With specific reference to key events explain how tensions within the Grand
Alliance escalated and caused the Cold War.
To what extent was this the responsibility of either the USSR or the USA?
The question of who, or what, caused the Cold War is a constantly evolving
argument. Orthodox and revisionist views highlight ideological objectives of the
USSR and USA, respectively, as the cause of the Cold War. Usually, Post-
revisionists, such as Gaddis, attempt to apportion the blame between the two
superpowers by considering other contributing factors underestimated by
orthodox and Revisionist historians. One orthodox view, such as that of
Schlesinger, holding Stalin’s marxism was accountable is flawed, because if he
believed that “[capitalists] inherent greediness- the irresistible urge to place
profits above politics- would sooner or later prevail, leaving the communists with
the need only for patience as they awaited their adversaries' self destruction” 1,
why did he act as if his ideology was threatened? A revisionist argument like that
in Radchenko and Craig’s ‘The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War’,
provides American ideologically motivated actions, promoting US hegemony, as
the cause. This has a tenable aspect, considering Truman “deliberately
exaggerated the Soviet threat [...] to secure congressional aid for Greece and
Turkey and US acceptance of the Truman Doctrine” 2. However, the USSR was a
menace to countries that did not want communist governments. Stalin violated
his promise for free and fair elections, and regardless of whether or not Truman
had to convince Congress to respond, it was reasonable to. Conflicting post-war
goals were present from the beginning of the alliance, as Gaddis illustrates
“victory would require the victors either to cease to be who they were, or to give
up much of what they had hoped, by fighting the war, to attain.” 3. Ultimately
though, “Narcissism, paranoia and absolute power came together in Stalin” 4 and
this drove his obsessive security concerns which were the most detrimental
factor to relations. Mastney broadly agrees with Gaddis, and draws attention to
constant bad decisions and conflicting policies on Stalin’s part. For example, he
somehow expected the Berlin Blockade to give him the upperhand of influence
and neglected to see how it may have worsened his reputation and relations.
Stalin’s decisions were deluded by heightened paranoia for his personal security
and saw the USA as a threat not just to his ideology, but himself because his
power lay in the regime he had created. As a result, he disregarded full
cooperation, which the USA saw as necessary to the functioning of the alliance.
Thus, Stalin undermined the alliance, favouring his own objective to guard his
power and exacerbated the situation with uncoordinated and clumsy action.
1 J L Gaddis, ‘The Cold War’, Penguin Group, London, 2007, p. 12
2 A Mitchell, ‘The Cold War: The role of the leaders’, 20th History Review Volume 8, No.4, 2013, p.13
3 J L Gaddis, p.6
4 Ibid, p.11
, Tensions within the Grand Alliance were undeniable; the only thing uniting the
Soviet Union and America was their desire to stop Hitler from dominating
Europe, with disparate goals otherwise. Gaddis sets forth that “the war had been
won by a coalition whose principle members were already at war - ideologically
and geopolitically if not militarily - with one another”5. Stalin afterall, did choose
to make a pact with Germany before World War II and at that point “it would
have been extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would, instead of reaching
an agreement with the Nazis, have come to an arrangement with the Western
Powers”6. By signing an agreement with his ideological enemy, Stalin gave
plenty of reason for Roosevelt and Truman to be sceptical of his character. He
would sacrifice his ideological beliefs for security and, being absurdly suspicious,
possibly expected that the USA would have done the same. Nevertheless,
cooperation during the war was necessary. At the time of the Tehran conference
the USA prioritised keeping the Soviet Union in the war, as they likely could not
have won the war without them, and this “meant providing all possible
assistance in food, clothing, and armaments, even if by desperate means and at
great cost”7 and not “contesting Stalin’s demands for the restoration of lost
territories, despite the awkward fact that some of these [...] had fallen under
Soviet control only as a result of his pact with Hitler”8 In this example, their
intention was specifically to not exasperate Stalin. Despite this, Stalin’s paranoia
remained incessant, bugging Roosevelt and Churchill’s rooms at Tehran.
Radchenko also recognises that “Stalin used the non-aggression pact to carve
out a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe” 9, so Stalin’s paranoia predated the
war, which makes it less likely that the USA initiated these concerns that drove
Stalin to pursue hegemony for security. These concerns were also evident in the
“Show Trials” he conducted in the 1930’s to rid himself of opposition within the
communist party, proving his paranoia pertaining to maintaining his personal
power: “Stalin appears to have treated everything and everyone with suspicion.
The dominant question in his mind was always: who could be about to betray
me”10. He referred to the outside world as hostile in an attempt to further justify
and consolidate his regime, a belief he exhibited at the Bolshoi Ballet Speech in
1946 (appendix 1). Stalin more actively prioritised security for himself in
quantitative power, which is recognised by Radchenko and Gaddis, standing as a
more important factor than Roosevelt’s attempts to mitigate tension, when
considering the basis for the tentative alliance.
Yalta could be considered a point of failure for both the USA and USSR. Though
the compromises at the time seemed auspicious and “a sign that it was possible
5 L Rees, ‘Hitler and Stalin: The Tyrants and the Second World War’, GB, 2020
6 J L Gaddis, p.19
7 Ibid p.19
8 L Rees, xxvi
9 Chris Reed, ‘The Yalta Agreement’, MHR Nov 2020, Vol 23, No 2
10 Arthur Schlesinger, ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs
Vol. 46, No. 1 (Oct, 1967), pp. 22-52, p.26
