C2042556_CRL
Topic Page
Criminal Law Fundamentals 1
Driving Offences 2
Criminal Damage 3
Offences Against the Person and 5
Defences
Murder 9
Voluntary Manslaughter 11
Constructive Manslaughter 13
Gross Negligence Manslaughter 15
Corporate Liability Manslaughter 16
Sexual Offences 18
Theft 21
Making off Without Payment 24
Robbery 25
Fraud 26
Burglary 27
Attempts 29
Accomplice Liability 30
Defence of Intoxication 32
Consent as a Defence Essay 34
Dishonesty Essay Plan 38
Anything in yellow – substitute in with application of scenario
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Criminal Law Fundamentals
Liability for Omissions
Most offences need a positive act. Liability for failing to act happens in 4 scenarios:
Special Relationships If D has family ties (Gibbins and Proctor)
If D has assumed a duty to V (Stone and
Dobinson)
Contractual Duty If D’s employment requires them to act
(Pittwood)
Statutory Duty Stopping at a red light
Dangerous Situations If D has created a dangerous situation and
failed to take reasonable steps to stop it
(Miller)
Voluntary Acts Involuntary acts aren’t liable, D must have
acted voluntary to satisfy the AR (Hill)
Direct Intent D’s ‘aim, purpose or desire’ (R v Mohan)
Indirect Intent Virtually certain consequence which D
foresaw as a virtual certainty (Nedrick,
Woollin)
Ulterior intent Extra element of MR, where D intended to go
beyond AR of crime
Basic Intent Intention or recklessness will meet MR (all
sex offences are basic intent Heard)
Specific Intent MR requires intention and nothing less (DPP
v Beard)
Recklessness D foresees, and goes onto take an unjustified
risk (subjective) – Cunningham, R v G
Transferred Malice Malice can be transferred to a different victim
(Latimer)
Transferred malice only works if AR
committed is for the same type of crime
originally intended (Pembliton)
Negligence Failing to measure up to the standards of a
reasonable person
Strict liability Offences where MR nor negligence needed
for conviction (Sweet v Parsley, R v Brown
(Richard))
Coincidence of AR and MR AR and MR coincide if in the same sequence
of events, the fact there was a lapse in time
between the two did not enable the defendant
to escape liability (Le Brun)
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Driving Offences – p.26-7 of Statutory Extracts
Careless and Inconsiderate Driving (s.3 Road Traffic Act 1988)
AR: Driving a mechanically propelled vehicle in a public place without due care and
attention, or without reasonable consideration for other people using the road or
public place (falls below expected standards of a competent and careful driver
(3ZA(2)) by... This is an objective test, it is ‘impersonal and universal, fixed in
relation to the safety of other users of the highway’ and is unrelated to the
experience or proficiency the individual driver has (McCrone v Riding).
MR: irrelevant as it is an offence of strict liability (Andrews v DPP, Sweet v
Parsley, R v Brown (Richard)).
Death by Careless Driving (s.2B RTA 1998)
AR for careless PLUS it caused the death of X. MR is the same.
Dangerous Driving (s.2 & 2A Road Traffic Act 1998)
AR: Driving a mechanically propelled vehicle dangerously on a road or public place.
‘Dangerous’ means falling far below the standards of a careful and competent driver
(s.2(1)) OR the vehicle’s condition is dangerous and is obvious to a competent and
careful driver (s.2(2))
MR: irrelevant as it is an offence of strict liability (Andrews v DPP, Sweet v
Parsley, R v Brown (Richard)).
Death by Dangerous Driving (s.1 RTA 1998)
AR for dangerous driving PLUS it caused the death of X. MR is the same.
Drink Driving causing death (s.3A RTA 1998)
If death is caused (3A) due to alcohol:
AR: driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or public place. D is unfit to
drive through drink or drugs (1a). There is evidence of excess alcohol in driver’s
blood, breath or urine’ (3A(1)(b)).
MR: Drink driving causing death is a strict liability offence because MR or negligence
don’t need to be proven for conviction (Sweet v Parsley, R v Brown (Richard)).
Andrews v DPP confirmed R v Bateman that a ‘very high degree of negligence is
required to be proved before the felony is established’. D would only be liable if
considered to be grossly negligent, ordinary negligence is insufficient (Bateman).
ACCOMPLICE
Being a silent passenger to dangerous driving (speeding) can make you an
accomplice (Du Cros v Lambourne)
Car was the accomplice’s but couldn’t determine who was the principal
DEFENCE Involuntary acts aren’t liable, D must have acted voluntary to satisfy the
AR (Hill and Baxter)
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Criminal Damage – p.12-13 of Statutory Extracts
Start with Simple and move to Aggravated.
Simple Criminal Damage (s.1(1) of Criminal Damage Act 1971)
AR: Damage or destruction of property belonging to another without lawful excuse.
“Damage” is satisfied if any expense is involved in restoration to original condition.
The original state of the property must be altered to be damaged. The damage
doesn’t need to be extensive (Hardman v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset
Constabulary). If it can be wiped clean, it isn’t damaged (R v A (a juvenile)).
Whether damage has been caused is a matter of fact and degree, to be determined
in a common-sense way (Roe v Kingerlee).
An omission to act isn’t enough for liability unless a dangerous situation is
created. Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent a dangerous situation
establishes AR (R v Miller).
“Property” is anything of a tangible nature, real or personal, including money (s.10)
which someone else has custody or control of (belonging to another), or any
proprietary right or interest in it (s.10(2)).
MR: Intention or recklessness as to the damage and knowledge or recklessness that
the property belongs to another (s.10(1)).
Originally, D wanted to damage X’s property but instead, Y’s was damaged.
They are liable under transferred malice (Pembliton, Latimer)
Direct Intent
D’s ‘aim, purpose or desire’ was to damage X’s property (R v Mohan), evidenced
by...
D could rely on the defence of lawful excuse…
Indirect Intent
Although D’s intent isn’t explicitly clear, D must have been virtually certain that their
actions would have caused damage to X’s property, so had indirect intent (Nedrick,
Woollin). D could rely on the defence of lawful excuse…
Was death or serious injury virtually certain to occur as a result of the
defendant’s actions?
Did the defendant foresee the death or injury as virtually certain?
Recklessness
The test for recklessness (Cunningham, R v G) concerns if D did foresee the risk of
damage with their actions, and still went on to take that risk even though it was
unjustified. Therefore, they meet the MR.
Simple Arson (s.1(3) of Criminal Damage Act 1971)
AR: Damage or destruction of property belonging to another without lawful excuse
(by fire).
MR: Intention or recklessness as to the damage and knowledge or recklessness that
the property belongs to another (Cunningham, R v G).
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