Epistemology
Is idealism a plausible theory for perception of knowledge? [25]
Idealism states that the only objects of perception are mental, everything is esse est percipi.
As a theory of the world, it has defensible aspects and strong arguments associated in its
support. The theory begins with an immediate objection to the primary and secondary
qualities distinction outlined by Locke in indirect realism. Locke states within his theory of
indirect realism that the primary qualities in our ideas, resemble their material causes.
Berkeley states that this is not possible as ideas are of a completely different nature to the
supposed nature of material objects. Ideas are mental, only exist when perceived, take up
no space and are temporary. However, material objects are non-mental, exist unperceived,
take up space and are permanent. This makes it impossible for former to resemble the latter
as they have opposite traits.
This counter-argument can however, be further opposed. We can have resemblance
between images and reality, despite the obvious differences between the nature of images
and material things. Similarly, words and other symbols can accurately represent material
objects, there is not a resemblance of the same kind but there is a representational content.
To perceive mental representation as a resemblance between internal pictures and external
objects is a naïve and old-fashioned perspective. Instead we should modify the words used
by Locke and state that our ideas are an accurate representation of their causes.
Even with this modification to Locke’s terminology, the same distinctions that he outlines
remain. Secondary qualities remain different as they do not accurately represent reality, for
example, an object looking a certain colour suggests that the mind-independent object had
a phenomenal quality of being a certain colour. However, no external object has properties
of this kind.
A further argument to ‘disprove’ the theory of realism is the master argument. The master
argument highlights a contradiction within the realists theory. Realism is the belief that
mind-independent objects exist, it follows that an object can exist unperceived, if realists
believe this phenomenon to be possible, they should be able to conceive of the possibility.
However, in the pursuit of conceiving an unconceived object, they are conceiving the object.
This contradiction suggests realism is incoherent. The only alternative explanation to the
existence of mind-independent objects is the non-existence of mind-independent objects
and therefore, idealism is the only plausible theory for the world.
Realists object to this by stating we can think of a representation of an unperceived object.
We are therefore, only conceiving of the representation, not of the object itself.
Representations always have content, they are always information bearing, they state that
things are thus and so. Therefore, a representation can be perceived whilst the content of
the representation, is not.
Idealism’s existence is argued by disproving realism. All arguments for idealism are driven by
the weaknesses in realism as opposed to the strength of idealism. The arguments to
disprove realism have realist responses that seem strong enough to withstand their
challenges. Suggesting that realism should still be favoured as there is no argument that
weakens it fatally and therefore, idealism remains implausible.
,There are many issues with idealism, challenging its plausibility. The first refers to
unperceived objects. Due to the theory of idealism, it follows that objects cannot exist when
they are not perceived, this does not align without common sense thesis as unobserved
existence explains biological changes such as hunger of a pet. With intermittent existence,
these changes seem hard to explain, especially as changes occur over a set period of time
despite their gappy existence. Berkeley’s responds to this challenge by stating that
everything always exists as God always perceives everything.
It also seems hard to explain that we have all created the same sense data when it is not
caused by any mind-independent object. If God observes our ideas to keep things in
existence then it would follow that one idea can be in multiple minds. This theory does not
seem to align with common sense as we have private thoughts making an overlap of minds
seem inexplicable. A response to this dilemma is that God aligns our thoughts so that we all
perceive the same ideas. These ideas, however, do not overlap between minds, they are
copies of each other. God has the divine archetype and all humans simply have a copy of
this idea, this would explain the similarity in our sense data and the existence of private
thoughts.
Another objection to idealism is the complexity of the objects of perceptions. For realists,
complex internal structures are easily explained as biological machines that work due to a
combination of elements playing causal roles. However, according to Berkeley ideas are
causally passive. If a heart is simply a collection of ideas, this means it is causally
inefficacious. It follows that a heart cannot pump blood; however, it clearly can.
Berkeley argues that God’s benevolence incentivises him to make the world predictable and
regular. He establishes regularity in the sequences of ideas he puts in our minds.
Illusion and hallucination also create problems in idealism as they cannot be explained in
terms of the relationship between ideas and mind-independent reality or as quasi-
perceptual experiences. These explanations are not possible in idealism as there is no mind
independent reality. This leaves idealists without an explanation of illusion and
hallucination, we know these experiences occur and therefore, idealism is an incomplete
theory.
Berkeley responds to this issue by explaining illusions and hallucination. He states that
illusions are experiences where we are liable to go wrong in our beliefs. Veridical
experiences fit a regular patter, illusion and hallucination fall outside this pattern; however,
all are ideas in the same way. Hallucination can be distinguished as it is less vivid and
occasionally (imagination) is under voluntary control, meaning we can distinguish different
phenomena within our minds, thus explaining illusion and hallucination under the theory of
idealism.
The threat of solipsism is also prominent in idealism. Solipsism is the threat that, for all I
know, I may be the only thing that exists. There may be no other people, as well as no
external world. Minds are not perceptible, therefore, we cannot prove their existence.
Berkeley advertises idealism’s ability to escape scepticism; however, the threat of solipsism
is just as important.
Berkeley replies by highlighting involuntary ideas, these ideas must be caused by some
,external force, the only causal powers are minds and therefore, there must be at least one
other mind. He also references language, the existence of language to communicate ideas
between people suggests a plurality of minds.
The largest problem with many of Berkeley’s responses is the role of God within his idea.
Aside from the obvious necessity of proving God’s existence, there are many flaws with the
part he plays in Berkeley’s idealism. Any explanation that relies on God’s existence is
incomplete, as God’s existence is unexplained. Berkeley argues that all explanations must
stop at a brute fact with no explanation. He argued that God is this brute fact, this claim is
weak as God’s existence is easily disputed, a brute fact should not be so easily debatable.
The master argument, used to argue idealism as it arguably disputes the existence of mind-
independent objects can also challenge God’s existence as he is mind-independent and
suggests the incoherence of theism. However, the response is that we do not have
perceptual ideas of God; but we can believe in him using inference.
The first is that we feel pain and have negative sensations. All ideas are in God’s mind as he
has the divine archetype; however, this means God must feel pain and discomfort. God is
perfect. God cannot be perfect and feel imperfections. Berkeley replies weakly by stating
that God feels pain differently, for example, our pain is involuntary, God’s is voluntary. It is,
also fair to say that God would not be omniscient or perfect without knowing experiences of
pain.
Finally, if God possesses the divine archetype of all our ideas, when we decide to perform an
action and move something, we are changing God’s divine archetype idea. This suggests we
are exerting power over God. This challenges God’s omnipotence if he can be controlled by
any mind.
Despite these extensive issues, residual weirdness remains. There are many examples that
seem to count against Berkeley’s claim that his theory is in accordance with common sense.
For example, when a fire gets smaller we would assume this is because it burns away;
however, idealism suggests that God gives us smaller ideas. This incoherence with common
sense tests the validity of idealism. Furthermore, whilst Berkeley can, by various revisionary
manoeuvres (often involving God), find a defence to many of the natural realist objections.
The multitude of objects and the weakness of the role of God suggests that idealism, whilst
defensible is not a plausible theory of the world.
Is innatism a plausible theory for the source of knowledge? [25]
Innatism is a rationalist view that states we are born with some of our propositional
knowledge. I shall demonstrate the implausibility of this view.
, Plato believed that the truth of innatism could be proven by a simulated situation between
2 characters, Socrates and a slave boy. The slave boy cannot initially display knowledge that
p. The proposition is: the area of a double size square has the side of the diagonal of the
original square. Plato then shows that by a series of questions the slave boy can reach
knowledge that p, without being told the proposition.
This proof of innatism is flawed in many respects. The most obvious objection is that by way
of prompting questions, Socrates is teaching the boy. Whilst he does not explicitly tell the
boy the proposition, he leads him to the answer. The slave boy would not be able to display
this knowledge without the help of Socrates.
The other problems with this proof are associated with its poor expla
unatory power. The implications of Plato’s innatism seem to be an ontological extravagance
given that Socrates provides the slave boy with the knowledge.
The first component is the problems with the realm of forms. Plato believed that our innate
knowledge is acquired in ‘the realm of forms’ before our birth. This knowledge is then
forgotten once we join our material body. We can then reach the knowledge in our material
lives via the faculty of reason. Many questions arise with this ‘realm’. There is no indication
to the location of the realm or how the realm functions. Furthermore, there is no suggestive
evidence for the realm of forms. This suggests Plato has conjured its existence into reality
without any rational motivation.
The realm of forms also gives light to the issue of immaterial souls. Plato states that we
experience the realm of forms in an immaterial soul. There are myriads of issues with
immaterial souls. With new discoveries in modern day science they seem inexplicable.
Overall, it is plausible to argue that Plato’s proof does not prove innatism due to Socrates
teaching of the boy. However, even if we accept its conclusion, we cannot accept innatism.
The issues of the realm of forms and immaterial souls suggest that Plato’s innatism is an
unnecessary extravagance. Thus offending Ockham’s razor (to not multiply the agents in a
theory beyond necessity).
Gottfried Leibniz provided a different path to innatism. He did this using the concept of
necessity. Leibniz showed we have the concept of necessity by highlighting contingent
versus necessary truths and falsehoods. He then argued that it is impossible for us to
acquire the concept of necessity by experience. This is because our experience is finite.
Therefore, it is impossible to acquire a concept that relies on infinity from a finite lifetime.
One could argue that necessity could be acquired through regularity of patterns. However,
Leibniz argues that normativity does not equal necessity. For example, the romans saw the
sun rise every day; however, they did not believe it would continue to rise without certain
worship. Another path to necessity could be sense experience. Sense experience breeds
necessity. However, Leibniz countered by stating that universal conformity does not equal
necessity. Rendering this argument redundant.
Leibniz objections to alternative paths to necessity seem plausible. However, we are still
inclined to believe we can acquire the concept of necessity through our experience. The
most likely way that we reach necessity is that we apply the concept of necessity seen in
analytic truths to synthetic ones. For example, we can see necessity in geometric truths like
Pythagoras’ theorem which we can then apply to synthetic propositions. This origin of
necessity seems more plausible than the innatist view that we are born with the concept.
