Criminal Legal Cases
Ch 1 Actus Reus
R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 CA
- But for test and causation
- White wanted to kill his mother and so he put poison in her night-time drink. The
mother was found dead the next morning, but from a heart attack rather than the
poison. Therefore, White was acquitted of murder as she still would’ve died without
his actions, but he was found guilty of attempted murder
Hughes [2013] UKSC 36 - Legal Causation (blameworthy cause)
- The court held that the defendant’s actions couldn’t be held as a blameworthy cause
of death as the victim was high and driving on the wrong side of the road
Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273 - Legal Causation
Rafferty [2007] EWCA Crim 1846 - D’s actions must be an operative cause
Mackie [1973] 57 Cr App R 453 - V’s acts as a foreseeable result
Dear [1996] Crim LR 595 - V’s acts as a foreseeable result - chain of causation
- Acid attack, then victim took to Belgium and legally ended his life.
- The judge ruled that the victim and doctor’s acts broke the chain of causation
- However, this was overruled by the court of appeal, and they said that the decision
to end his life was a foreseeable reaction by the victim to the defendants’ acts.
- Therefore the defendant who caused the acid attack caused the death.
- [Note this was in mid 2010s when acid attacks were gaining a lot of attention in
media so this, as well as horrific injuries, may be why the court of appeal allowed
retrial].
Hayward (1908) 21 Cox CC 692 - established eggshell skull principle
Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411 - D must accept V as they find them
Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 - “palpably wrong treatment” was found to have broken the
chain of causation
- Doctors gave victim a drug he was allergic too when he was almost fully healed and
then, after taking him off the drug, another doctor gave him the same drug again,
causing an allergic reaction and death.
Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 - medical treatment did NOT break chain of causation. “thoroughly
bad” treatment per Lord Parker CJ at p42
Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670 - the “complication was a direct consequence of the appellant’s
acts which remained a significant cause of death” per Beldham LJ at p852
Michael (1840) 9 C&P 356 - shows how third-party is not always medical treatment.
Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670 - if multiple causes, D’s acts do not need to be the sole/main
cause of death, it is sufficient that his acts contributed significantly to that result.
Warburton [2006] EWCA Crim 627 - not sole cause of death but significant factor in the
chain of events that led to V’s death
- Case involved 2 defendants who both admitted to taking part in the assault but
denied causing anything more than minor injuries and therefore not the death.
- Despite this, the court found that they were both liable for the victim’s death as it
was immaterial whether they had participated into forcing the victim into the bin.
- Nor was it material that the injuries inflicted by the defendants were minor
- Their actions alone were not the sole cause of death, but they both contributed to a
significant factor in the chain of events that led to the victim’s death, and so were
liable.
,Ch 1 - Mens Rea
Hales [2005] EWCA Crim 1118 - intention
- The court accepted that the defendant’s motive was not to kill the officer, however
he was prepared to kill in order to escape. As the result, the court held that he did
have the intention to kill, as intention is broader than motive.
Maloney [1985] AC 905 - being able to foresee harm to the victim is not enough for
intention
- He was sentenced to murder as he did aim at the victim, but this was acquitted by
the Lords as his foresight in his drunken state was not enough for intention.
- The good relationship between the victim and defendant (father and son) was also
considered.
Hancock and Shakland [1985] AC 455: per Lord Scarman ‘foresight does not necessarily
imply the existence of intention’.
Woollin [1999] AC 82 - oblique intention and the test for oblique intention (case written out
in notes)
Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 (CA) - applied a subjective test of recklessness which asks ‘did
the defendant foresee a risk that his actions would cause the AR of the relevant offence?’
- As such, liability for offences involving recklessness was based on D’s foresight of the
consequences of his actions
- In the case, D fractured a gas pipe during an attempt to steal money from the meter.
This caused he gas to leak into an adjoining property where it was inhaled by the
woman sleeping there, endangering her life.
- He was charged under s23 of the OAPA 1861 for maliciously administering a noxious
substance. The issue in this case was the correct interpretation of the word
‘maliciously’
- It was held that ‘maliciously’ meant foresight of consequences, so an offence that
requires maliciousness requires either that D intended the consequences or foresaw
the consequences and recklessly took the risk that it would occur
Caldwell [1982] AC 341 (HL) - formulated an objective test of recklessness
- D set fire to a hotel whilst he was drunk, as revenge for being fired. He was charged
with arson with intent to endanger life or being reckless as to whether life was
endangered.
- The HoLs held that failure to recognise an obvious risk was just as culpable of
recognising the risk and deciding to take it and so created a test for recklessness
based on the objective standards of a reasonable man
- A person would be reckless if (1) he created an obvious risk that property would be
destroyed or damaged and (2) he recognised that risk and went on to take it
(advertent recklessness) or failed to recognise that risk (inadvertent recklessness).
- This test was criticised as it would allow someone who had not foreseen a risk of
harm to nevertheless be liable if the risk was obvious to a reasonable person
- Overruled in R v G
R v G [2004] 1 AC 1034 (HL) - Replaced Caldwell with a test of subjective recklessness that
provides that a person acts recklessly when he is aware that a risk exists and it is, in the
circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take that risk.
- This removes the uncompromising objective standard and replaces it with a test that
requires D to recognise that a risk exists.
, - There is still an element of objective evaluation involved but it only comes into play if
D is aware of a risk.
- A defendant who is not able to recognise a risk cannot be said to have acted
recklessly
Stephenson [1979] QB 695 - defendant’s perception of risk does not need to be reasonable
- The defendant did not foresee a risk due to his schizophrenia and, therefore, could
not have the mens rea of recklessness
Brady [2006] EWCA Crim 2413 - the size of risk is irrelevant
- Even though there may not have been foresight of a major risk, there was still a
smaller risk of him falling off the dance floor
Parker [1977] 1 WLR 600 - how carefully the defendant considers this risk is also irrelevant.
- The defendant lost his temper and, even though he argued that his anger stopped
him from being able to consider risk, the court ruled that at the moment of
slamming down the phone there must have been at least some flash of realisation
that his actions were causing criminal damage.
Ch 2 - Murder, Transferred Malice + Correspondence Principle
MURDER
Adebolajo and another [2014] EWCA Crim 2779 - AR of ‘Under the King’s peace’
- Not found guilty of murder, as a result of British foreign policy, as they were fighting
in the war
Poulton (1832) 3 C & P 329 - AR ‘Of a person’ - Foetuses cannot be murdered
- Not ‘fully expelled from the womb’
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 All ER 10
Cunningham [1982] AC 566 - MR needs intent to kill
- Lord Edmund-Davies (dissenting): ‘there should be no conviction for murder unless
an intent to kill is established’
TRANSFERRED MALICE
Latimer (1886) 17 QBD 359
Pembliton (1874) LR 2CCR 119 - MR must be in the same category of the offence.
- D’s MR was to hurt the men, but the AR was for criminal damage. Thus, there was no
transferred malice, and they were considered separate offences.
Mitchell [1983] QB 741 - Transferred malice between 2 offences because the intended
offence is within the broad category of offences, so it’s a similar offence.
- D fights a man at a post office and pushes him and he falls onto an elderly lady in the
queue who sustains injuries and dies.
- Because the defendant intended a non-fatal offence against the intended victim, he
was held liable for the manslaughter of the victim.
- Mitchell intended to hurt a person and therefore was liable when that intended
harm caused death to a different person.
A-G Ref (No 3 of 1994) [1996] 2 All ER 10 - there cannot be double transferred malice.
- D intended GBH to his girlfriend who did not die but gave birth to a premature child
who subsequently died.
- Problem is that a foetus is not a person for the purposes of murder, therefore the
transferred MR would have been transferred from GF, to her unborn child, to the
legal person that her foetus would become when they were born
, - Therefore, transferred malice couldn’t happen as there were too many steps.
COINCIDENCE PRINCIPLE
Fagan [1969] 1 QB 439 - affirmed the Single Continuing Act
- Fagan drove over the policeman’s foot (AR)– hurting V’s foot (battery) – and then
refused to drive off policeman’s foot (MR). Therefore, AR was accidental and
therefore did not coincide with MR.
- The Court upheld Fagan’s conviction ruling that the act of driving over the victim’s
foot was a single continuing act, and therefore the actus reus continued until the
time that the mens rea occurred, and therefore they could coincide
Thabo-Meli [1954] 1 WLR 228 - The Single Transaction approach
- D planned to kill V with 3 others.
- In order to try make this look like an accident they hit V over the head and threw him
off a cliff, believing him to be dead. The victim did not die of the blow to the head,
but instead died of exposure as he lay at the bottom of the cliff.
- D appealed against their conviction for murder on the basis that the AR (which
occurred with the blow to the head), did not coincide with the mens rea (when V
died of exposure).
- The court, however, ruled that the actions of the Ds formed a single transaction,
whereby the time of the mens rea was formed indivisible from when the actus reus
was triggered.
- The court was heavily influenced by the fact that D’s actions were premeditated
Church [1966] 1 QB 59 - ST without a pre-meditated plan
- The defendant knocked a victim over the head and, thinking he had killed her,
dragged her body into a river and, as a result, the victim drowned.
- The court upheld his conviction as, although there was no general plan to kill the
victim, the actus reus (causing the victim to drown) and the mens rea of hitting the
victim, were linked and therefore his actions could be seen as a single transaction.
- Therefore, the acts were a single transaction even though there was no
preconceived plan to commit the actus reus.
Le Brun [1992] QB 61 - ST for an offence beyond murder
- Court upheld conviction as the defendant’s actions were both of the same type and
therefore could be seen as a single transaction.
- D formed the MR for a manslaughter offence when he hit the victim, and the
established the actus reus elements when he moved her unconscious body
- Therefore, Single Transaction approach can be used for an offence beyond murder
OBLIQUE INTENTION
Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103 - established ‘virtually certain’ oblique intention test.
Ch 3 - Voluntary Manslaughter - LOSC
Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 414
- D killed V, a workmate, after an extended period of perceived intimidation by V.
- D gave evidence that he was unable to sleep in the preceding days and was gradually
‘shutting down’ before he acted to kill, describing his final acts as having been done
in a ‘dream-like’ state. D was charged with murder.
- Court of Appeal: conviction upheld on appeal. The planning that preceded the killing
undermined a claim of LOSC
