INTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY
2019-2020
BACHELORSOCIALSCIENCES PROF.DRIESLESAGE
D.L.Y.
,InternationalRelationsTheory D.L.Y.
CHAPTERONE
INTRODUCTION
1.THEORISINGTHESYRIANWAR(2011-?)
1.1.WHYHASTHEUNSCNOTSTOPPEDTHEWAR?
● UNSC(UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil)watchoverwarandpeace
○ Imposepeacebylegallybindingdecisions
● FailstoimposepeaceinSyria
● RussianVETO
○ Russia unhappy with foreign intervention after what happened with the Western intervention in
LibyaandwhathappenedwithKhadafi
■ GreenlightedUNSCmandateregardinginterventioninmakingLibyaa“noflightzone”
■ KilledinNATOmission
■ Endedupinregimechange
○ Principlesproblem(alsoCN)
1.2.WHYDORUSSIAANDIRANSUPPORTASSAD?
Russia Iran
● NavyinMediterranean ● BackingAssad
● Influence in Syria (competition) after Syria cosied ● Logistical,technicalandfinancialsupport
uptoRUandCNinsteadoftheWest ● Nationalinterests
● Assad important for world hegemony, RU cannot ● SyriaistheonlyallyofIran
loseSYtotheWest
● Putin must protect Assad at all costs in order to
showhiscapabilities
● Putin’simageandRussia’sprestigeareatstake
● Losing SY as ally wouldbeharmfulsincetheylost
numerous allies in the recent past (Baltic states
after collapse of Soviet Union, Hussein of Iraq,
Malasovich of Yugoslavia, Yanukovych of Ukraine
andKhadafiinaway)
● Stakes increase, RU increases effort to protect
remainingallies(militaryaid,armstrade)
● From 2015 on, RU army entersSY,createstipping
pointinthewarbybackingAssad(nationalinterest
orprolongingwar?)
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● Putinfearsmassprotests(fueledbytheWest)inMoscowagainstPutinregime
● Competition:realism
○ Basedonidea“youfightoryouperish”
○ Greatpowershavetorelyonthemselves(andallies)
○ Opposedtheories:securitydilemma(wouldstillbackAssad),RUalwaysbeenexpansionist(strategic
culture)
● Geopoliticalreality
○ Geopoliticsinthestrictsense:relationsbetweengeographicalconditionsandinternationalrelations
○ RussiahasalwaysportrayedinterestintheMediterraneanarea,IndianOcean(Afghanistan,Iran,…),
accesstohighseas,bufferzones(e .g.Napoleon’sincursionsviaDE)
○ Russia has always had the poisonous idea that they were entitled to these buffer zones inother
countries,s.a.Baltics
○ ProblematicmindsetfromearlytsarsupuntilPutin
3.WHATDOTHEUS,GULFSTATESANDTURKEYWANT?
US GulfStates Turkey
● Support Syrian Kurds (YPG) ● Aid anti-Assad as opposed to ● SupportedSyrianrebelsagainst
who rebel against Assad until Iran(theirrivals) Assad (national interest orjust
2017 ● Balancing choices competitors: prolongingwar?)
○ Provided reconstructionaid equalpositions,morepowerful ● ReceivealotofSyrianrefugees
toSY ⇒existentialinterestsRealism ● If Arab springwentasErdogan
○ Unclearintentions ● Religionaspect,butnotkey wanted, increase prestige,
● Provided air support and ● More pragmatic perspective: demoralise secularists in TR,
weapons to the Syrian religious divide makes it more militaryalliesinregion
Democratic Forces (ally of difficult, but is not the main ● Within NATO, TR combatting
Kurds and Arab forces fighting reasonoftheconflict forces that are helping to
ISIS) ● More elaboration is possible: overthrowDaesh
● Targets IS and other extremist sociological aspect of the ○ Other side of the story:
groups division between secularism defense mechanism not
● US wants to block Iran and andislam helping TR in combatting
Lebanon (shia militia ● WanttocontroltheArabworld theseforces
Hezbollah) → threatening US’ in their own way (hegemonic ○ Opportunity for Putin →
allyIsrael worldorder) weaken bond between TR
● MiddleEasthasaterroristissue and the other NATO
(Sunni-Shia divide) → if the countries
Gulf states gain control over
this area they can widen their
sphereofinfluence
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NumerousperspectivesoftheSyrianconflict
● Dimension1/core:anti-AssadrebelsfightAssadregime:whoarethey?Jihadielements(managedtogainmore
controlasthewardraggedon,groupslikeAlNusragainedgroundinwhatstartedasthecoreconflict)
● Dimension2:c ountrydestabilised,Kurdishseeanopportunityfordreamoftheirownstate
● Dimension 3: emergence Daesh as benevolent for Assad (coexistence) → association of Daesh with the
rebellion, framed asproblemforthewholeworld→effective:afterterroristattacksinParis,priorityshifted
towardscombattingDaesh
1.4.COULDAMILITARYINTERVENTIONAGAINSTASSADEVERWORK?
● Lookingatthephysicalmilitarydimension:HusseinandKhadafiwereisolated,butAssadisnot
● RussiasupportedAssadwithsophisticatedarmsandmissiles
○ IftheWestwouldattack,theirplaneswouldbeshotintheairbecauseRussiaprovidedSyriawiththe
equipment(asopposedtounequippedIraqandLibya)
● Russiagainedtimetothrowoptionofinterventionoffthetable
1.5.WASITPOSSIBLETOPREVENTTHECONFLICTORMAKEITSTOPEARLIER?
● Russiadidn’twantSyriatobeinfluencedbytheWestordestabilised
○ Perhaps if Syria remained under RU influence if RU prevented Assad from mass atrocities, there
wouldbeanexitstrategypossibleforAssad
○ Inthiscase,PutinwouldnotcareaboutAssadasapersonbutonlyaboutthenationalinterestinSY
● Lacking:greatpowerconcert→1815-1850s(Crimeanwar):ConcertofEurope(RU,Prussia,UK,FR,AT)
○ 21st Century: no concert of great powers with joint responsibility and understanding (with own
interests included) that could keep the world stable → couldpreventmassatrocitiess.a.inSyria,
Somalia,Sahelconflict
2.WHYINTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY?
2.1.OVERVIEWOFMAINCURRENTS
● Theoriesofferconceptualframeworksandexplanationsforeventsanddevelopments
● Eachtheoryadoptsaspecificlens,highlightingcertainfactors,dimensions,dynamics
○ Emphasisonperpetualcompetitionbetweenstates(realism)
○ Emphasisonpotentialforcooperation(liberalism)
○ Emphasisoneconomicinterests,classstruggles(Marxism)
○ Emphasisonideas(constructivism)
● Potentialforeclecticism
● Relevanceoftheorycanchangeovertimeandspace
2.2.NORMATIVEASSESSMENTANDPOLICYRELEVANCE
● Theoriesprovideinsightinthemotivationsofactors(empathy,understanding)
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