‘Collectivisation was a disastrous policy for the USSR.’ How far do you agree?
The issue here is an analysis of the impact of the collectivisation of agriculture on Russia. There is
a case against. War Communism had not worked and the NEP arguably was little more than a short
term solution. It might have led to a return to 1913 levels, but that was insufficient for any industrial
growth and it was not an efficient method of farming. Russian agriculture had barely moved on in
methods from mediaeval times; the wooden plough was the order of the day. In addition, Stalin felt
that the Kulak was a threat to socialism and that the state was losing control of the countryside with
the growth of peasant unions and reaction in the countryside. Grain requisition was still needed and
there was little incentive in rural areas to use new technology or scientific methods of eradicating pests
or fertilising
There was a valid economic case for: prices might stabilise and get controlled, productivity should
increase and much needed labour would be released for industrial development. After all, the ‘mir’ had
always had a ‘communal’ basis. By 1941, 98% of land had been collectivised, but the most productive
parts of the countryside were the peasants’ private plots. The idea might have been sound, in theory,
but the practice was disastrous. While the impact on Russia is well known, with one of the largest
man-made famines of all time, the even more terrifying implications for outer regions such as
Kazakhstan are only just becoming known and ‘0’s are being added to the total death toll. The
slaughter of livestock and the ‘fundamental idiocy’ of it took decades to recover from. Later
experiments like Khrushchev’s virgin lands policy showed that political control, especially when it has
an ideological underpinning, can be disastrous.
To what extent does Stalin’s use of his position as General Secretary of the Communist Party explain
his rise to power by 1928
It could be argued that it was only one factor amongst many. His sheer ruthlessness and ambition,
coupled with a totally pragmatic approach to attaining dictatorship, were as important. His control of
the party was, of course, a critical factor. Lenin’s untimely death and failure to sort out a succession
issue was important. Stalin survived the will/testament episode well and potential rivals were reluctant
to take advantage of it. Lenin had clearly identified Stalin as pre- eminent over Trotsky which helped
as well
Stalin was clever, had had a good ‘revolutionary’ background and a good Civil War. He quietly took
over the whole party role and used it with enormous skill. His protégés were to dominate the vital
Central Committee; men like Molotov, and their votes were there for him when it mattered
throughout the 20s. He dominated the Party agenda from the early days through this role. He always
took care, as Westwood says, to let rivals dig their own graves, just lending them a spade occasionally.
Trotsky, always keen on party unity, failed to take on Stalin when he was most vulnerable, over the
Georgian Question or on Lenin’s Testament. Stalin’s manipulation of others and his development of
shifting alliances and rivalries were excellent, for example the use of Kamenev and Zinoviev against
Trotsky, and then his use of Bukharin against them
Trotsky was arrogant and conceited, and good at making enemies. He failed to notice in the 24th
Party Congress just how much Stalin controlled the whole party and the nature of the game that Stalin
was playing in the whole NEP/Socialism in One Country debate. Stalin’s canny control of the GPU
and the way in which it was carefully utilised to get Trotsky first into exile and then out of Russia was
clever. It was his ability to convince his rivals and potential rivals that he was not after power – until it
was too late – was always a key factor. He could disguise his ambitions well
‘Totalitarian rule was a means to an end for Stalin, and not an end in itself.’ How far do you agree?
The central issue under discussion here is Stalin’s motivation for the creation of the totalitarian state
that existed in Russia by 1941, possibly the most extreme example of totalitarian rule seen in the 20th
century. Was his motivation primarily to enable him to attain the first genuinely communist state or
was the motivation to ensure that he got into absolute power and just stayed there? There is a
considerable historiographical debate on the issue, unsurprisingly, and awareness of the various
theories from both writers like Tucker and the more recent Russian authors and their ‘revisionist’ and
more Russian viewpoint should be welcomed. The ends of making Russia both a genuinely socialist
state, a major industrial power capable of fending off her many enemies and also capable of spreading
the gospel of socialism and world revolution and ending capitalism could not be attained by gentle
, methods and Marx had never expected anything otherwise
Others such as Mao and Pol Pot have argued that unless a radical ideological ‘cleansing’ process is
undertaken, there can be no way forward to a socialist paradise which benefits all. However, it is also
equally easy to present Stalin as little more than a brilliant opportunist, always the suspicious ex-
peasant, determined to grasp total power and keep it for himself. It is argued that he could have
attained his ‘socialist’ objectives of collectivisation and industrialisation by gentler methods, that the
purges were no more than his determination to eliminate all opponents and possible opponents, and
just terrify all into total submission to his autocracy. Was it necessary to censor folksongs and nursery
rhymes to get socialism
To what extent did Stalin create a totalitarian state in Russia?
The key issue here is the nature and extent of totalitarianism in Russia under Stalin. A definition
is expected and reflection on the extent to which Stalin attained it. There is a case against the view
that it was the pinnacle of autocracy. Much of what he did had been started by Lenin and much of that
followed on from the autocracy of the Tsars. The NKVD had a clear descent from the Okhrana and
the CHEKA, and as Solzhenitsyn pointed out the same jailors ran the same jails and camps from the
late 1890s through to the 1930s. Banishing opponents or likely opponents to Siberia went way back
into Russian history. Stolypin’s neckties were just replaced by a bullet in the back of the neck in the
Lubyanka. Stalin did not create it; he just killed a lot more. He had popular support for many of his
objectives and without the enthusiasts who went out and collectivised or worked under appalling
conditions in the Magnitogorsk works he would have achieved little. There was a tradition of
authoritarianism already ingrained, which he just developed. On the other hand it could be argued that
he changed the very nature of totalitarianism. The extent which his regime reached, be it in education
or family life, agriculture and industry, showed the total subordination of all to the whim of one man.
The fact that when Russia was nearly destroyed in 1941 it could be put down to the failings of him and
him alone shows just how totalitarian it was, while the survival of Russia thereafter shows well how
important the innate support for the regime was
‘The main reason why Stalin remained in power was because of his use of terror.’ Discuss this view.
The issue here is an analysis of the reasons why Stalin was able to retain power until the end of
the period under study. There are many other factors which can explain his tenure of power including
his ability to outmanoeuvre his opponents and identify those who might oppose him. There was a
general consensus within Russia that socialism ought to be given a chance to work and that radical
measures such as collectivization and the massive industrial programmes were necessary and inevitable.
His aim to make Russia a major power and secure from its many enemies was popular and supported
and it was again accepted that this needed a tough approach. Russia had been ruled by autocrats for
centuries and many saw Stalin, or were encouraged to see him, as a more benevolent version. Several of
those who appeared in the show trials recognised that what he was doing was ‘right’ and it was just the
way he went about it that could be challenged. There was support for collectivisation amongst the
young enthusiasts who went from the cities to carry it out. Propaganda played a huge part in his
survival as did indoctrination. While there was resentment by other politicians at his power, few
disagreed with his broad objectives for Russia. It could be argued that the terror was not actually
needed, and that in purging so many, ranging from engineers to army officers he actually weakened
Russia and his own position. The army in 1941 was so weakened that it nearly led to the end of the
regime of which he was head –and it had never been disloyal to the regime, there was no tradition of
military takeovers in Russia and no evidence that there might be. Terror was not necessary.
Assess the effectiveness of Stalin’s industrialisation policy.
Reflection of what an ‘effective’ industrial policy might be in this context is expected. Arguably
Stalin may have had a policy which led to what Russia, in an international context, might need while
not being exactly what the Russian people wanted. While collectivisation might be mentioned, it is
not expected that it will be central to the response. It must be contrasted initially with the NEP,
which of course was seen as purely a temporary measure. There were ideological motives which have to
be considered, as, underlying the various plans was the need to create the industrial proletariat
necessary for the arrival of proper socialism. A fear of war and the need to increase national status
were also factors behind the drive for industrialisation. From the planning point of view there was
.
