Advanced Sociological Theory: Modelling Social Interaction (200300009)
Instelling
Universiteit Utrecht (UU)
Bevat aantekeningen van de colleges, de videos en informatie uit de artikelen. De informatie van de videos is in het Nederlands omschreven, verder alles in het engels.
Week 1.......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Lecture week 1.....................................................................................................................................................2
Video 1 Game theory............................................................................................................................................4
Video 2 Two-by-Two games.................................................................................................................................5
Information from the articles...............................................................................................................................6
Week 2.......................................................................................................................................................... 7
Video repeated prisoner’s dilemma.....................................................................................................................7
Video public goods game (with punishment).......................................................................................................9
Lecture week 2...................................................................................................................................................11
Week 3........................................................................................................................................................ 14
Video utility and altruistic preferences...............................................................................................................14
Lecture 3.............................................................................................................................................................16
Week 5........................................................................................................................................................ 20
Video Schelling’s model of segregation..............................................................................................................20
Video Agent Based Model (ABM).......................................................................................................................22
Video 5.4 Steven Strogatz: Hoe dingen in de natuur synchroniseren................................................................23
Lecture................................................................................................................................................................23
Week 6........................................................................................................................................................ 26
Video 6B The problem of mass collective action................................................................................................26
Video 6C cumulative distribution functions.......................................................................................................27
Video 6D Granovetter threshold model.............................................................................................................27
Lecture (structure of the Threshold Model).......................................................................................................29
Week 7........................................................................................................................................................ 32
Video 7A The demand for social norms..............................................................................................................32
Lecture 7 Social Norms.......................................................................................................................................34
, Week 1
Lecture week 1
Five important aspects of theory building
1. Making things more precise
2. Avoid black boxes (search for plausible mechanisms)
3. Take the micro level into account!
4. Carefully model the micro-macro transformation
5. Search for a micro-model that is realistic enough, and not too complex.
+ Coleman’s diagram helps.
Type of explanations:
(1) covering-law explanations
(2) logical schemes
(3) Coleman’s diagram.
Covering-law explanations:
a. Deductive nomological model: all A’s are B | x = A | x = B.
b. Inductive probalistic model: most A’s are B | x = A | x is likely to be B.
General law
Initial/social conditions (these two are the explanans)
Explanandum
+ Not all arrows present causal relations.
+ Bridge assumptions of transformation rules do not link micro to macro.
Statements Ibn Khaldun (global)
“Cooperation is necessary for people survival and to become more productive and
make settlements possible”.
“Close contact and affection are necessary for cooperation”.
“Building large cities requires so much cooperation that many people are not inclined
to do so, which makes the ‘stick of royal authority’ necessary”.
,Thomas Hobbes
Solution: we need a leader who takes control.
Durkheim’s solidarity
a. Mechanical solidarity: social integration of members of a society who have common
values, beliefs and trust each other.
b. Organic solidarity: social integration that arises out of the need of individuals for one
another services (example: work related).
, Video 1 Game theory
What is game theory?
(1) Theory of conscious behavior where people need to take mutual interdependent
decisions in situations. (2) Interdependent: payoffs of another doesn’t only rely on choices
they make themselves. (3) Strategical behavior.
+ Actors do have alternative choices, they have aims, and expectations (or information)
abouts conditions. They choose the one that fits te most, because of their expectations en to
realize their aims.
Best-reply strategy
1. No cooperation between the players.
2. X is the best strategy of player A against Y, if X maximizes the outcome of player A.
Dominant strategie
1. X is the dominant strategy of A if X is the only best answer of play A against al the
strategies of player B.
+ the player has one dominant strategy, most of the time there are zero.
Nash equilibrium
1. The combination (X, Y) is a Nash equilibrium if X is the best strategy of player A and Y
is de best strategy of player B.
+ every game has one, most of the time a game has more equilibriums.
Pareto optimality
1. The outcome where you can’t change the position of a player to optimize, without
deteriorating the position of the other player.
Pareto suboptimal
1. The outcome is indeed possible to optimize for one or more actors without
deteriorating the position of the other player.
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