Lecture 1: Russian Foreign Policy
Russian foreign policy has developed from partnership or competition towards a siege mentality. The
siege mentality that Russia is in currently is shown in the discourses, fortified by the Kremlin, that Russia
is threatened from the West, the South and the East and therefore Russia needs to take disciplinary
measures against others but also against their own population. Anti-Western discourse (MH17 and
Crimea).
Russia is itself in international federation (not a unitary state) that is composed of 85 subjects/federal
units of which 22 have the status of a republic within Russia’s own borders (Tatarstan and Chechnya). In
these republics, the ethnic minorities are often not the majority, but they have their own republic
(international element of Russia). Power of republics within Russia depends on the power to pressure
the Kremlin (economy, separatism etc.). For example, Chechnya is a small republic but with a history of
separatism it threatens the unity of Russia (lots of pressure).
(Foreign) policy, which is made by the (Russian) elites, has two goals:
1. Output goal(s) of foreign policy: achievements and reasoning behind foreign policy and this is
because of primarily (1) security and (2) economy. For security, policy is there to avoid an attack
and to create a safe environment (alliances, subjugation of other countries, war): ministry of
international relations and foreign relations and the army. For economy, foreign policy is there
to create an environment where you have a free trade area that is beneficial for your own
production and trade (free trade only beneficial for big players): banks, economic ministry.
2. Input legitimacy/goal(s) of foreign policy: legitimization of (foreign) policy through values,
status, respect (protection of own way of life and civilization which legitimates foreign policy,
war, etc.). This means to declare what you are not: the idea that the West is corrupt and is losing
ground by taking in too many uncivilised peoples, such as Turks and Moroccans (‘’Gayropa’’
instead of Europa). Russian discourse: defending ‘’European’’ identity (West uncivilized and
Russia defending European identity by fencing off a European identity from emancipation,
people from other faith groups and people from another identity). Also, Russia wants to be
accepted as a great power and their discourse is regarding a multipolar world and not a unipolar
world with multiple great powers, including Russia, and not only the US. Multivectoralism means
Russia wants to build good relations with everybody and it looks both to the West and to the
East.
Russian foreign policy is made by people who have an interest in the direction that foreign policy
takes. Zakankov classified various players into categories: Westernizers (Russia’s place in the world is in
the West: Russia must pass through certain historical phases to become European which was famous in
the 1990s but not anymore since Putin (failed democracy)), statists (state and its institutions most
important and should be in charge, famous in the 1990s), nationalists (you can be a nationalist and be
against the state at the same time as the state is not identical to the society and your nation: Russian
federation should comprise all Russians) and civilisationalists (believe in a civilization, such as
Eurasianism). Richard Sakwa introduced a finer web of categories to understand the Russian elite:
siloviki/power ministries (most important! The ministry of defence, the border guards, foreign
intelligence services (also Putin!) ministry for emergency situations: guns and people in power right now
under Putin), statists, technocrats, and oligarchs (economically dominated system by a few figures who
keep the market under their control; two types: (1) self-made businessman 1980s/1990s and (2) state
oligarchs (placed in important positions in the state by the president)). Foreign policy must
,accommodate the interests of all these people AND the bosses of the regions and republics who have
ambitions and are interested in the foreign policy for their own ambitions and plans!
Sergei Lavrov is Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2004 and he is a career diplomat (only minister of a
power ministry who is NOT a silovik but a career diplomat!). This shows that the foreign affairs elite
expanded power since the 1980s and grew with Putin in higher (state) positions as Putin grew to power.
Most people of the elite in the foreign affairs do not pay a lot of importance to their ethnic background
(most elite is foreign): no interest in nationalism from the elite!
Discourse is the whole universe of concepts, ideas, values, and symbols attached to a certain item, for
example Russian foreign policy or nuclear weapons. Discourses are made by discourse makers or political
technologists (Russia). Geopolitical zones are one way to identity how the Russian elite views the world
but there are also alternative conceptions, such as the concentric circles of the Russian homeland (where
is the Russian territory/the homeland?).
The Svarin article provides three geopolitical zones/areas: Eurasia, Euro-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific. Russia
wants to be part of all three regions and Russia understands its power as being at its best if Russia is
integrated in all three regions! The Eurasian Union (counterpart to EU and China) was at the idea an
addition to the collective security (control) with Russia at its centre, but it is a weak institution that is not
standing next to the countries but is in fact the sum of the individual governments and in particular the
presidents.
Concentric circles around Russia (overlaps and tensions by excluding groups: different identities). Which
way is Russia going in? Three alternative identities based on nationalism, religion, and large union
(Federation now). People think differently about how Russia looks like and what and who it should
include and exclude:
1. Russian Federation. Centralisation since 2000 instead of decentralisation in the 1990s.
2. (Eastern) Slavic World. Identity derived from similar languages and nations that should belong
together (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia). (Nationalist)
3. Orthodox World. Identity derived from religion. Ukraine and Belarus diverse landscape of
religions so you cannot include the whole country of Ukraine and Belarus if it depends on
religion. Church instrument of foreign affairs, including war.
4. Recreation Soviet Union. Reinforcement of the non-Russian element into the state.
Russia and EU: strenuous relations (sanctions)
Russia and Middle East: stage for Russia to demonstrate its status as a global power, to show military
strength in the conflicts and economic relations (Soviet Union also important in the M-E) and to display
secure protection and loyalty (money without conditions) (US no reliable partner)
Lecture 2: USSR as an attractive proposition/Communism as the beacon of hope for many people
Communism had disqualified itself historically in three different ways:
1. High estimate of dead people in communist countries
2. No communist state was a democracy: every communist state was a dictatorship (despite the
great differences within communist states)
3. The Soviet-plan system was an economic failure to a great extent compared to the capitalist
West
, Despite the negative aspects of Communism, it was an attractive ideology for many people in different
ways:
1. Communism stands for the community of property and this idea appealed to many people:
equality, altruism, community, justice (these concepts and ideas are aroused by the idea of
Communism): sympathy. Crimes that are committed in the name of Communism are often not
attributed to the idea but to the false implementation or the betrayal of the idea of Communism:
widespread feeling compared to for example Nazism, which is never seen as a good ideal and
only badly implemented goodwill towards Communism
Fellow travellers/sympathisers of Communism (not Communists): why did people like the SU? The
sympathy for Communism developed in stages and in different forms:
- 1917 October Revolution: sympathy/enthusiasm amongst the workers movements and present
journalists from around the world for the revolution because it was the first time in history that
workers or the common people have seized power (impression many contemporaries had
about the Revolution): establishment of Council of Workers
- 1930: the idea of workers power in the Soviet Union was replaced by the ideal of a planned state
and a planned economy: the SU embodied the rational state/the plan in times of great
economic depression and mass suffering in the West with its market forces
- 1935-1940: sympathy not about workers power or the rational state but replaced by anti-
fascism: SU presented itself as anti-fascist, humanist and civilised
Several moments in history of a breakdown of sympathy for Communism:
- 1921: an uprising of workers and sailors in the SU that the Bolsheviks put down by force
- 1930s: man made by Stalin
- 1937-38: Great Terror
- 1939: Molotov Ribbentrop pact
Despite the moments of breakdown of sympathy, many people still sympathized with the SU. People
thought that several events, such as the Great Terror, were not true or people were provided with false
details and the idea that for something great to be achieved you must make sacrifices and do bad things
was popular. With the onset of the Cold War, the greatest wave of popularity in the West was over. In
times of Stalin, Communism was the most popular. After Stalin’s death, left-wing people began to see
the SU as a slow-moving state and a threat. It also became clear that the SU was a nightmare in terms of
consumerism, compared to everything capitalism could offer. It is important to note that Marx argued
that the goal of Communism was to overcome the economic stagnation produced by capitalism, but
Communism during the Cold War presented just that of stagnation and not of growth. BUT the SU
remained popular for several reasons: destalinisation (no mass deportations, trials etc.), anti-
Americanism/anti-capitalism and decolonisation. For the colonized nations, that just shook off colonial
despotism, Communism was attractive because these nations had two options: be like your oppressor as
they are strong or to be the traditional colonized nation to gain the strength to overthrow your
oppressor (contradictive options) and the SU provided the perfect middle ground of these options. Also,
during the 1970s, the SU supported most of the National Liberation Movements in the world. Also, the
SU seemed less dangerous for people than the USA in the Nuclear Arms Race. This all made the
SU/communism attractive!
The USSR/SU was committed to world revolution (except under Gorbachev who abolished the concept
completely) but until 1985, officially, the world revolution ideal remained the goal in the SU (despite
the priority of state interests of every country), because socialism in one country (ideal of Stalin) did not
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