Q. To what extent did the fundamental laws of 1906 change Russian government more then any other
event 1855-1917?
The period of 1855-1917 certainly saw the Russian state and government undergo a deep and profound
change, Russia transformed from a backward country, held in state of medieval decay by an outdated
social system to the world’s sixth largest industrial power by 1914, before the Great War would bring
even greater governmental and societal upheaval. But what caused such change, can it be explained by
the oppressive policies of successive tsars such as the fundamental laws of 1906 and Alexander III’s
statute of state security in 1881, or did it change more owing to reforming legislation such as the
zemstva act of 1864 and the October manifesto of 1905- or can it be explained by a reason completely
distinct from the rulers of the government themselves, in the form of war and opposition?
A fairly strong case could be made for asserting that the fundamental laws, which Nicholas II imposed in
April 1906 did much to change the nature of Russian government. The edict was a reactionary one, it
reimposed Nicolas’ autocratic power, permitting him to rule by decree and to close the Duma at any
time owing only to his own personal will. The act was so pertinent as it completely transformed what
the duma could have become, in the eyes of the Octoberists and Kadets, their sacred duma was meant
to be the first chance for Russia to have a truly representative body, it was seen by the Kadets and the
westernizers as the first step for Russia on the road to becoming a more liberal and more western
constitutional monarchy. Yet with one small edict, all of this was undone. The fundamental laws took
away much of the power of the Duma and rehabilitated the tsar to full autocratic power. The liberals
despaired, Russia’s chance at western-style parliamentary government had just been severely diluted, if
not completely crushed by the might of the autocracy. What this shows is how important the
fundamental laws were in changing the nature of Russian government.
A good case can be made for other repressive and reactionary measures, which, it could be argued, had
a greater impact on the nature of government then the fundamental laws, herein I refer to the statue of
state security, which was imposed by Alexander III in 1881 and was followed by his ‘manifesto of
unshakable autocracy’ and his rejection of the loris melinkov proposals, all within a few weeks of his
coming to the throne. With this trimurti of measures the new tsar reiterated his autocratic powers and
fundamental commitment to the doctrine of orthodoxy, nationality and autocracy. In the statute of
state security, the powers of the secret police (the okhrana) were greatly expanded, giving them the
power to arrest, question, imprison and exile anyone they thought could have committed a crime or was
possibly associated with someone criminal. This bred an atmosphere of immense fear and did much to
quash any potential opposition and revolutionary activity. The loris melinkov proposals were accepted
by Alexander II near to the end of his life and looked at setting up an advisory body of civilians that
would have had some say in government- the first action that Alexander III took as tsar was to abandon
this proposal. That said, his actions did not really transform government, or at least not to the extent
that the fundamental laws had, this was because they did not actually change much, the secret police
had been active under alexander II too and the loris melinkov proposals had never actually been
introduced, so, whilst on the surface such actions may have looked transformative, all they really did
was emphasize the position of the tsar and the strength of the autocracy, they did not really change the
nature of government.
But what of reforming legislation, could examples of this not be posited as changing the nature of
government more then the fundamental laws? One example of reformist legislation is undeniably the
1864 zemstva act, which was introduced as part of alexander II’s spate of reforms owing to the
realization that Russia would never equal the west unless it began to move forward, not just