Chapter Two: Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding
1. Not Merely Destructive
Wittgenstein was critical in two Kantian senses:
o Kant explored the limits of pure reason; Wittgenstein investigated the limits of
language
Kant delimited reason in order to make room for faith; Wittgenstein (in the
Tractatus) delimited language in order to make room for ineffable
metaphysics, ethics and religion
these were seen as forms of life beyond rational justification
o Similar to Kant, Wittgenstein was a remorseless critic of the philosophical illusions
that come about when the bounds of reason are transgressed
behaviourism and dualism in psychology, intuitionism and Platonism in
maths, foundationalism in epistemology and in philosophy of language
yet this is not all negative: firstly, philosophy can achieve nothing based on
illusion, and secondly, Wittgenstein gave detailed illustrations of the logical
grammar of many problematic philosophical concepts. This is positive.
THIRDLY, Wittgenstein was positive in the sense that he defended the
autonomy of humanistic understanding (psychology, linguistics, history,
social sciences etc) from scientism (methodological naturalism)
Scientism is the illicit extension of scientific methodology and forms of explanation to
humanistic understanding
o the doctrine of the Unity of Science is a reductive form of scientism, vigorously
propounded by the logical positivists
e.g. behaviourism - the mental does not exist
LOGICAL behaviourism - statements about the mental are reducible to
statements about behaviour/dispositions to behave
o methodological scientism is not reductive
it recognises that social and psychological phenomena are not reducible to
the physical, but retains causation - the mechanism of explanation in these
cases is the same as that in the natural sciences
Wittgenstein was not directly concerned with this problem, but was concerned with the nature
of linguistic representation - hence with meaning and intentionality
2. Humanism, Science and the Study of Man
The Renaissance marked a rebirth of humano-centrism, as had been practiced by the ancient
civilizations
o This humano-centrism went hand-in-hand with the emergent individualism of the
rising bourgeoisie
o the two preached rational reality, that the power of human reason can render the
world intelligible, that the pursuit of knowledge accords with the dignity of man etc.
o This humano-centrism led to the advocacy of the study of mankind. This is the
genesis of modern humanism.
At this time the theoretical sciences lagged behind, and shortly after the Renaissance spirit
was over, the scientific revolution took off
o Kepler, Galileo, Newton
o teleology was mostly abandoned in favour of laws, though the laws posited were still
seen as exhibiting design, and thus until Hume teleological residue remained
o Bacon and Descartes were the philosophical spokesmen of the scientific revolution
Bacon preached inductivism and experimentalism, Descartes preached
rational abstraction from the data of experience
Neither of these schools saw themselves as challenging the truths of Christianity, but as
complementing them
o arguably Judeo-Christian monotheism is the perfect seedbed for theoretical science: it
recognises the reality of the natural world, whilst affirming the existence of a
, supernatural world with the power to design the mechanisms of nature. This is
opposed to Confucianism, or Hinduism
In fact both inevitable challenged Christianity:
o humanism was overwhelmingly secular; individualism challenged the Catholic
doctrine (hence the rise of Protestantism)
o science inevitably challenged the pre-scientific truths of religion; the first-generation
philosophes adopted Deism rather than Christianity; and the third generation of
enlightenment thinkers tended towards atheism and utilitarianism. Darwin gave a
scientific, naturalism answer to the question of man’s place in nature
From the Enlightenment to 20th Century, science and humanism were allied against
authoritarianism in doctrine, despotism in government, irrationality and inhumanity in socio-
political arrangements
o By the 20th Century religion had lost all authority on matters of fact, and its domain
because values and norms. Science saw itself as providing value neutral offerings to
socety
As the 20th Century went on, rifts opened between science and humanism
o the erosion of humanistic values and decline of high culture
o transformation of the conceptions of the value of education and its harnessing to the
needs of post-industrial society
o devaluation of humanities in education
o perceived danger of the power of knowledge unrestrained by understanding of
humanity
o AND at the theoretical and intellectual level of the dividing line between scientific
methodology and humanism - is methodological naturalism valid or encroachment?
3. Scientism and the Doctrine of the Unity of Science
Descartes fostered the vision of the Unity of Science
o the Cartesian mechanism covered metaphysics, physics, medicine, mechanics and
morals, but ended at the the mental, which he defined in terms of consciousness and
thought. BUT:
his successors didn’t envisage such a limitation to the mechanism
he had no theory of the social sciences and dismissed history
he still envisaged the relation between volition and action as causal and
hence explanation of human behaviour as nomological
Hume had a vision of laws of the operation of the mind - he wanted to be a Newton of the
mental sciences
The concept of voluntary human action as causal was dominant from Descartes and Hobbes to
the 20th Century
o neurophysiology gave impetus to this notion - the true explanation could be found at
the neural level
o this led to the rise of behaviourism, both radical (eliminative) and more moderate
(methodological)
Behaviourism was superseded by cognitivism, which was intended to reinstate the psyche in
psychology
o ironically this coincided with the rise of the computer sciences and emergence of
Chomsky’s computerizable theory of syntax, the rules of which the mind/brain could
cognize, even if the person couldn’t
o psychological theory was not so much humanized as computerized
Comte posited that the social sciences would be the last of the sciences to reach maturity; its
existence presupposed the antecedent sciences of mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry
and biology
o social science was to study the laws of the functioning of social wholes
followed by Marx, Mill and social Darwinism
o these theories were internally incoherent: Comte insisted on invariable laws of social
change and inevitable paths yet relied upon a scientific-industrial elite to guide
history down those paths; Marx similar but with class struggle. Social Darwinism