EUGIC - Summary Book 'European Union Politics' by Cini
335 keer bekeken 21 keer verkocht
Vak
EU Governance in an International Context
Instelling
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU)
Boek
European Union Politics
Contains chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27. Organized in the order of the lectures. Contains all key points of the chapters. Written in English.
European Union Governance in an International Context (EUGIC)
Summary Book: European Union Politics by Cini
L2 – H2: The European Union: Establishment and Development
Integration and cooperation in Europe: ambitions, tensions and divisions. European integration has
been a defining feature of post-WOII, but ideas for European unity already emerged throughout 1920s
and 1930s. During these years various proposals have been drafted and among these was Spinelli’s
1941 Ventotene Manifesto ‘For A Free and United Europe’. Establishments that followed WOII were
the ‘Benelux’ (Be, Nl & Lu customs union), Treaty of Dunkirk (alliance and assistance pact between
Fa & UK), Treaty of Brussels (same as Dunkirk but for Benelux countries). And on April 4 th 1949
NATO was created. But the appetite to pursue the ambitious goal of a United Europe wasn’t universal,
economic recovery was for example a more pressing concern. Nevertheless on May 5 th 1949 the
Council of Europe was created. And in April 1948 initial steps in promoting economic integration
were taken with the establishment of OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation). For
integrationists the OEEC & Council of Europe lacked ambition.
Around 1950 the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was established. The Treaty of Rome
established the basis of the European Union’s institutional architecture.
The Communities and a Europe of ‘the Six’. Supranational integration was initially limited to ‘the Six’
and was established through three ‘Communities’: the ECSC, the EEC and the EAEC. The 1960s
witnessed both progress in developing the EEC but also a failure to enlarge and the ‘empty chair’
crisis. The early years of the EEC and EAEC demonstrated that integration was possible, at least
between ‘the Six’. The new institutions were established, thus adding to neo-functionalist pressures for
closer integration. Ireland, Denmark and Norway were also added to the six. The UK application were
welcomed by most, however French president de Gaulle vetoed the application seeing the UK as a
Trojan horse for US influence.
The European Court of Justice also issued important rulings on the primacy and direct effect of EEC
law.
With governments’ attention firmly on trying to mitigate the effects of economic recession and high
unemployment, Europe entered a period of Eurosclerosis with integration apparently stagnating. The
European Council responded by creating European Monetary System (EMS). Plans for economic
and monetary union and further integration foundered in the 1970s as the now enlarged Communities
entered recession. The enlarged Communities were faced with the challenged of a more diverse
membership.
Establishing the European Union. The commitment to European Union had not fallen victim to the
Eurosclerosis and Euro pessimism of the 1970s. Thatcher’s government’s advocacy on deregulation
and more liberal markets soon found common cause with the Commission and its proposals to remove
remaining barriers to trade within the EEC and establish a genuine single or internal market. The
logics of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism both appeared to be driving closer integration.
The Single European Act. In adopting the SEA, the member states agreed some significant
amendments to the Treaty of Rome. They also signaled that the SEA was not simply about Single
Market-orientated reforms, but an attempt, genuine as far as most member states were concerned, to
realize their desire to ‘transform’ their relations into a European Union, to implement this new entity
and to invest it with the necessary means of action. As regards the institutions, it expanded the
decision-making role of the EP through the introduction of a cooperation procedure to cover mainly
internal market issues, and the assent procedure governing association agreements and accession. The
SEA also extended the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, allowed the Council
to confer implementation powers on the Commission. Communities reflected member states’
differences on how much supranational integration they were willing to pursue.
The Treaty on European Union. Agreed by the member states at Maastricht in 1991, TEU-often
referred to as Treaty of Maastricht- was designed to expand the scope of European integration, to
reform the EC’s institutions and decision-making procedures, and to bring about EMU. It also
furthered the goal of ever-closer union by bringing together the EEC-now renamed the European
Community-the ECSC and the EAEC as part of an entirely new entity, the ‘European Union’. Semi-
1
,permanent differentiation between member states in a major policy area would characterize the new
EU. There were fears that the Maastricht opt-outs would set a precedent leading, at worst, to an a la
carte EU, with member states picking areas in which they are willing to pursue closer integration.
Key points: Despite ‘ever-closer union’ being a long-established goal of the EC member states, the EU
was not created until 1993. The TEU created a new entity, the European Union. The new EU lacked a
uniform structure, consisting of one supranational and two intergovernmental pillars. The TEU
introduced opt-outs from certain policy areas for some member states.
Reviewing the Union: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Early experiences of the EU raised concerns about the functioning of the pillar structure. The desire
not to be held back by more recalcitrant member states led to mechanisms for closer cooperation
between interested and willing member states.
The 1996 IGC. Opinions deferred. For the less integrationist member states, it would provide an
opportunity to review and fine-tune the functioning of the EU and its structures. The IGC would
provide an opportunity to push ahead with the goal of creating an ever-closer union. There were
concerns on the ideas concerning ‘core Europe’, variable geometry and a multi-speed EU.
The Treaty of Amsterdam. It added the establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.
Treaty was supposed to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement. The Treaty incorporated
Schengen cooperation into the EU. Despite the acknowledged need to introduce institutional reforms
in preparation for enlargement, the Treaty failed to prepare EU sufficiently to admit more than a
handful of new members.
Preparing for enlargement and the 21st century: the 2000 Intergovernemental Conference, the Treaty
of Nice, and the ‘Fututre of Europe’ debate.
Enlargement moves centre-stage. Preparing the EU institutionally for enlargement had been a key
objective of the 1996 IGC. Yet the Treaty of Amsterdam failed to deliver. The issues-the size and
composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, and the possible extension of
qualified majority voting- became known as the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’. Changes in the approach that
the EU was adopting towards enlargement in 1999 gave greater urgency to the need to address the
‘Amsterdam leftovers’ and to agree institutional reform.
The 2000 IGC. Agenda 2000 provided the European Commission’s blueprint for enlargement.
Focused on those Amsterdam leftovers. Many of the proposals were too ambitious for the IGC, in
which progress was already proving to be slow, not least due to major differences on how to best deal
with the Amsterdam leftovers.
The Treaty of Nice. What the member states agreed at Nice attracted much criticism. Although it was
rightly heralded as paving the way for enlargement, for many it produced suboptimal solutions to the
institutional challenges increased membership raised. While criticized for potentially weakening the
EU, the Treaty of Nice initiated a process designed to respond to calls for a European Federation and a
European Constitution.
L2 – H3: From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon and Beyond
From the ‘Future of Europe’ debate to the Constitutional Treaty. The origins of the Constitutinal
Treaty (CT) owe much to the ‘Future of Europe’ debate started by the Nice European Council in 2000
and furthered by the 2001 Leaken Declaration. The debate grew out of an awareness of the Treaty of
Nice’s own weaknesses: the existing proliferation of treaties and elite desires for making the EU more
democratic and effective through a process of constitutionalization. Ways of improving the democratic
legitimacy and transparency of the EU.
The 2003-04 Intergovernmental Conference and the Constitutional Treaty. In the Treaty of Rome
member states signed a document; it was designed to replace all of the existing treaties and become
the single institutional document of the EU. The CT abolished the European Community and the
pillars, replacing them with the single EU. The CT changed the way the EU made rules through the
ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). Directives and regulations were renamed law. The CT also
envisaged citizen’s initiatives. Accompanying all of this was an extended use of QMV, although
unanimity was still required for a range of sensitive issues, such as measures relating to tax
2
, harmonization, the accession of new members and treaty revisions. As to what the EU could do, CT
clarified its policy competences; customs union, competition, monetary policy for the euro area and
common commercial policy and those in which competence is shared with member states, including
the internal market, social policy, the environment, freedom, security & justice (AFSJ). The CT thus
attempted to establish a streamlined and more democratic EU, and it’s considered highly controversial.
The ‘no’ votes: crisis. The Constitutional Treaty could have entered into force only if it had been
ratified by all member states. ‘No’ votes in the French and Dutch referendums reflected a range of
concerns, not all of which were connected with the CT, together with a failure of national and EU
leaders to make convincing cases about European integration. The two no votes left the EU with a
constitutional crisis. The rejection of the CT was regarded as evidence of popular discontent with the
EU.
Negotiating the Treaty of Lisbon. For much of 2005 and 2006 EU leaders were st s loss as to what to
do extricate the EU from its latest crisis. The reflection period failed to produce any clear answer to
the ongoing constitutional crisis. The German Council presidency followed a tightly controlled
strategy to secure member state agreement on a IGC mandate to transfer much of CT into a
conventional amending treaty. Discussions about the new amending treaty occurred against the
background of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome. Under the Portuguese
presidency, a technical IGC produced the Treaty of Lisbon.
The main elements of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty was not deigned to have a lasting existence of
its own, since its function was to amend the two treaties- the TEU and TEC- on which the EU is based.
Was an amending treaty that included many aspects; such as Protocols. Five of the Protocols-covering
the role of national parliaments, subsidiarity and proportionality, the Eurogroup, permanent structured
cooperation, and the EU’s planned accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)-
were originally part of the CT. It also states a set of common provisions and rules on European
citizenship. Everything is supposed to now function through the basic Community method. First
opponent of treaty it brought matters into line with common practice. Second, treaty made it clear that
EU is a body based on powers conferred by the member states, enshrined in the treaties, and subject to
subsidiarity and proportionality. Member states have rights of action, consultation, recognition,
support and secession. Third, EU policies were not greatly expanded by the treaty. Fourth, in terms of
decision-making, the treaty renamed co-decision as the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and
established it as the default legislative process. Fifth, the treaty introduced significant changes to
institutional arrangements. The EP received extra powers, notably over the budget an treaty change.
Sixth, is a new emphasis on values and rights.
The Treaty of Lisbon: an appraisal. The first question is whether the treaty succeeded in its intention
of increasing the democratic legitimacy and the efficiency. Despite the range of changes introduced
and the criticisms made of it, its effects have not been revolutionary.
Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. The treaty was enforced a year later than planned because of the
Irish rejection in a referendum in 2008. The main causes of the ‘no’ vote in Ireland were a lack of
knowledge and understanding of the treaty together with specific national concerns. Ratification of the
treaty continued despite the ‘no’ vote in Ireland, with the government committing itself to holding a
second referendum. Irish voters’ concerns were addressed through ‘guarantees’ and a dedicated Irish
protocol, thus paving the way for a yes vote in a second referendum.
The significance of the Treaty of Lisbon. Abandoning the language of ‘constitution’ in the treaty failed
to pacify opponents. The Irish ‘no’ opened a new period of crisis over EU reform.
Implementing the Treaty of Lisbon. The impact of the treaty was muted and occurred against the
background of the economic crisis. Despite the measures introduced, the EU is still perceived as
suffering from a democratic deficit.
Beyond the Treaty of Lisbon, crises Brexit and the future of the EU. The treaty was never intended to
provide closure on EU treaty reform. The eurozone crisis led to calls for treaty reform to provide the
EU with the necessary competences and improve the institutional framework for economic governance
but only ad hoc treaty amendments were introduced. There continue to be calls for close European
integration but there remains limited appetite to pursue reform, particularly given increased
Euroscepticism.
3
Voordelen van het kopen van samenvattingen bij Stuvia op een rij:
√ Verzekerd van kwaliteit door reviews
Stuvia-klanten hebben meer dan 700.000 samenvattingen beoordeeld. Zo weet je zeker dat je de beste documenten koopt!
Snel en makkelijk kopen
Je betaalt supersnel en eenmalig met iDeal, Bancontact of creditcard voor de samenvatting. Zonder lidmaatschap.
Focus op de essentie
Samenvattingen worden geschreven voor en door anderen. Daarom zijn de samenvattingen altijd betrouwbaar en actueel. Zo kom je snel tot de kern!
Veelgestelde vragen
Wat krijg ik als ik dit document koop?
Je krijgt een PDF, die direct beschikbaar is na je aankoop. Het gekochte document is altijd, overal en oneindig toegankelijk via je profiel.
Tevredenheidsgarantie: hoe werkt dat?
Onze tevredenheidsgarantie zorgt ervoor dat je altijd een studiedocument vindt dat goed bij je past. Je vult een formulier in en onze klantenservice regelt de rest.
Van wie koop ik deze samenvatting?
Stuvia is een marktplaats, je koop dit document dus niet van ons, maar van verkoper Yasmijnovervelde. Stuvia faciliteert de betaling aan de verkoper.
Zit ik meteen vast aan een abonnement?
Nee, je koopt alleen deze samenvatting voor €5,49. Je zit daarna nergens aan vast.
