Jessica Miners
The central criterion of the Cold War can be traced back to ideology. American foreign
policy became focused on economic gain and ideological expansion. As a result, the USSR
had a need for security and Stalin’s paranoia grew. This was exacerbated by America’s
attempt to hide the atomic bomb which suggests issues within the Grand Alliance. America’s
superior military and economic power led to a reluctance to compromise. Both sides
prioritised domestic security interests and consequently tensions mounted regarding the
Soviet sphere of influence and American domination in Japan. In short, America held an
atomic monopoly and was intent on dominating the global economy post-1945, a position
that threatened Soviet security.
The historian Alperovitz agrees that “the bomb was used not because there were no
alternatives, but precisely because American policy makers wished to avoid the political
consequences of these alternatives”1. Similarly, Williams argues that it was American “Dollar
Imperialism” - which is the use of economic aid for control – underpinned by extreme
ideological differences, that caused the most tension in the Cold War. This was emphasised
by the USSR’s weakened economy compared to America’s booming one. He says that
“Americans assumed a posture of moral and ideological superiority at an early date.” 2. Thus,
economic expansion was accelerated by their atomic monopoly and American superiority
contributed to the breakdown in international relations. Therefore, it is American ideology
that started the Cold War as it was this criterion which drove economic expansion, and
which caused Stalin to attempt to protect the Soviet state.
Gellately, the author of ‘Stalin’s Curse’, disagrees, and instead believes that it was Russian
hostility, and Stalin’s confrontational personality, that caused not only the Cold War but the
USA’s attitudes and actions throughout negotiations. He believed that Stalin’s “preference
was to continue the wartime alliance, to milk it for all it was worth, while at the same time
planting regimes to his liking wherever the Red Army went” 3. This argument is weakened by
failing to consider American expansion pre- and post-1945. The USSR’s need for ideological
expansion was caused by security issues rather than purposeful hostility. Stalin sought to
compromise with Roosevelt, however this became problematic after Yalta due to American
foreign policy. Therefore, blame should be placed on America rather than Russia.
Alperovitz blames America’s attitude being focused on atomic power rather than genuine
cooperation and compromise. This reflects historical debate at the time Alperovitz was
writing as being focused on criticism of American foreign policy, illustrating that the context
in which sources are written can influence the interpretation they present. On the first page
of Alperovitz’s book ‘Atomic Diplomacy’ he says that “the atomic bomb had a very
significant influence on American views of diplomacy towards the Soviet Union” 4. He
continues, “the weapon was inextricably bound up with President Harry S. Truman’s
1
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 158
2
Williams, W. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland and New York: World
Publishing Company, 1959) p. 84
3
Gellately, R. Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (Vintage, 2013) p.
23
4
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 1
1
, Jessica Miners
strategy towards his Potsdam meeting with Stalin”4. This atomic monopoly forced Stalin to
prioritise security in the face of a nuclear armed America, with a booming economy and an
anti-communist president. The arguments raised by Alperovitz strongly assign responsibility
to America for the Cold War, as evidenced when looking at the historical context of the July
1945 Potsdam meeting.
Tensions rose when, with the war over, the Big Three (USA, UK, and USSR) no longer had a
common adversary to work against. Potsdam also came with the challenge of new leaders
with different opinions. It saw the introduction of Attlee (after July 26 th) and Truman, and it’s
Truman who Alperovitz focuses on as an aggressor of the Cold War whose focus was on
“eliminating Soviet influence from Europe”5. Similarly, Robert McMahon says that “Truman
proved more willing than his predecessor to accept the recommendation of hard-line
advisers that getting tough with the Russians would help Americans achieve what they
wanted.”6 This leadership change had far reaching impacts on Cold War diplomacy and was
likely a central criterion for Stalin’s hostility. Truman even said that if the Russians didn’t
cooperate “they could go to hell”7.
Furthermore, there were pressing issues at Potsdam, namely that of the division of
Germany and Poland as well as the war with Japan. In ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy’,
Williams recognises that “Stalin arrived in Potsdam with a noticeably different set of
priorities”8 to those of America and the UK. The USSR suffered ~ 27 million casualties
throughout World War II. A quarter of its pre-war physical assets were lost whilst millions
suffered from famine and disease. Consequently, Stalin sought massive economic and land
reparations but “America was not interested in reparations for anybody” 9 unless their
ideological outlooks fitted within American aims for the World post-1945. This was due to
fears of poverty causing communism to flourish, just as the harsh Treaty of Versailles in
1919 contributed to the rise of Nazism, but also due to the strategic catastrophe that a
communist Germany in the heart of Europe would create. Therefore, Truman saw the
reconstruction of Germany as vital to American economic ambitions and was consequently
unwilling to allow any USSR influence within Europe.
Gellately believed that Truman had no “hidden agenda” and “wanted to get along with
Moscow as much as anyone else”10, but this is a limited analysis. Although Gellately holds
the viewpoint that Truman was fair to the USSR, witnesses such as Fleet Admiral Leahy said
Truman aimed “to take the offensive”11. At the Potsdam conference there is evidence of
Alperovitz’s ideas including ideological differences and the influence of a hostile individual.
5
ibid. p.63
6
McMahon, R. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003) p. 22
7
Taken from Bohlen’s notes - Truman, S. Year of Decisions (Doubleday & Company, 1955) p.
77
8
Williams, W. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland and New York: World
Publishing Company, 1959) p. 293
9
Alperovitz, G. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965) p. 210
10
Gellately, R. Stalin's Curse: Battling for Communism in War and Cold War (Vintage, 2013) p.
171
2
