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Was the CAA's response to Eyjafjallajokull justified or not? £8.49
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Was the CAA's response to Eyjafjallajokull justified or not?

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In the wake of one of the biggest aviation disruptions in history across the European Union, the CAA led the investigation and response into how they best responded

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  • January 6, 2021
  • 17
  • 2020/2021
  • Essay
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Examine CAA’s risk communication strategy during the spring 2010 volcano
crisis;


Requirements:
 Minimum of 15 peer-review references, can’t be those that are on the reading list
 2,000 words
 Harvard referencing
 Show original analysis and critical thought


Risk Communication literature:

Top-down communication was used

Best practices generally are inclusive of:

1. Accurate information on the receiver of the communication
2. Be proactive
3. All groups should be briefed frequently
4. Well-prepared communication strategy
5. How can risks be atteniated and amplified by the media




Who did the communication come from?
 Lack of elected leadership throughout the crisis as it coincided with the general
election campaign. Therefore, response effort was lead by a number of different
agencies:
o CAA – in accordance with ICAO procedures, promptly closed UK airspace
 Leadership was expected to be taken by the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA), when this didn’t happen, the CAA through their Head
of Airworthiness, created a working conference of all available experts
which steered the UK to timely solutions
o MET – provided updates on the status of the ash cloud, role to provide
support in cases of civil contingency – worked as the UK’s VAAC
o Department for Transport – tried to lead the crisis, but were confused and
not helpful and tended to interfere with the work of the CAA
o The Natural Environmental Research Council (NERC)
 Operate the Dornier 228 Airborne research and surveying facility
(ARSF) and a 50% owner of the MET facility for Airborne Atmosphere
Measurements( FAAM), operating the large atmospheric research
aircraft (ARA)

,  Supplied CAA and Met with reconfigured ARSF instruments from
FAAM, within 11 hour of initial closure. Continuously worked with the
MET to make ARA available within 6 days of closure
 NERC’s Natonal Centre for Atmospheric Sciences (NCAS) and the
British Geological Survey (BGS) took an immediate national lead in
giving expert advice as was required on the non-engineeering
scientific issues, took lead on coordinating all data collected
o NATS – closed airspace and then took instruction from CAA
o MoD –
 Took advice and decided flying would only be authorised for lifesaving
purposes
 MoD laboratories rapidly redirected to investigate necessary
airworthiness issues, failure on MoD, because of a lack of “adequate
coordination” with the airworthiness efforts centre on the CAA.
o Cabinet Office Civil Contingency Office
 Spoke to Dft and others, but was late to the event, and failed to
recognise the leadership that had already been assumed by the CAA,
Met and NERC
o The Government Chief Scientist – formed a SAGE group , under some secrecy
 Wasn’t much use as other actors weren’t made aware of it = lack of
visibility degraded its usefulness
 Had good scientific literarcy, but secrety of its operation was an
obvious pitfall


What was this crisis?

The eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull volcano in Spring 2020, started on the 14th April (Civil
Aviation Authority , 2010)


 CAA is informed and advice Is given to airlines
 Ash cloud becomes clear – the CAA leads a National Airspace Crisis
Management Executive meet up for the first time
o They continue to meet 3x a day throughout
 15th April – UK Airspace is impacted
o Ash reaches Scottish airspace – NATS announces that 12:00-18:00 -
no service to be provided to commercial operators into the
contaminated space
o CAA follows it with a NOTAM reinforcing the decision
o
th
 16 April – Ash detected across various location in the UK
o CAA, NATS and Met Office in contact with Eurocontrol
o Meet with SST and agree further communication, including with
airlines and airport representatives

, o Establish a working group with 100 individuals to assess whether
slightly denser contaminated than current acceptable levels set by
ICAO are safe
 17th April – no positive prognosis
o Weather patterns in the UK keep ash over the countries airspace
o Reports from around the country suggest ash is still present and
settling on the frame of aircrafts
th
 18 April – further working groups
o Request for more data to re- access safety levels
o Test BA flight is used to measure contamination levels and practical
impact
 19th April
o Collaboration with aircraft manufacturers – US work through the night
to suggest a plausible solution
o European Transport Ministers agree a 3 band model for classifying ash
– and then Eurocontrol announce a new zoning system in effect from
0600 20th April
o Working group access data from instrumental flights showing low
levels of contamination but no uniform agreement is met about
changing tolerance levels
th
 20 April
o Working group takes place
o CAA emergency board meeting at 17:30
 Agree a 2milligram per cubic metre of air set as an acceptable
safety limit
 Requirements are established, including a range of inspections
to engine and airframes between flights
o CAA brief secretary of state for transport and airlines and announce
airspace will be reopened at 22:00
o 9 engine manufacturers go public with support of new threshold
o Airspace remains open an usual until 3rd May
 3-5 May
 8-10 May


1. Challenges of emergency communication : lessons learnt post crisis
(A.Alemanno, 2011)
Chapter 6 – Chakraborty, S (2011)
o There was no empirically founded approach towards the emergency risk
communication
o Information was contradictory and stemmed from a range of sources from
international organizations to private sources
o Lack of trust = public perceptions of the risk were greater
 Risk communication is a critical component of crisis communication and effective
emergency responses
 Fischhoff et al, 1993, p 200

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