules of community are shaped by their response to difficult situations. Form of moral rules is intimately
connected with specific institutional arrangements, & what one learns as guide for actions & standard for evaluation is not morality as such,
but specific morality of particular social order. M also provides rejoinder to liberal account's response to their alternative account, which is
as follows: While it may be true that individuals progress from particular
M argues that the liberal account of morality, which holds that where and from whom one learns morality is irrelevant, is incomplete. M believes that the
particular community from which one learns morality is crucial to both the content and the nature of moral commitment. M argues that the specific rules
and precepts of morality that one learns are intimately connected to the institutional arrangements of their community, and that the goods that morality
seeks to uphold are socially specific and particular. Therefore, M contends that moral rules can only be justified by the specific goods they aim to produce,
which are particular to a given community. Additionally, M argues that one's moral commitment is sustained and reinforced by the community in which
they live, and that moral agents need others to reinforce their moral strengths and assist in remedying their moral weaknesses. M suggests that it is only
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