“Armies were commanded by incompetent generals.” How far do you agree with this view
throughout the period 1792-1945?
There are many different ways in which you can assess generalship, we can divide the main areas
competency of into four categories; strategic decision, their tactic choices, how well they motivated
and engaged with their troops. Overall, I only partially agree with the statement, as although there
are many examples of incompetent generals throughout the period, there are equally as many
examples of highly competent generals that leave behind a huge legacy. For example, even
Napoleon who commanded as early as 1897 (his first Italian campaign,) who has had a hugely
influential effect on later wars becoming in effect a paradigm, for future generals, therefore I think it
is inaccurate to claim that all generals were incompetent. Instead I would that the generals across
the period have varying degrees of competency in regards to commanding.
Perhaps one of the most key areas that generals of history is often judged by, is their ability to use
great tactics. One of the most famous tacticians of the Napoleonic era was the Duke of Wellington,
who on two famous occasions beat Napoleons supposed formidable and unbeatable elite fighting
force. His signature tactic became holding behind ridges, we see this at both Vimarano in the
Peninsular war and at Waterloo where he retreats to this defensive position, allowing shelter from
cannon fire. This is an example of great competency as the duke had to go against the popular more
offensive tactics of the time, and get others to trust in his own ability as a general. Similarly, in the
American civil war Grant and Sherman had to look beyond the typical army v army tactics and
diversified to using more total war tactics. For example, Sherman’s march to the sea destroyed an
area of land in the south 60 miles wide and 40 long, which was not traditional combat, and
consequentially allowed him to gain an advantage over the supposedly tactically superior Robert E
Lee. However, there are equally many examples of poor tactical decisions that are evident
throughout the period, that support the statement. Haig, one of the most famous generals of world
war one, is often criticised for his failure to adapt his tactics to the new vast theatre of war. One of
his most famous blunders and examples of this was the Somme where despite previously falling, and
achieving very little by sending waves of men over the top, Haig continues to do so. Consequentially
costing the British army 600,000 casualties alone. Unlike Wellington, and Grant, Haig fails to adapt to
the new way of battle, taking him until 1918, the battle of Amines to develop any other tactics to
successfully weaken the German forces. Overall, I would argue that tactically speaking the focus is
on how well one can adapt to new theatres of war, not how genius and nuance the generals tactics.
As demonstrated by Lord Chelmsford in the Zulu war who although was decided to use different and
offensive tactics sending two thirds of his army to chase the Zulu’s, he underestimated his enemy in
both scale and tactically, not adapting and inevitably lost. Therefore, we cannot limit tactical
incompetence to more modern wars within the period, instead tactics have a huge part to play in
generals competency across the period, and their failures are generally due to inflexibility.
Strategical decision making is an area that I would argue generals perhaps don’t gain as much credit
for, or indeed when generals fail strategically it less widely accepted. For example, Napoleon and Lee
were tactically far superior to their opponents however they were let down by their overambitious
strategies. The importance of a solid strategy increases throughout the period for a general, as by
world war one they are fighting on more than one front, with huge armies, thus strategy becomes a
integral part of judging whether a general is competent. Towards the end of the Napoleonic era,
after his return from his exile in Elba, Napoleon begins to take on larger opponents. At Waterloo he
faced the combined force of the British and the Prussian army. He is fighting a war agenised the
whole of the 6th coalition (Prussia Britain, Austria, Russia, Spain and Sweden,) when he had
previously he had only taken on one nation at a time, and strategically speaking aiming to concur six
