Summary
Summary Harman - The nature of morality
- Module
- Ethics
- Institution
- Oxford University (OX)
Notes on Gilbert Harman's 'The Nature of Morality'
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Gilbert Harman - The Nature of MoralityChapter One: Ethics and observation
● Can moral principles be tested in the same way as scientific principles - can we ever
perceive the rightness or wrongness of what someone does?
○ though we say we can see that an act is wrong, can we ever test the
wrongness of what we see? if not, then it could be a reflection of anything - a moral
sense, an upbringing
● In both science and ethics, general principles are invoked to explain particular cases
○ and, in ethics, these general principles can be tested by appealing to
particular judgements that certain things are right/wrong, just/unjust etc
● In science we need to make assumptions about physical facts in order to explain the
occurrence of observations that support a scientific theory e.g. the observation of a vapour trail in
a cloud chamber only confirms a scientific theory to the extent that there actually was a proton
going through the cloud chamber - we must assume the proton to explain the observation
○ BUT in ethics we can explain the occurrence of moral observations
without assuming the existence of any moral facts - all we need to explain someone
saying ‘Killing is wrong’ is to assume some psychology and more or less well articulated
moral principles
Chapter Two: Nihilism and naturalism
1. Moral nihilism
● Nihilism = no moral facts, no moral truths, no moral knowledge
○ this can explain why moral facts don’t help us to explain observations -
there are no such facts
○ extreme nihilism - nothing is ever right or wrong
○ moderate nihilism - non-cognitivism/expressivism
■ on this view, we shouldn’t expect moral judgements to
help to explain observations because such judgements are akin to ‘Alas!’ or
‘Close the door!’
■ both forms conflict with our ordinary way of talking e.g.
‘it’s true that x is wrong’
2. Reductions
● Even if assumptions about moral facts don’t directly help us to explain observations,
moral facts may be reducible to other sorts of facts, assumptions about which do help to explain
observations
○ this may in turn give us evidence for assumptions about moral facts
○ e.g. we can explain colour perception without assuming that objects have
colours, by reducing colour to particular reflective properties of objects
■ this would help us to explain colour perception, but
would not prove that there are no facts about colours, just that these facts are not
additional facts, over and above physical and psychological facts
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