'The concept of God is incoherent' (25).
The three main monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) typically agree that
God, as a perfect being, has the following four divine attributes: omnipotence, omniscience,
omnibenevolence, and either eternal or everlasting. In this essay, I will argue that the
concept of God, entailing these divine attributes, is coherent. Not only will I combat any
attacks against the attribute of God’s omnipotence, as seen in the problem of the stone, but I
will also defend the omnibenevolence and omniscience of God against issues such as the
Euthyphro dilemma and the free will vs omniscience paradox.
There are many interpretations of God’s omnipotence, but the term is commonly taken to
mean ‘all-powerful’. This interpretation argues that God can do anything - God is imagined to
be perfectly powerful and it is not possible for there to exist a being with more power than
God as He is the most powerful being possible. This means that there are no limits to God's
power. However, if we are to take this definition, it could be argued that the concept of an
omnipotent being is self-contradictory. The paradox of the stone argument tries to prove this
by asking the question: if God is omnipotent, can He create a stone so heavy He can't lift it?
If God can create such a stone then there is something that God cannot do (namely, lift the
stone) and so God is not omnipotent. However, if God cannot create such a stone then there
is still something that God cannot do (namely, create this stone) and so God is still not
omnipotent. Philosophers like J.L. Mackie argue that this shows that the concept of
omnipotence cannot coherently or meaningfully be ascribed to God. This example leads us
to the broader question of whether an omnipotent being can use its powers to do something
that will limit its own power. If God can’t use its powers to do this, then God is not
omnipotent; if God can use its powers to do this, then God’s powers will be limited and God
is not omnipotent. Either option seems to reveal a contradiction within the concept of
omnipotence. Therefore, since God contains within it the concept of omnipotence (itself
incoherent) then the concept of God is also incoherent.
Nonetheless, I strongly believe that the paradox of the stone argument cannot be seen as
being successful in undermining the coherence of God’s omnipotence. George Mavrodes
argues, and I agree, that this paradox, when properly analysed, reveals the incoherence of
the task set rather than incoherence of the term 'omnipotence'. The idea of "a stone an
omnipotent being cannot lift" is a contradiction. He argues that if we assume God is not
omnipotent, it is trivially true that God cannot do certain things (such as lift or create certain
stones). If we assume that God is omnipotent, the question of the stone should be properly
phrased as 'can a being whose power is sufficient to lift anything create a stone which
cannot be lifted by that being?'. Mavrodes’ interpretation of God's omnipotence recognises
that it is not a real limitation on God’s power to say God can’t do what is logically impossible
because what is logically impossible is meaningless. Since the task of the stone is a
self-contradictory task, and therefore a logically impossible task, the paradox disappears. In
this way, I contend that the attribute of omnipotence becomes fully coherent when
understood as the claim that God can do anything that is logically possible. I would argue
that this redefinition avoids the problems of the first definition (and therefore the problem of
the paradox of the stone) and it isn't a real limitation on God's power - what is logically
impossible isn't anything at all, it is meaningless. So, even if we say God can't do what is
logically impossible (something that contains a contradiction) this isn't any real limitation on
God's power - he would still be omnipotent.