Lenin failed to solve Russia’s economic problems.’ How far do you agree?
An analysis of Russia’s economic problems in 1917–18 and then of Lenin’s attempts to manage
them is expected here. An examination of the situation in 1917–18 would indicate an inheritance of
staggering difficulty, and a contrast with the situation in 1924 shows substantial progress, admittedly
from a low base
Total breakdown was the order of the day on Bolshevik accession to power. Infrastructure had
collapsed, there was anarchy in the countryside, the governing and managerial class had largely
disappeared. Brest-Litovsk saw the disappearance of food and raw materials, civil war raged
throughout large parts of Russia as well as foreign invasions. War Communism evidently failed and
famine and cannibalism were features of Russia at the time. Hostility to the regime was endemic, both
within and outside Russia. The money economy had collapsed and inflation was out of control
By 1924, the situation had changed radically. Central planning was coming in. The NEP ensured that
food production recommenced and that a money economy was beginning to return to normal.
Industrial production did not reach 1913 levels until 1926, and then it was only by making use of
existing assets. There was a growing awareness of what the problems were by 1924 and a debate
growing about possible solutions. Arguably he did little more than apply cosmetic measures to ensure
temporary survival and left the attempt to apply an ideologically-based solution to his successors. The
evidence points to ‘yes’ but ‘any’ might seem harsh
To what extent had Lenin created a totalitarian state in Russia by 1924?
The central issue here is an analysis of the state that Lenin had created by 1924 and the extent to
which it was actually a totalitarian state, or whether it was merely a state onto which Stalin was to
build a totalitarian system. There is a great debate amongst critics and supporters of Lenin as to what
his intentions were. His references to the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ echoing Marx, of course,
does not help. The debate centres on whether he used totalitarian methods as a means to an end, or
whether they were ends in themselves
The case ‘for’ totalitarianism is an easy one to make with factors such as his dealings with the
Constituent Assembly in 1918 and his attitude towards future elections. His brief to Dzerzhinsky
makes it pretty clear that killing on a large scale was expected and the methods used by the Red Army
were deliberately terrifying. What happened to the Kronstadt sailors was typical of much else that
happened by 1924. War communism was little more than state looting and his treatment of all types of
opposition, his use of propaganda and censorship bear all the hall marks of a typical totalitarian ruler
However, there is another case to be made. It could be argued that, given the nature of the task and
the potential strength of the Whites, he had no alternative if he was to attain what he had promised
and felt that Russia needed. War communism had been replaced by the NEP which allowed greater
freedom. His policy towards the other nationalities within Russia was highly tolerant and much more
libertarian than what either his successor or predecessors had come up with. There was a genuine
debate within the party which was tolerated and his long term intention was very obviously to give
much greater freedom within a socialist framework
Discuss the view that Trotsky was more important than Lenin to Bolshevik victory in the Civil War in
Russia.
An assessment of the role of Trotsky and then a comparison with the role of Lenin and other factors
in the final Bolshevik victory is expected here. A discussion which just has a focus on the two men is
acceptable, but credit should be given to those who argue that there were many other, often very
important, factors to consider. Lenin provided overall leadership and also a degree of pragmatism
which was to be vital. The shift from War Communism to the NEP is a good example of this,
particularly when it was realised the harm that the grain requisition was doing to the Bolshevik cause.
His development of the CHEKA and the overall ruthlessness was also a major factor, as well as
policies like censorship. There was the inspirational leadership and speechmaking, but his focus was in
providing solutions to the economic and political problems in Russia during the war
The military strategy and leadership were left to Trotsky. The Red Army (and later the Labour Army)
, was his creation. His military leadership and its ruthlessness were vital. The use of railways, the
developments of the all-important commissars and conscription were all down to him. It can be
difficult to envisage success without the pair working together towards a common goal. It could be
argued that both were equally important in their own ways. There were, of course, many other factors
that could be brought in: the many failings of the Whites, the internal divisions there, and the
competence of men like Wrangel and Denikin was not high. They had fewer resources in many cases,
and geographical factors – fighting from the periphery – did not help. The tide of Russian nationalism
was against them. The role of the Party could also be seen as important, and others ranging from Stalin
to Kamenev had a claim to some of the successes
'The incompetence of the Whites was the main reason for Bolshevik victory in the Russian Civil War.’
How far do you agree?
The key issue here is the identification of the principal factors which led to Bolshevik victory in the
Russian civil war. There needs to be a balanced argument, weighing up on the one hand the advantages
possessed by and strengths of the Bolsheviks, counterbalanced by an analysis of the problems facing
their opponents and arguing which was the most significant factor in the final outcome. The
Bolshevik’s opponents, both internal and external, were bitterly divided. The anarchists were unlikely
to try and work with monarchists. Those who supported greater regional autonomy, the ‘nationalists’,
were not going to work with Wrangel or the Czech Legion. The White Generals were neither willing
nor able to work together. Foreign support added a treasonable and anti-nationalist element to their
cause. They were unable to offer a viable alternative to socialism and there were too many bad
memories of the Tsarist past to convince the people to wish for a return there. Communication
between the peripheral regions of Russia was limited and coordination a nightmare. Famine and war
exhaustion helped as well. Any opposition had an uphill start. Apathy by many and committed support
by some was vital to the Bolsheviks. Lenin’s leadership was important, ranging from his use of
propaganda to his ideological flexibility over the switch from war communism to the NEP for
example. There was ruthlessness there, as the early work of the CHEKA showed, as well as the ability
to take horrendous decisions such as Brest Litovsk and Kronstadt. The work of Trotsky and the Red
Army was vital and the commitment of hundreds and thousands of men and women who fought and
produced munitions was vital as well. Geography helped, they were operating out of the ‘centre’ while
the opposition was scattered. Perhaps they just seemed to offer a better way out of the appalling state
that Russia was in in 1918.
To what extent had Lenin created a communist state in Russia by 1924?
Much depends here on the definition of ‘communism’ and there could well be many diverging views
on this. Expect a definition but allow for substantial variety there. Some might start with a strictly
Marx-based view of the system; others take on a more moderate ‘socialist’ perspective while others
might simply see it as a totalitarian system. Be flexible towards the latter if the intention is to keep a
focus on the ideological basis of the system and not just how it was run. Certainly Lenin intended to
create such a state, although he was well aware that pure Marx needed to be adapted to particular
circumstances and that the stages to socialism had to be managed differently. War communism needs
to be viewed as part of the process as does the NEP. Arguably, with the elimination of the majority of
his enemies, the state of Russia in 1924, the party and administrative structure which existed, the
potential for creating a socialist state was there. The mix of apathy, exhaustion and support was such
that there was a willingness to accept the need for radical solutions to Russia’s problems; also there
was an acceptance that the Bolshevik message might be the less evil alternative to any other. Arguably
the success of the NEP and the peasant acquisition of land would suggest that communism had
shallow roots, but the early work of Gosplan and the Russian tradition of central control might suggest
that a basis had been laid for a gradual acceptance of a socialist state
To what extent does Lenin’s use of terror explain the establishment of Bolshevik rul
in Russia by 1924?
The issue for discussion here is the extent to which the establishment of the Bolshevik regime was
dependent on the use of terror by Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Certainly it was a major factor, although
some might argue that it alienated as well as subduing. The use of the Cheka in eliminating opponents
from the earliest days and other methods established by Dzerskyinsky were effective. The methods
used by the Red Army against its opponents in the Civil war were effective both in dealing with
