International Security and Strategic Studies
Course Notes April – May 2024
UNRECORDED DISCUSSION SESSIONS
Professor: Alexander Mattelaer
[Bolded information is most emphasised/important takeaways.]
EXAM FORMAT AND CONTENT INFORMATION ON FINAL WEEK.
Week 8 Discussion Session: Intelligence in Peacetime & Wartime
Lecture:
Guest lecturer was unable to attend. Professor Mattelaer conducted general discussion and questions
around the topic of intelligence in place of the guest lecturer.
General Discussion:
- Belgian intelligence agencies
o More intelligence can reduce the need for personnel costs as better information lessens
the work needed
- Supranational intelligence (e.g. EU intelligence) is a possibility, but not yet in phase
o Competences for national security are not currently under EU domain
o Security laws would need to be changed, and it is unclear if there is a national will by all
member states
o As security environments deteriorate, each individual country may have heightened fears
and be less trusting of sharing information and efforts with other states
Collective possibilities may fade further, even if they are considered more
necessary
Freedom of sovereign choice over foreign policy would greatly reduce
E.g.: Austria and Russia continue to have a close relationship, which
inspired other Member States/EU capitals to push their intelligence units
out of Russian embassies in their countries
o A large diplomatic presence can easily hide intelligence efforts
Some 90 members of the Russian diplomacy in Belgium
is seemingly overkill
o Austria can act as a weak point for EU security
Despite it having the right to enact its own sovereign
choice over national security policy
o The required coordination of foreign policy choices would be far
beyond what the EU has historically wanted to collectivize
- 9/11 attacks, and then the most recent Russian invasion into Ukraine both had consequences for
the CIA
o Was a series of attacks against the US, not just on their interests but homeland, and the
attacks had a profound psychological impact on the average US citizen
o In the US population, current events in the Ukraine are not consider as particularly
important for US security interests
, The professor brings this up, to emphasis that the author, William Burns, of the
assigned Foreign Policy article wanted to convince US citizens of the similar
importance of Ukraine-Russia as 9/11 once was
In terms of the security of the international system, the smooth operation
of it, and what it means for the future of international relations
The lasting impact and resulting policy changes today are even more
significant that how the US responsed to 9/11
- Author states that the US has a “once in a lifetime opportunity” to capitalise on the internal
dissatisfaction of the Russian people (to recruit new intelligence sources from within Russia)
o Russian intelligence will read it and get quite annoyed
US is seeking dissent and growing doubts to destabilise Russia from within
o Maybe dissatisfied Russians will read it and be inclined to reach out
o Multiple layers of meaning that adds to the air of “mystique” around intelligence
agencies
- When you enter an intelligence agency (as a career), you sign away many aspects of your own
personal security so that the state can pursue potential channels of leakage if an incident occurs
o Personnel/candidates must be vetted with a security screening to be aware of what the
person has done in the past, who they are connected to, stability of their finances, etc.
o Provides a relative indication of trust-worthiness, and is repeated cyclically
- Belgian security example from ~2 years ago
o Targeted clandestine influence, bribery from foreign governments hoping to swing votes,
etc.
o Unique case, as usually national governments are not allowed to conduct mass personal
surveillance of their own population
o 2016 terrorist attacks in Belgium: Belgian security apparatus was very focused on
mitigating the terrorism risk, which would have forced the de-prioritisation of other areas
like counter-intelligence (the countering of foreign influence on Belgian territory)
Now working towards raising the personnel number to allow a combination of
both anti-terrorism and anti-counterintelligence
- Why does a state need intelligence?
o Main reason:
State decision-making (particularly to do with those relevant to the
international stage) are highly dependent upon the quality of information
they can obtain
What is actually going on, what is at stake, what can government
actions do, what risks are involved
The entire intelligence apparatus is a means to ensure the state is truly
sovereign, relying only on information it gains itself, rather than that of
foreign actors/media outlets/etc.
National news from foreign states, for example, has an aim to serve
state interests so is not an ideal source of information
A truth-checking machine
E.g. extent of actual threat Iran hoped to impose on Israel example
mentioned below. Intelligence agencies would try to discover if it was
“political theater.”
o Secondary reasons, provided by classmates:
To keep an eye on its own population
, The opinions of citizens are better understandable and thus influenceable
when the state uses its intelligence
Because states are often out of touch with the “real” on the ground
feelings of society
Protects from unrest, coup d’etats, etc.
To conduct sabotage
More outspoken and less legal version of intelligence, but of course some
use this offensive mindset
Clandestine interference
Defensive rationale
To be aware of what is incoming from other countries
- Current events case study: Iranian Missile Attack on Israel
o Disclaimer: Professor Mattelaer has only limited knowledge of Middle Eastern politics
o Intelligence methodology:
Middle East (ME) is a complicated, complex region with hot interests/causes
(e.g. Palestine, Israel)
Intelligence is not about promoting a cause, but for analytically observing the
relevant facts and actors with as little bias as possible
Dispassionate
Emotional involvement does not provide the most high quality insights (so he
says, but this is clearly a “realist” masculinist perspective that values certain
knowledges over others) aka is not ethics related
o Facts:
Iran executed a military strike on the state of Israel, in retaliation for Israel
striking an Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria
Iran fired over 300 projectiles towards Israeli (military) targets
o Drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles
o Relatively easy to intercept, but ballistic missiles are tougher
Israel says their targeting of the consulate was to stop Iranian officials
who were “pulling strings” over what is going on in Gaza
o Hamas, Houthis, and Hezbollah are all non-state actors
supported by (and he says controlled by) the state of Iran, posing
a threat to Israel, thus legitimating Iran as a target
o To level external supports
Targeting discussion
Requires specific, high-quality intelligence that identifies and then
generates the exactitudes of the targets
o Who is where, specifically when
o The follow-up information as to deaths that resulted
Tactical need to support competitive efforts between the two
Israel = human targets
Iran = more spread targets
Reactions
Western allies stress risk of regional war if Israel were to go for the most
robust of responses
o Not in US to have a regional war, so is trying to ask Netanyahu
to hold back
