Essay
What are Final Causes?
- Module
- Aristotle
- Institution
- The University Of Warwick (UoW)
Essay of 4 pages for the course Aristotle at UoW
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University of WarwickDepartment of Philosophy
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Number of words ___1,814_____
Title of work___What are ‘Final Causes’? What is the Relation Between Final Causes and the rest of
Aristotle’s Four Causes?___________________________________________________
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, What are ‘Final Causes’? What is the Relation Between Final Causes and the rest of
Aristotle’s Four Causes?
In his Physics, Aristotle gives an account of causes, or ‘aitia’, which are meant to give
a complete explanation of something. When each of the causes are satisfied, then we have an
adequate explanation of the object in question, in which nothing fundamental to the object is
lacking. For instance, if one were to explain an exam but failed to mention that it involved
answering questions, one would have given an explanation that is lacking in some respect and
hence this explanation would result in incomplete knowledge about exams. Aristotle
discusses four such causes, one of which being referred to as the ‘final cause’, which
encompasses the broader idea of teleology, that things in nature have an aim or purpose. This
cause will be examined in detail, as well as whether Aristotle is justified in asserting that such
concept of an aim is present in objects in nature, and finally what relation it bears to his other
three causes. Overall, it will be seen that the idea of ‘final cause’ is best understood in
conjunction with at least one if not all of Aristotle’s other causes, and is justifiably based on
empirical evidence.
To put the idea of a ‘final cause’ in context, it is necessary to give an outline of
Aristotle’s theory of the four causes. For clarity, they will be illustrated through application to
a cup of coffee. The material cause is ‘that out of which as a constituent a thing comes to
be’1, meaning the matter which makes it up. For example, the material cause of a cup of
coffee would be the polystyrene from which the disposable cup is made up of, and the liquid
particles of the drink inside. The formal cause is ‘the account of what the being would be’2,
meaning what it is, in essence, to be the thing in question in the ideal sense. For example. The
formal cause of a cup of coffee would be a hollow, cylindrical shape with liquid inside. This
is in the ideal sense because cups of coffee may be imperfect in ways, such as the cup is
misshapen or has a hole in it, and so would not completely embody the formal cause and
essence of what it is to be a cup of coffee. The efficient cause is ‘the primary source of the
change, or the staying unchanged’3, meaning whatsoever it is that brings about that the object
is in the form that it is. For example, for the cup of coffee the man who manufactured the
polystyrene into a cup shape and the barrister who poured the coffee into the cup would be
the efficient causes as they are responsible for changing the basic matter so that it is arranged
in the form of a cup of coffee.
The ‘final cause’ is ‘what something is for’4, in the sense of an aim or a purpose. For
example, the cup of coffee has the purpose of quenching my thirst, or more practically of
keeping me awake during a tedious experience. This cause is linked to Aristotle’s teleology,
which is the theory that everything in nature has an end that it strives towards and that
changes it undergoes are directed at – a ‘telos’. For example the eyelashes have the end
purpose of protecting the eyes by preventing dust getting into them and damaging them, and
they aim at this telos through the change they undergo by growing to replace any that fall out.
It could be argued that there is a plain difference between this cause and the other three, in
that it requires greater justification. The other causes seem plain, empirically, in the sense that
it is relatively uncontentious that things which exist are made up of matter (material cause),
have been caused to be the way they are by something (efficient cause) and take a certain
1
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics, 194b, 23-26
2
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics, 194b, 26-29
3
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics, 194b, 29-33
4
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics 194b 33-195a 20
, form which enable us to identify them in the way that we do (formal cause). However, when
it comes to the final cause, it is arguably the case that Aristotle is introducing a new idea in
positing a final cause that is not apparent in objects, which therefore needs defending, namely
his teleology.
Aristotle needs to present a case for why his teleology is more plausible than the
materialist alternative - that an object can be understood in terms of the arrangement of its
atoms, and no more is required. This materialist view denies that there are inherent aims
which objects strive towards which must feature in a complete understanding of them. So of
the eyelashes, the materialist would state that they are atoms arranged in such a way that they
rest in thin strands above the eye in a slightly curved shape, not that it is part of being an
eyelash to aim at protecting the eye. They may happen to fulfil this function, but it is not part
of what it essentially is to be an eyelash that it aims at protecting the eye; all it is to be an
eyelash is to be atoms arranged in a certain way. The argument Aristotle gives to demonstrate
the necessity of the notion of a final cause in a full explanation of something can be
reconstructed thus;
1. Things in nature happen with regularity (‘all things which are due to nature, come to
be as they do always or for the most part’5)
2. Nothing which happens from luck or spontaneity happens with regularity (‘nothing
which is the outcome of luck or spontaneity does that’6)
3. Things in nature do not happen from luck or spontaneity (from 1 and 2)
4. Things either happen for something or they happen as a matter of luck
5. Therefore things in nature are for something (from 3 and 4)
The idea of things in nature being ‘for something’ is equated to the idea that they have a final
cause. The various claims made in this argument need defending. Premise 1 seems acceptable
as there are many occasions of regularity in nature, for example eyelashes regularly grow in a
curved shape above the eye as opposed to growing on the side of the eye or in a zig-zag
shape. Equally, it seems intuitive that premise 2 is correct, as the very idea of things
happening as a result of luck is that they happen randomly. If they happened with regularity
then we would not call them luck. For instance a pen being thrown onto the floor and landing
in the bin is a matter of luck when each of the other 10 times I’ve thrown pens in that general
direction have resulted in the pen landing on the floor. Whereas a case of 10 times of
throwing a pen but the result being that each time it landed in the bin (hence a regular result)
would not be called a case of luck, but a case of me aiming for the bin.
The potential problem with Aristotle’s argument lies in premise 5, the idea that things
happen either for something or as a matter of luck. It is from this he concludes that things in
nature must happen for something and hence have final causes, as he has excluded the
possibility that they happen as a matter of luck, so if the premise is flawed then so is his
conclusion. The problem with this premise is that Aristotle has not provided an argument for
why these are the only two options. Perhaps it could be the case that there is some third
option, or concept of things happening with some degree of luck. For example, that the pen
landed in the bin is partly due to my skill and intention of throwing it there, but there is also
luck involved in that I have correctly judged the angle of the throw, force with which I throw
it and any wind which might influence the throw. While this may not be an overwhelming
argument against premise 5, it is clear that Aristotle needs to defend this claim in order to
conclusively prove his conclusion that things in nature have final causes.
5
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics, 198b18-199a5
6
Aristotle and Ackrill, Physics, 198b18-199a5
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