In this essay, I will strongly argue that idealism, the view that all that exists are minds and
their ideas, is false. I will discuss and reject Berkeley’s likeness principle and master
argument, instead concluding that the problems with idealism, such as solipsism and the
issues with the role of God, make it an unconvincing view of perception.
Berkeley’s idealism rejects the existence of a mind-independent external world (realism) and
instead argues that all we perceive are mind-dependent ideas (this is what reality is). In this
way, the immediate objects of perception (i.e. ordinary objects such as tables and chairs) are
mind-dependent objects. Berkeley summarises this view in the phrase “esse est percipi” (to
be is to be perceived) meaning that in order for something to exist, it must be perceived. In
the same way, if something is not being perceived, it cannot exist. I would immediately
contend that this argument that reality is wholly in the mind will create several weakness for
Berkeley because not only does it go against our common-sense, but it cannot explain why
all our perceptions unequivocally must be mind-dependent or prove that the existence of
mind-independent objects is impossible.
It could be argued that Berkeley’s likeness principle, which underscores his idealism,
provides good reason for us to believe in his theory. Berkeley tries to prove that everything
we perceive must be mind-dependent by rejecting Locke’s distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. He instead argues that both primary and secondary qualities are
mind-dependent and, since everything we perceive is either a primary or secondary quality,
everything we perceive must be mind-dependent. This implies that there is no such thing as
a mind-independent external world, meaning that if we removed the perceived properties
from an object, then it would cease to exist. Thus, idealism, in rejecting the existence of what
the indirect realist terms “material matter”, avoids the problems of causation. Since an object
is simply a collection of ideas or sense impressions, idealism does not need to explain how
material objects in the external world can cause immaterial objects in our minds, because
there are only immaterial objects.
Berkeley’s master argument is key in his proof of idealism, as it suggests that the very idea
of a mind-independent object is contradictory and so inconceivable. This argument appears
in ‘Three Dialogues’ as a discussion between Philonous and Hylas. In the dialogue,
Philonous asks us to “try and think of an object that exists independently of being perceived”
and Hylas responds that he is “thinking of a tree that is not being perceived by anyone”.
Philonous claims that this is impossible to do because whenever we try to think of an
unperceived and mind-independent object, we are perceiving it in our minds. For example,
our unperceived tree is still being conceived in our minds, and if it is in our minds, then it is
not a tree independent of any mind at all. Therefore, some people may argue that Berkeley’s
master argument suggests that idealism is convincing because it is logical and sensible to
say that we should be able to conceive of and explain everything that we account for.
Nonetheless, I disagree and argue that Berkeley’s master argument is not convincing,
meaning idealism cannot be true. In line with Bertrand Russell’s response to Berkeley’s
idealism, I believe that Berkeley is conflating the existence of mind-independent objects with
our ability to conceive of them. Simply put, he is confusing the idea of an object with the
subject of an idea (the object itself). Russell does acknowledge that Berkeley is correct to
say that when we conceive of a mind-independent object, the idea of it exists in our minds
(ideas obviously require a mind being present in order for them to exist). However, just
