The End of the American World Order
Chapter 1: A Multiplex World (p.1) 1
Chapter 2: The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Moment (p.12) 1
The Fall and Rise of Declinism (p. 20) 2
Chapter 3: The Myths of Liberal Hegemony (p.33) 3
Co-opting China (p.45) 4
American Power and the Future of Multilateralism (p.50) 4
Chapter 4: Emerging Powers. The Hype of the Rest? (p.59) 5
The G20: Promise and Performance (p.64) 6
Power South and the Poor South (p.69) 7
Norm-taking and Norm-making (p.73) 8
Prospects (p.78) 8
Chapter 5: Regional Worlds (p. 79) 8
Regions under Liberal Hegemony (p.82) 9
Regionalism’s Changing Purpose and Relevance (p.84) 9
Europe as the Model: Limits of a Hegemonic Idea (p.93) 10
The Rerun of Hegemonic Regionalism? (p.101) 11
Chapter 6: Worlds in Collusion (p.106) 11
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Chapter 1: A Multiplex World (p.1)
Emerging world described in variety of ways: multipolar, post-American, no one’s world
● ‘America’s decline’: order established by America is ‘declining’, referring to
America’s position and role in world affairs
o Question whether AWO will persist
● American World Order (AWO) /American-led liberal hegemonic order: sweeping and
as-yet-unfinished US hegemony in world politics
o vs. Chinese world order
● AWO: built around a world of territorially bounded nation-states
o Relies on hegemonic benevolence providing global public goods (trade,
security, multilateral coopeeration’
● Questioning existence of AWO, and if it did exist, its membership, scope and
benefits?
● End of ‘AWO’, not only end of unipolar moment, but also of the force of American
hegemony → age of global dominance by only one actor
● Cooperation between established/emerging powers necessary for future of global
governance
Nye’s ‘three-dimension chess game’:
1) Top layer dominated by military power, remaining unipolar
2) Middle layer economic power, now multipolar
3) Bottom layer: transnational activities where non-state actors (social movements or even
terrorist groups) operate with dispersed/chaotic power largely independent of
governments
→ does not account for ‘soft power’. Better way to phrase it as a ‘multiplex cinema’:
● Different producers and actors staging their own shows concurrently
● Often has one/two theathers that are much larger than the others
o AWO would be one movie in one theater after the run of the British
● In multiplex world, American show joined by others with different plots, producers,
directors and actors
Multiplex world four-dimensional: power, geographic scope, leadership and time
● Height: distribution of power, hard power (polraity)
● Length: captures regional orders on a global scale
● Depth: quality, robustness and legitimacy of order (leadership)
● Time: transcience of orders, their points of origin and ending, cannot replicate past
orders
Chapter 2: The Rise and Fall of the Unipolar Moment (p.12)
New World Order of multilateralism & international cooperation: nations of the world, East and West,
North and South, can prosper and live in harmony
● Unipolarity: ‘illusion’, power balancing is natural and inevitable
‘Unipolar’ illusion and ‘unipolar stability’ have three things in common:
1) Both accept that international order shaped primarily by structural factors, especially
the distribution of power in shaping international order
a. Prospects of peace and stability as closely tied to the configuration of power
2) Structuralist perspectives adopt narrow interpretation of stability; does not account for
the regional conflicts and interventions post- Cold War period
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3) Perspectives rely on Eurocentric evidence, rooted in European history
In summary: two perspectives share a focus on structural factors, have a narrow interpretation of
stability, and rely heavily on Eurocentric evidence which may not fully capture the complexities of
global peace and stability in the contemporary world
The Fall and Rise of Declinism (p. 20)
Three main differences between latest ‘America in decline’ debate & previous one triggered by Paul
Kennedy thesis
1) Current debate on America’s decline: domestic and external deficits, diffusion of
technology around the world, gridlock governance, doubts over US ability to pay off
debts
2) China is far more important as an emerging power than in 1987
3) Previous decline debate short-lived and faded during Reagan era, marked by
economic revival and optimism
Roman Empire analogy (Nye): US decline would be like Roman Empire, slow motion
→ however, British empire did not take that long to decline
Robert Pape: US experienced one of the most significant declines of any state since the
mid-nineteenth century
→in corresponding period, China’s share of the world GDP grew immensely, China is the ‘wolf’
However, also arguments that US is not in decline:
● Anti-declinists argue that not US, but Europe and Japan that experienced the real
decline
o Trilateral system that is in decline today, rather than American power per se
● Another anti-argument: even if emerging powers acquire growing wealth, it would not
necessarily translate into greater power or influence (e.g India)
● Some evidence in Asia for more power-seeking towards Washington for closer
political and security ties
● US still enjoys fundamental strengths: universities, lead in science innovation,
commitment to multilateralism
o Economy remains highly productive
o Military strength has not suffered; high military spending levels
Issue of decline in relative terms
● US GDP relative to China’s has declined from being eight times in 2000 higher to less
than three timer higher in 2010
o China major economic power
● US will very likely remain the major military power in 2030
o Relative decline
● China will in 2030 probably be the country with the largest share of material power
o China & India will together account for 34% of global economy, froming the
first and foruth largest world economies
However, NIC 2030 reports also projects that US will remain the single most powerful country,
because no other power would be likely to achieve the same panoply of power
→ ‘First among equals’ among the other great powers in 2030
Asia 2050 report pains two different scenarios:
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1) Asian century: China & India will account for more global GDP than US, key
assumption that fastest-growing economies in Asia of past 30 years will continue to
grow for the next 40 years
2) Asia’s growing economy will fall into the ‘middle-income trap’, following the pattern
of Latin America over the past 30 years
Despite all their differences, there are two areas that unite the believers and skeptcitips when it comes
to the issue of the US decline:
1) Overall consensus seems to be that the loss of American predominance results in
heightened international stability 🡪 heightened international rivalry
2) Finding an American writer who supports anything other than the US in leading
position power is quite challenging, however some of the writers do not favor ‘going
back to the approach of George W. Bush
While some writers may still refuse to accept that the U.S. is declining in influence, others
acknowledge this decline with some hesitation. Almost all of them, though, are interested in a
resurgence of U.S. power and offer suggestions on how the country can regain its former
prominence.
Chapter 3: The Myths of Liberal Hegemony (p.33)
One perspective on the changing world order argues that the AWO, whether it is in decline or not,
may persist and co-opt challengers like China. Based on three main elements:
1) Existence of this order with international support
2) Faces three main challenges: the rise of unipolarity, eroded norms of state sovereignty,
and the shifting source of violence 🡪 ‘crisis of authority’
3) Liberal hegemonic order far from finished, no alternatives have emerged
a. However rise of non-Western powers are creating new constituencies and
pressures for liberal international order
Biggest challenge: rise of a number of powers.
● Gramsci: hegemony is upheld more through consent than coercion, but recognizes its
inequality and injustice
o Calls for mobilization of popular resistance with alternative ideas
● Liberal hegemony thesis glorifies hegemonic rule, paints dark picture of alternatives
● Hegemonic stability theory (HST): effective cooperation & functioning global
economy rely on political structure marked by supremacy of single dominant actor
o Hegemon creates international institutions to serve its own self-interest which
are also in harmony with interest of others, thus serves altruistic purpose
o Hegemon maintains position by coercion/through incentives
o Very comprehensive and encompasses much 🡪 proven to be durable
Liberal hegemonic order (Ikenberry): hierarchal system with American power dominance & liberal
principles of governance. Nonetheless it is constrained by postwar rules, institutions and political
processes, creating a fusion of American hegeomony and a liberal international order
Different myths concerning the liberal hegemonic order:
1) Extends far → only small part of the world influenced by this order
a. Not involved: Soviet Union, China and India
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