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Can moral anti realism be defended?

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debates criticisms and responses of anti realism

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  • April 3, 2022
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  • 2021/2022
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Can moral anti-realism be defended? (25 marks)

Anti-realism holds the view that there are no mind-independent moral properties/facts. Put simply,
it is the denial of realism. Anti-realist theories differ in whether they are cognitivist or non-
cognitivist, which determines if moral language is able to express beliefs and describe reality. When
applied to ethical language, this determines whether the ethical language we use such as ‘right’ and
‘wrong’ are even properties that exist. For example, according to anti-realists the statement ‘murder
is wrong’ refers to moral properties which do not exist. In this essay I will argue that moral anti-
realism is not successful because it contradicts a widely accepted belief of moral progress.

Emotivism holds the view that moral judgements are expressions of emotion. Ayer’s theory is anti-
realist and non-cognitivist, meaning moral statements are unable to describe reality and moral
truths don’t exist. We use moral language to express feelings of approval or disapproval rather than
to state moral facts. To say ‘murder is wrong’ is really to say ‘Boo! Murder!,’ not that murder has the
real property of wrongness. Ayer’s verificationism argues for non-cognitivism, and therefore
emotivism. Language is meaningful if and only if (iff) it is analytically (e.g. a triangle has 3 sides) or
empirically (e.g. water boils at 100C) verifiable. Moral judgements meet neither of these
requirements, therefore moral language is meaningless. Since all non-cognitivist theories are anti-
realist, emotivism is in this category too.

A criticism of anti realism, and most suited to emotivism, is whether it can adequately explain how
we use moral language. This means to ask if emotivism misunderstands what people aim to do when
they use moral language. When people use moral language, they intend to state the truth. In saying
‘murder is wrong’ I’m not aiming to say ‘boo murder’ but instead I believe that it is true. Emotivism
cannot account for this intention.

Ayer responds to this criticism by arguing that people are wrong about their use of moral language.
We really mean to express attitudes, not truths, as his VP states. Moral language is merely about our
own attitudes.

Ayer’s defence of emotivism consists of reiterating his supporting arguments, which would suggest
that this version of anti realism cannot be defended. Emotivism’s description of moral language is
much too narrow. Prescriptivism, however, is better able to explain how we use moral language.

Prescriptivism claims moral judgements express non-cognitive instructions that aim to guide
behaviour. According to prescriptivism, when someone says ‘murder is wrong’ they actually mean to
say ‘don’t murder.’ Giving an instruction does not equivalate to expressing a belief which may or
may not be true or false. This explains why prescriptivism is a non-cognitive theory. This description
of our use of moral language is less rigid than the one given by emotivism, hence why prescriptivism
is better able to defend anti realism. It is agreeable that when we make moral statements, we
prescribe our feelings on that certain act. This then expresses whether we think its morally good or
not.

A substantial criticism of prescriptivism would be that it leads to moral nihilism – the rejection of any
moral values. Both emotivism and prescriptivism want to hold onto the idea of moral values but
claims they are not mind independent. However, a nihilist would claim this is not possible. Nihilists
conclude that if there are no objective values then morality should be abandoned, since nothing is
morally wrong or right.

A prescriptivist could acknowledge that nihilism could be logically consistent with the theory so long
as the nihilist rejects all moral judgements. Hare believes that the risk of nihilism is small since

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